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A b s t r a c t
The thesis deals with several aspects of the impact of informed speculation on 
financial markets. It consists of four chapters.
Chapter 1 gives a general discussion of the welfare effects of insider trading, and 
investigates whether insider trading should be prohibited. The following chapters 
are concerned with more specific questions of the organisation and regulation of 
financial markets.
Chapter 2 investigates the performance of dealership markets in the presence of 
informed speculation. It is shown that informed trading creates externalities which 
might render markets with several competing market makers less liquid than a 
market with a monopolist specialist.
Chapter 3 deals with a different effect of insider trading on secondary markets. 
It is argued that insider trading influences the allocation of risk between different 
classes of investors. The premature resolution of uncertainty due to insider trading 
makes prices more volatile and more informative. The effects of these two opposed 
effects on ex-ante investment are ambiguous: both more and less investment may 
occur.
Chapter 4 investigates a dynamic asset pricing model with informed speculation 
and noise trading. The properties of the steady state equilibria in a overlapping 
generations economy with infinite horizon are characterized. It is shown that noise 
trading leads to feedback effects of the kind that expectations of a high price 
volatility become self-stabilizing. The effects of asymmetric information and the 
early release of information are discussed and related to the results of the preceding 
chapters.
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C h a p t e r  l
S h o u l d  i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  b e  p r o h i b i t e d ?
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1. Introduction.
The starting point of most discussions on insider trading is "fairness” . Probably to 
most people it appears rather unjust that some speculators are able to earn profits 
at the expense of others who just happen to know less about the asset in question. 
This assessment is quite similar to our attitude towards say a seller of used cars 
hiding to possible buyers a past accident of the car. Still, there are important 
economic differences between a market for used cars and financial markets. The 
market for used cars is a well defined market in which the desires and needs of 
buyers and sellers are relatively clear. Financial markets, however, perform a very 
complex task for the whole economy: the allocation of investments among the 
different sectors of an economy, the allocation of risks between different classes 
of agents, and consumption smoothing of consumers over time. An analysis of 
the impact of insider trading on the performance of the financial markets should 
therefore help us to determine the scope of the fairness argument.
Among the main arguments against insider trading one can distinguish two main 
lines of reasoning which differ considerably in the definition of behaviour considered 
to be insider trading. The first, more restrictive argument defines insider trading 
as a breach of fiduciary duty or at least a breach of trust and confidence. In the 
modern capitalist economy with its prevalence of the separation of ownership and 
management, fiduciary duty of the managers is considered to be the basic guaranty 
of the functioning of this economy by creating the "right” incentive structure. The 
profits at the expense of their shareholders realized by managers who deal on 
the basis of information which they have obtained through their position, are 
considered to arise from an illegitimate breach of the relation of fiduciary duty 
which links managers to their shareholders.
A second, less restrictive line of reasoning objects to any form of trading on the 
basis of differentials in information, regardless whether the traders are in a relation 
of fiduciary duty or not. Apart from the violation of fairness among shareholders 
with equal rights, it is argued that unrestricted insider trading will lead to a
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breakdown of capital markets which are unable to perform their role efficiently. 
Outside investors, afraid of being exploited in the future by better informed traders 
will not invest in markets characterized by an intensive insider activity. Moreover, 
it is argued that unrestricted possibilities of insider trading will induce too much 
costly information acquisition, since private and social benefits of information will 
in general not coincide.
These arguments have led most industrialized countries to adopt a more or less 
severe insider legislation, the most notorious exception until now being West Ger­
many. According to the above arguments they differ mainly in the scope of their 
definition of an insider. However, starting from Manne’s influential book on inside 
trading (Manne(1966)), the academic literature brought forward some arguments 
against the common firm stance concerning inside trading. Against the fiduciary 
duty argument, Manne argued that the problem between managers and sharehold­
ers is not so much that managers actively try to follow strategies designed to harm 
their shareholders. For him the major drawback of the separation of ownership and 
control is rather that managers tend to pursue policies which are less dynamic and 
innovative than the ones an independent entrepreneur would choose. Manne’s ar­
gument is that the possibility of insider trading just creates the right incentives for 
managers, i.e., the incentives of an independent entrepreneur. Against the other 
arguments that unrestricted insider trading leads to a market breakdown and a 
waste of resources, Manne claims that the prohibition of insider trading prevents 
prices from reflecting all available information and thus does not allow the capital 
markets to perform efficiently their role as an allocation mechanism of capital.
Before looking more closely at these arguments1, it will be useful to give a more 
precise meaning to the term insider trading. In the public discussion the term is 
often reserved for "classic” insider trading, i.e., trading of speculators who possess 
certainty about specific fundamental events which would become public shortly 
afterwards, and deal on this information. In practice things are a bit more com­
plicated: There are several degrees and manners of inside information, and there
1A n  in terestin g  agnostic  v iew p o in t  is to ignore the co n ten ts  o f the  d eb a te  a lto ge th er .  H addock  
and M ac ey  (1987) follow a public-choice  approach to  ch aracterise  the  current insider leg is la tion  
only in term s of the  ou tco m e  of an clash of interests  b etw een  different in terest  groups.
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are also different participants in the business of acquiring and marketing 
information1; it is actually far from obvious how to define "real” insider trading.
On the most elementary level a certain sophistication with the working of the stock 
markets, the interpretation of balance sheets, the understanding of the impact 
of new developments in a certain industry etc. is required to transform readily 
available news into valuable bits of information. Analysts of brokers and banks, 
but also participants in the industry will possess this sophistication. They will in 
general both trade on this information and resell it to outside customers. With 
a certain time lag the results of this news processing will also be available to a 
general public through the financial newspapers. In general this information will 
not cause dramatic price changes and profit possibilities; nevertheless it is this 
information procession which is the basis of the every-day movements at a stock 
exchange. A whole industry is trying to get news, interpret the news and transmit 
the news with the only aim to do that a bit faster and more precisely than the 
others, and to earn a -limited- profit on this advance.
A more sophisticated level of information concerns news, whose impact depend less 
on a able and thorough interpretation of readily available facts, but will rather lead 
to unambiguous drastic revaluations of a certain stock. This information contains 
for example knowledge (or at least the probability) of future changes in the regula­
tory conditions of a certain market, of new inventions or discoveries, of unexpect­
edly high profits or losses, future take-overs and the like. This kind of news will be 
in general only available to the corporate insiders, i.e., to the managers themselves, 
advising financial institutions and to some extent the analysts performing primary 
research for brokers and banks. This kind of news differs from the one of the pre­
ceding paragraph only in two respects. First, the assessment of its impact does 
not require a technical analysis, and second, it has more dramatic consequences.
I.e., at the same time they are both cheaper and more important, and this from 
a social and from a private point of view. However, in principle they do not differ 
from the kind of additional information acquired on a less sophisticated level.
If we consider the major players on stock exchanges we would come to a broad
1A nice d iscu ss ion  of these differences can be found in M a n n e  (19 66 ) .
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classification of information degrees consisting of outside investors - financial indus­
try - corporate insiders. This classification is however rather crude. The knowledge 
of large institutional investors will in general be comparable to the financial in­
dustry. Continental and Japanese banks are at the same time active in primary 
research and acquire through their direct supervision facilities inside knowledge of 
firms which is comparable to a corporate insider. It is indeed the bank dominated 
financial systems, which give a particular good example how fragile the common 
distinction between ”true” inside trading and research is.1 It is more than unclear 
how tight the famous Chinese Walls can be in reality. Still another problem is 
posed by a potential raider in a merger or hostile take-over contest. At the same 
time, he does research (on the target firm), he is a corporate insider (in relation 
to his own actions), and in general he is also selling his own managerial abilities 
to the target firm.
For our discussion it will be furthermore useful to distinguish between the two 
major roles of capital markets in the investment process. First, they coordinate 
both directly and indirectly the allocation of new real capital among different 
firms. The direct way would be through the issue of new shares; a procedure whose 
importance has significantly declined in recent years. The indirect influence is given 
by the implicit determination of the necessary rates of returns for internal financing 
of new investments both of listed and unlisted companies.2 Second, capital markets 
organize the reallocation of already existing real capital in a different production 
context (through hostile or friendly mergers). Our discussion will mainly focus on 
the paradigm case of new investments, but many of the arguments have general 
validity.
1K a y (1 9 8 8 )  d is t in gu ish es  betw een insiders and quasi-ins iders. In particu lar  in a cou ntry  like W est-  
G erm an y  there  is an oth er ,  even more severe problem w ith  the  ac t iv it ie s  o f  b an k s.  D u e  to  the  close  
links to the  firms, the  resp. d om in a n t  bank  will in general o b ta in  new firm-specific inform ation  
earlier th an  th e  o th er  creditors. P rem atu re  cance lla t ion  o f  a credit  has th e  sa m e  effects on the  
other  creditors as insider trading on stock m arkets  on th e  o th er  sh areholders. In our d iscussion  
we will con cen tra te  on insider trading on stock  m arkets .  T h e  p rob lem s arising in con n ect ion  w ith  
insider in form ation  and debt have been largely ignored by the  l i terature . How ever, in particular  
after the  recent E E C -D ir ec t iv e  8 9 /5 9 2  (on insider trad ing ) ,  th is  problem  has b ec o m e  the  subject  
of legal and econ o m ic  trea tm en ts  in W est G erm any. See e .g .  F ra n k e(1 98 9 ) .
2T h a t  is, if m a n agers  act as they  should according to th e  tex tb o o k s;  one m ight shed som e d o u b ts  
on this a ssu m p tio n .
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The chapter will be organized as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 deal with the three 
main economic arguments listed in the beginning. Section 2 deals with the effects 
of expected insider trading in the secondary markets on the welfare of investors 
and ex-ante investment. In section 2 the link between investment activity and 
insider trading is indirect, because we ask how the possibility of insider trading 
might influence the behaviour of investors. In Section 3 we explore a direct link 
between investment and insiders. We investigate how insider activity leads to more 
informative prices and how this influences better investment decisions. We compare 
these benefits with the costs of this process, the losses inflicted on outsiders and the 
resources spent on information acquisition. Section 4 discusses the issues related 
to incentive questions. Section 5 relates the results of the preceding sections with 
the fairness arguments. We survey the three main forms which this argument takes 
in legal practice and contrast them with the economic analysis. Finally, we survey 
in an appendix the additional features of insider trading arising in the take-over 
process.
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2. The Victim s of Insider Trading.
2.1 The Redistribution of Wealth
At a first glance, it should be obvious who are the victims of insider trading, namely 
their trading partners. However, the case is much less clear-cut than might be 
expected. Of course, there are no problems with the assessment of the manipulative 
abuse of inside information. There are several possibilities of manipulation for 
corporate insiders by retaining information, driving prices down by releasing wrong 
information and the like.1 There is no question that this manipulation distorts 
prices, leads to wrong investment decisions of individual investors and to a lower 
allocation efficiency of capital markets.
When insiders deal on the basis of information which is true but unknown to 
the market, the identity of the victim is less clear. Every rational investor who 
holds the shares does not have to worry about the insider trading, since it only 
anticipates events which occur anyhow. If he intends to trade despite the presence 
of insiders, he should at least expect to be better off than without trading. Hence 
the only victims which might be harmed by insider trading are those who must deal 
because of some exogenous liquidity shock, i.e., either shareholders who have to 
sell for some need for liquidity or non-shareholders who receive additional liquidity 
and want to invest in a risky asset to smooth their consumption path optimally 
over time.
But a priori it is even unclear how these traders should suffer from insider trading 
in the future. Future prices may both rise (in the case of good news) and fall (in 
the case of bad news). Hence, a liquidity trader who arrives in the market shortly 
after an insider was active might profit or lose (depending on whether he buys 
or sells and whether the news have been bad or good). Accordingly, if he is risk 
neutral he should not be worried by the insider trading.
1See M a n n e (1 9 6 6 )  for a d iscussion  of th ese  practices .  B e n a b o u /L a r o q u e (1 9 8 9 )  give an a na ly t ic  
trea tm en t  o f  the  p rob lem atic .  T h e y  deal in particular  w ith  the  q u est ion  w h eth er  rep utat ion  
effects m ight prevent sy s te m a t ic  m an ip u la t ion  of in form ation .
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However, a liquidity trader is harmed in a more subtle way which is analogous 
to the adverse selection effects common from markets like the one for used cars. 
On most financial markets liquidity is provided by professional traders or market 
makers, i.e., the usual counterpart of an investor is a professional dealer. If these 
market makers face an insider risk, they will buy resp. sell shares only with a 
corresponding discount which compensates them for the potential losses due to 
information based trading.1 Thus, already the possibility of insider trading induces 
additional transaction costs on outside traders, even when the insiders are not 
present at the moment. This argument is for example developed in King/Roell 
(1988) who argue that the real harm imposed on outside investors is this additional 
tax on investments arising through the adverse selection component of the bid- 
ask-spread.
How important this tax might be, is certainly an empirical question. However, 
there are also some theoretical problems with the argument. The first concerns 
the consequences of a prohibition of insider trading via a disclose-or-abstain rule. 
If such a rule could be strictly enforced, the bid-ask-spread and the transaction 
costs faced by the liquidity traders would certainly fall. In practice, such a rule will 
probably only reduce the amount and seriousness of the cases of insider trading. 
Some insiders will still try to cheat. For practical reasons the regulator will only 
sue very serious and clear-cut cases of insider trading. However, the effects of a 
reduction of insider trading (as opposed to a complete elimination) are not entirely 
clear. Both in strategic models in the spirit of Kyle (1985) in which insiders and 
market makers take the effect of their own actions on the overall outcome into 
account, and in competitive models like Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) in which the 
actions of the individual insider resp. market maker have no effect on prices and 
allocations, less insider trading may lead to higher or lower spreads depending on 
the environment.
1For a d iscu ss ion  of th e  insider risk c o m p o n e n t  o f  the  b id-ask-spread  see e.g .  G lo s te n /M ilg r o m  
(198 5 ) ,  K yle  (1 98 5 ) .  T h e  original idea goes back to B a g e h o t  (1 9 7 1 ) .  T h e  effect arises also in 
s tandard  c o m p e t i t iv e  m o d e ls  w ith  a sy m m etr ic  in form ation  like th e  one  of G r o s s m a n /S t ig l i t z  
(1980) .  In th ese  m o d e ls  the  uninform ed investors,  facing insiders and liquid ity  traders and try ing  
to deduce  in form ation  from the aggregate  order flow play th e  role o f  th e  m arket makers. T h e  
bid-ask-spread arises in the  form of  price m o v e m en ts  due to  noisy  ex cess  s u p p ly /d e m a n d .  For a 
more deta i led  d iscussion  of this and the  rem ainder  of this sect ion  see ch apter  3, sect ion  5.
17
The second theoretical problem with the bid-ask-spread arises when risk aversion 
is introduced. If market makers are risk averse, the bid ask-spread will also include 
a component which compensates market makers for the additional risk they bear 
when they buy shares (resp. for their suboptimal risk bearing in case they sell). 
This compensation for risk bearing is obviously the greater the riskier the asset, or 
put slightly differently, the less information on the asset is available. Hence, liquid­
ity traders might actually have an interest that insiders actively reduce uncertainty 
over the asset’s future returns. These benefits of insider activity are partially offset 
by the adverse selection effect, but ultimately the benefits of insider trading on 
the size of the bid-ask-spread may outweigh the costs. If one assumes that the 
introduction of a disclose-or-abstain rule leads to less information acquisition and 
less insider activity, such a rule tends to favour most the market makers. We will 
come back to this point in section 5.
The introduction of risk aversion in the utilities of investors also allows to study 
an additional effect how outside investors might suffer from insider trading. If out­
siders find themselves in a suboptimal portfolio position, i.e., they possess either 
less or more of the risky asset than they would optimally like to hold, they will 
want to buy resp. sell shares on the stock market in order to rebalance their port­
folio position. Hirshleifer (1971) argued that under these circumstances investors 
generally have an interest that information is revealed after a first round of trade. 
The argument is essentially an insurance argument. Investors want to be opti­
mally insured against risk before the event occurs; afterwards insurance does not 
make sense. The link of this reasoning to the problem of insider trading is that 
insider trading will drive prices up to the true future realization of the risky asset, 
i.e., outside investors buy resp. sell at high prices if returns are high and at low 
prices when returns are low. But if prices already reflect most of the information 
on returns, the remaining profit possibilities for the outsiders are accordingly low. 
Hence, insiders harm outsiders through their influence on prices and the resulting 
premature resolution of uncertainty.
To make this argument precise, one must in general control for additional effects 
of new information, in particular income effects which might offset the negative
18
influence of new information. The argument is for example valid if investors have 
constant absolute risk aversion.1
2.2 The Ex-Ante Effects on Investment
The preceding discussion concentrated exclusively on the direct redistribution of 
wealth between insiders and outsiders. In a vague sense this might be considered 
as a contribution to an analysis how well secondary markets perform their role 
as a device to smooth consumption of economic agents over time. Nothing which 
is essential to capital markets has entered the analysis so fax. But ultimately we 
should be interested in the impact of the performance of secondary markets on 
original investment. For investors in a new project the link between secondary 
trading and the original investment should be quite obvious. If the investment 
project is relatively long lived, i.e., returns can be expected over many periods, 
the investors are interested in future prices on secondary markets because they 
have to take into account that at some time they might want to sell their shares. 
This occurs for instance because of exogenous liquidity needs or because of chang­
ing preferences. Therefore, their investment decision will not only depend on the 
characteristics of the new project, but also on the characteristics of the secondary 
markets for the shares and in particular on the prices which can be realistically 
expected on these markets. A general analysis of the link between investment and 
the liquidity of secondary markets is quite difficult. But even without a formal 
model the effect of insider trading on initial investment seems quite intuitive as 
long as all investors are risk neutral. In this case original investors will anticipate 
that in order to be able to sell their shares later on the secondary markets they 
have to incur a transaction cost in form of the bid-ask-spread. Accordingly they 
will only be willing to invest in the risky project if the issue price compensates 
them for this additional cost of holding the asset. It will become more expensive 
for firms to finance new projects on the stock exchange and underinvestment will 
occur (see e.g. Wyplosz(1988)).
1For a more deta i led  tr ea tm en t  of the Hirshleifer effect see e .g .  G ale  (1985) and H akansson  e t .a l  
(1982) .
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The situation is less obvious if we include risk aversion in the discussion. Risk 
averse initial investors do not only care about the size of the bid-ask-spread, but 
also about the volatility of prices on future secondary markets. Given that multi­
period rational expectation models with risk averse investors are quite complex, 
attempts to tackle the problem have assumed an easier deterministic structure. 
Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis assume an overlapping generations framework in 
which each generation lives only for two periods and must sell all the shares in 
the second period to the next young generation. Ausubel (1989) considers several 
investment projects and assumes that investors initially cannot diversify and are 
only later able to diversify on the secondary markets.
Despite certain limitations, the models of chapter 3 and 4 allow some insights 
concerning the relation between price volatility and investment. From an ex ante 
viewpoint the rather subtle effect of insider trading on the secondary markets 
is to shift risk from the future to the present. Insider trading leads to premature 
resolution of uncertainty and hence in case of an early liquidation of their positions 
shareholders are confronted with a higher variability of prices if informed traders 
are active. If risk averse shareholders anticipate this correctly, market value at the 
date of issue should fall and some investment projects may not take place.
But there is an important opposite effect to this movement. Since share prices 
should trade on average for a price equivalent to the expected value of future 
returns minus a risk premium, informed trading resulting in a lower uncertainty 
in the future should lead to smaller risk premia of the expected prices. Thus, with 
insider trading in the future, expected share prices should be higher than without 
informed trading. The anticipation of this will make market value at the date of 
issue rise again.
Under this perspective the main ex-ante effect of insider trading arises through the 
premature resolution of information which is reflected in prices as a consequence 
of the insider’s trades. Prices become more informative which from an ex-ante 
viewpoint leads both to higher prices on average and to higher price volatility. 
The overall outcome of these two effects is unclear and depends very much on 
the way how trading on secondary markets is organized and modelled. Depending
on the chosen specification, underinvestment might occur or not. A particularly 
intriguing example is given if we model secondary markets in a standard way 
following Grossman/Stiglitz (1980), i.e., with informed speculators, uninformed 
speculators and liquidity traders. Depending on the parameter constellations of 
the model, both less or more investment might be the consequence of changes in 
the intensity of insider trading. Decisive for the outcome is the amount of additional 
volatility due to the bid-ask-spread, i.e., how much prices tend to bounce back and 
forth as reaction to liquidity events.
2.3 Investors with Bounded Rationality
Up to now our arguments relied very strongly on the assumption of hyperrational 
investors, who have a definite picture of underlying probability distributions and 
who are able to update them correctly in response to price movements. A slightly 
different approach to the problem would be to drop the implicit assumption that all 
the investors are hyper-rational agents who ponder before each trading decision 
which information could be contained in the fact that they find a counterpart 
for their transaction, and argue that the arguments against insider trading have a 
somewhat different outside investor with a more bounded rationality in mind. From 
this perspective one might defend the insider trading legislation as the protection 
of investors with bounded forecasting abilities from too well informed speculators.
A discussion of bounded rationality of investors is necessarily somewhat specula­
tive; but it seems unquestionable that most investors form their expectations over 
the possible returns of risky assets through more or less crude rules of thumbs. 
To achieve reliable forecasts these rules of thumb require a certain stability of the 
stochastic processes that underlie price movements, a stability that price volatility 
due to informed speculation tends to undermine.
One not too implausible view of relatively "rational” uninformed investors would 
be that their abilities to forecast correctly the information contained in a potential 
trade are rather restricted, but that they are able to infer (more or less) concisely 
the information contained in the last observed trades.1 Such a behaviour will lead
1See Hellw ig  (1982) for a rational e x p e c ta t io n s  m o d e l  w ith  a lagged u p d a t in g  rule.
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the uninformed investors to buy too late in the case of good news and to sell too 
late in the case of bad news and to find themselves constantly in a suboptimal 
portfolio position. Another promising way to examine effects of insider trading in 
a context of bounded rationality might be to include the behaviour of chartists into 
models of price formation and to investigate in which sense their techniques might 
lead to overreactions of prices on insider speculation. However, a more detailed 
discussion of possible interactions between insider trading and possible bounded 
rationality of investors is beyond the scope of this chapter and we will not further 
pursue this discussion.
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13. Costs and Benefits o f Informational Efficiency o f Prices.
Modern finance theory has always stressed the importance of informational effi­
ciency of prices (see e.g Fama (1970)). Asset prices should incorporate as fast as 
possible all available information in order to fulfil their allocative function. What 
exactly is meant by that allocative function and in which sense more informative 
prices are able to be better indicators for investment decision, remains somewhat 
vague. A classic counter-argument of Hirshleifer points out that informative prices 
might actually be useless from a social point of view. Moreover, since the pri­
vate incentives for the acquisition of information will be usually redistribution of 
wealth, i.e., from a social viewpoint not efficiency improving, the resources spent 
on information are wasted and the overall result of more informative prices on 
the whole economy are actually negative. Hirshleifer’s argument is hence twofold: 
First he questions the usual presumption that more informative prices are always 
"better” . Second, he opposes the view that information as a good with public- 
good-character will in general be underproduced and underutilized and points out 
that actually the opposite may be the case.
Hirshleifer’s example considers a pure consumption-insurance world in which ex 
ante the portfolio positions of all investors are optimally diversified. In this sit­
uation there is no efficiency gain from new information: In a pure consumption 
setting in which everybody is ex-ante in a pareto-optimal portfolio position, in­
formation is socially useless. In order to understand this argument, consider the 
case of full disclosure of information which does not lead to any efficiency gain: 
In equilibrium the only result of the information is to change prices such that 
everybody is still satisfied with the endowments he has. The allocation of risks 
remains unaltered. Exactly the same applies to imperfect information revelation 
due to insider activity. However, the private incentives to acquire information and 
to speculate on behalf of the others are given by the profits arising through the 
redistribution of wealth from outsiders to insiders. Hence it might be profitable to 
spend resources on the acquisition of new information, although there is no benefit 
at all for the economy as a whole.
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However, the exclusive treatment of capital markets from the insurance viewpoint 
neglects their role in the process of the allocation and reallocation of real capi­
tal, i.e. the decentralized decision about future production. The question then is: 
How does private information influence investment decisions through the capital 
market? What are possible efficiency improving effects of informed trading? De­
spite the vast literature on "efficient” capital markets, there exists unfortunately 
no real welfare analysis of the allocational role of capital markets. In the sequel 
we will therefore discuss a very simple example to disentangle allocation effects, 
distribution effects and costs of information acquisition.
Let us consider a firm that wants to invest in new machines in order to produce a 
certain good. At the time of the investment decision the outcome of the venture 
will in general be uncertain; it may depend on the ability of the management and 
the workforce, parallel developments of competing firms, uncertain prices tomor­
row and so on. Let us assume that in order to finance the investment the firm 
plans a rights issue. As long as managers act in the interest of their shareholders, 
investment decisions financed through retained earnings can be treated in a similar 
way. The "real” impact of this investment decision can be considered to be the 
optimal number of machines to buy.
If the management acts according to the textbook rule and we ignore complications 
like unanimity of shareholders and incentives of managers, the management will 
take an investment decision such that the firm’s net market value after the issue 
is maximized. It is at this point that the capital market influences investment 
decisions. In practice, managers will have to anticipate the stock market’s reaction 
to the investment; if they fail, investors will not invest enough.
It is clear that stock market prices signal to managers things like risk aversion 
and wealth of potential investors, i.e., potential demand, and hence will influence 
investment decisions. If there is any role for insiders to play, then it is to make prices 
contain some fundamental information about the asset itself. It is however less 
obvious how information transmitted through prices should influence the decision. 
In the end the managers themselves should be the best informed about the project 
they are going to undertake. They should also be able to monitor the situation of
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their competitors as accurately as the capital market. And even if not, a general 
policy of public disclosures of all firms should be able to achieve all the possible 
benefits of information.
In practice there may be several problems with such a policy: problems of credibil­
ity, too high costs of continuous public disclosures, problems of keeping business 
secrets. The most severe problem with a policy of constant disclosures is perhaps 
the high costs which are required if every market participant has to perform the 
rather complex task of interpreting all the public disclosures of the economy. An 
alternative mechanism is that corporate insiders and firms specialized in informa­
tion acquisition, i.e., brokers and banks, deal on the stock market resp. sell the 
information to speculators who want to deal with it on the stock market and drive 
the prices to a level where they ” reflect” the information. The investing firm would 
then just have to regard the prices and deduce the necessary information for its 
own investment. This argument sees the price system as a mechanism to reduce 
the complexity of the world by transmitting only the relevant information.1
What is possible relevant information contained in prices? If share prices of com­
petitors in the same industry (and thus with correlated returns) reflect information 
about their returns, they determine the cost of capital to the investing firm and 
thus directly the investment decision through the market value rule. If there exists 
a futures market for the good produced, futures prices signal which prices can be 
expected in the future. And finally, although managers are probably in the best 
position to judge the technological properties of the investment, they are probably 
not a very objective judge of their own abilities. The share price of the firm will 
reflect the shareholders’ perception of the managers’ qualities. This assessment of 
the management’s qualities will influence the market value and thus the invest­
ment decision. A very serious practical problem is of course, that the evaluation of 
the information content of prices is a very complex task; it is hard to imagine that 
this should always be easier than obtaining the information directly. The futures 
example might be the most plausible example, because in this case prices are a 
relatively simple signal. Still, the difficulties of interpreting price signals correctly
1T h e  a rgu m en t is usually  a ttr ib u ted  to von Hayek (1945) .
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might shed some doubts on the extent to which managers really infer information 
from prices.1
But let us abstract from these general difficulties and assume that the most efficient 
way to transmit new information is through informed trading. For our purpose it 
is enough to acknowledge that information transfer might be socially desirable 
and that insiders might perform a useful role as information transmitter. But the 
individual aim of their activity is, of course, speculation: they try to make a profit 
from superior information at the expense of less well informed traders. Their in­
centives to acquire information stem merely from the perspective of redistribution 
of wealth between the uninformed and the informed. They are prepared to spend 
money for more precise information as long as they expect higher average returns 
in the future as a recompense.2
In contrast to the argument at the beginning of this section, there is now an 
efficiency effect which could potentially offset the costs of information acquisition. 
Whether this is the case will in general depend less on the insider activity per se 
than on other factors. How to measure conclusively these efficiency effects appears 
quite impossible without a satisfactory multi-period general equilibrium model 
which explicitly links financial to real markets.
One might argue that ultimately we should not be too concerned about financial, 
but rather about real assets. The outcome will then in particular depend on the
l A n  excep t io n  being  the  tak e-over-threat  inherent in low share prices . T h ere ,  the  in form ation  
conta ined  in prices concerns th e  market perception  of the  m a n a g e r ’s abil it ies  and d ec is ion s .  I shall  
deal in the  a p p en d ix  w ith  this po int th a t  is probably  b e tter  u n d ers to o d  under the  v iew p o in t  of
the control fu n ct ion  of prices rather than their  in form ative  fu n ct ion  in a str ict sense.
3T here  are several ways to make th is  idea form ally  precise .  T h e  b es t  k now n in th e  ra tiona l ex* 
p ec ta t io n s  literature  is probably  the  V erre ch ia ( l9 8 2 )  version of the  H e l lw ig ( l9 8 0 )  m o d e l .  T h e  
inform ation  of the  insiders is only partia lly  revealed b ecau se  th ey  can h ide  b eh in d  so m e e x o g e ­
nously given noise trad ing . A s  a function  of their characterist ics  (in the  Verrechia m o d e l  differing  
risk aversion),  their w ill ingness to take sp ecu la t ive  po s i t ion s  will vary and thu s their  w ill in gn ess  
to buy in form ation .  In equilibrium the  least risk averse traders will have acquired in form ation  
(which is th en  conta ined  in the  equilibrium price) ,  w hereas m ore risk averse traders do n o t  ac­
quire in form ation  b ecau se  it is too  cost ly  given the  ex p e c te d  ex tra  returns .  It is im p o r ta n t  to  
see th a t  in any standard  m o d e l  w ith  partially revealing equilibrium  prices th e  ex tra  profits of  
informed traders depen d  only on the  characterist ics  of th e  traders , the  costs  o f  in form ation  ac­
quisition and in particular on the characterist ics  of the  chosen  source of noise .  H ow ever it does  
not d ep en d  on the  results o f  more inform ative  prices on p o ten t ia l  p rod u ct io n  dec is ions .
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conditions on the market for the real asset. Imagine for example that the supply 
of machines in question is highly price-inelastic, i.e., changes in the demand for 
machines will have only a minor impact on the quantity of machines actually sold 
in equilibrium. In this case a higher precision of the estimate of the cost of capital 
will have almost no effect on the real investment. The opposite would apply to the 
case of price-elastic supply of machines.
In the case of a small impact of new information on real investment one might 
be tempted to argue that the new information is a social waste, because real ex­
penses on information acquisition are not compensated through real improvements 
in investment. However, many additional factors would have to be specified in a 
welfare analysis. Wealth will not only be redistributed among insiders and out­
siders in the financial markets, but also among the shareholders of the investing 
firm and the shareholders of the firm which produces the machines. Moreover, we 
also have to take into account that the financial assets play an important role 
per se. The insider trading will in particular determine the allocation of risks in 
the economy and the possibilities for investors to smooth their consumption path 
over time. It will certainly be possible to construct simple models in which the 
real costs of information acquisition are so high and the effects on real investment 
are so low that this negative trade-off overshadows all the other welfare consider­
ations. But on the whole, such a welfare analysis will always remain ambiguous. 
It remains ambiguous because the precise nature of the link between financial and 
real markets is not very well understood. But even if it were, our above argument 
shows that any general welfare analysis would still depend on certain endogenous 
characteristics of the markets in question. In our example, the supply of machines 
might be price elastic or price inelastic (depending on an exogeneous specification 
of technologies, preferences and the like).
Hence, even in such a simple example the often stated benefits of informative prices 
are far from obvious. It is possible that the financial industry spends just enough 
money, it is as possible that huge amounts of money are just wasted for the benefit 
of some happy few; more cannot be said in this generality. Notice however that, 
if ever, the argument is much more directed against the cost-intensive financial
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industry than the corporate insider who obtains information as a cheap by-product 
of his work.
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4. The Incentives of Corporate Insiders.
In the preceding sections we have focused on the effects of insider trading per se on 
shareholders. However, if the insiders are corporate insiders (like the managers of 
the firms and advising financial institutions) some additional considerations have 
to be taken into account. Implicitly the preceding discussion assumed managers 
to behave in the interest of their shareholders and to take optimal investment 
decisions. Nothing was said about the incentives for the managers to do so.
Manne’s (1966) classical argument deals with the issue of the incentives of man­
agers to take optimal decisions in favour of their shareholders. He argues that the 
perfect remuneration device to make managers act as ” entrepreneurs” is to allow 
them to earn parts of the profits through insider trading. His argument is mainly 
that this practice puts them in the situation of an independent entrepreneur and 
makes them more innovative. The position is similar to the motivation of patents: 
to give an incentive for inventions, one allows the inventor for a certain time to 
earn excess profits.
A different argument (see e.g. Demsetz (1986)) sees insider profits of managers and 
majority shareholders as a compensation for the higher firm-specific risk borne by 
them. Demsetz argues that managers specialize their human capital to the needs to 
the firm and hence cannot diversify away the firm-specific risk. Similarly, he argues 
in favour of the insider trading of majority shareholders: Large shareholders imply 
an ”efficient level of monitoring”, but incur a high firm-specific risk. According to 
Demsetz, this makes insider trading desirable in order to encourage specialization 
of managers and majority shareholding.
Many objections against this position have been raised, like the issue of the over- 
compensation of managers, moral hazard problems for the managers and the prob­
lem of a conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Moral hazard 
problems may arise through the obvious temptation to delay, artificially produce 
or manipulate information. A look on the U.S. stock exchanges before the 1929
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depression gives a good impression of the possibilities of large scale price ma­
nipulations. Conflicts of interest will occur whenever the trading which is based 
on inside information raises the cost of business for the firm and hence damages 
shareholders. This will happen if changes in the firm’s share price reveal possible 
plans of the firm like acquisitions. If insider trading of corporate insiders raises 
the firm’s cost of business through the indirect revelation of business secrets, the 
behaviour of managers is quite similar to a theft.1
The main problem with Manne’s argument is that he starts from a rather sugges­
tive aspect of the incentive problem arising through the separation of ownership 
and control, i.e. the Schumpeterian problem how to make a manager of a big firm 
act as an innovative entrepreneur rather than as an administrator. However, he 
does not really deal with the problem whether in general interests of managers 
and financial institutions will coincide with shareholders’ interests if one allows 
for unrestricted insider trading. There is no obvious reason why this should be 
the case. In fact, no restrictions on inside trading in the future will establish ex 
ante (i.e. at the date of a new investment) two rather different groups of investors, 
corporate and financial insiders on the one hand and outsiders on the other hand. 
These groups differ in the sense that they can expect different rates of returns 
on their investments; both corporate and financial insiders can expect to bear a 
smaller risk than outside investors since they can react faster to future news on 
the asset’s returns. Thus the problem is not as usual a problem of asymmetric 
information on the primary market for new issues, but a problem of expected 
asymmetric information on the secondary markets in the future.
Under these conditions several scenarios can easily be imagined. There may be a 
tendency to overinvestment, since insiders will take too risky investment decisions 
(knowing that the larger part of the risk has to be borne by others). This may also 
result in a world of underinvestment ex ante, if outside investors take account of 
this behaviour and demand a premium for the additional risk. Even ” reasonable”
1See H a d d o c k /M a c e y  (1987) .  F ish m a n /H a g e r ty  (1989) con stru ct  an e x a m p le  in which sh areh o ld ­
ers prefer less in form ative  prices, because  c o m p e t in g  firms can infer b u s in ess  secrets  from prices  
and su b seq ue n t ly  c o m p ete  m ore effectively w ith  the  sh areh o lders’ firm. For a d iscu ss ion  of o ther ,  
related  arg u m en ts  see A u su b e l(1 9 8 9 )  and D y e (1 9 8 4 ) .
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investment decision may then fail to attract sufficient funding, because outside 
investors cannot distinguish them from ” hyped” investments.
A look on the motivations behind the securities legislation of the "New Deal” in 
the 1930s shows that these possibilities are not just thought experiments. After the 
experience of the 1920 with its large number of excessive (and often fraudulent) 
share issues in which the issuers-entrepreneurs had long sold their participations 
before bad news became public, the original overinvestment had turned into a 
large scale underinvestment. Both the "Securities Act of 1933” and the "Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934” were intended to restore the confidence of the broad public 
in the stock market.1
In practice many firms (at least in the U.S.) have meanwhile imposed restrictions 
on the trading of their managers and, although Manne considers stock options as 
too inflexible, they have chosen stock options as an incentive for "entrepreneurial” 
behaviour.2
1T h is  restoring of confidence m ight of course have also other  c o n n o ta t io n s .  We will d iscuss this
p o in t  further in the  n ex t  sect ion .
3For a survey of current U .S .  practices  o f rem unerat ion  see J e n s e n /M u r p h y  (199 0 ) .
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5. Fairness, Efficiency and the Confidence in the M arkets.
Ever since the ”new deal”-laws began to impose restrictions on insider trading, 
the argument of fairness has played a major role in their justification. Thus, the 
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934” was motivated by the desire ”to assure the 
maintenance of fair and honest markets” .
In its most basic form the fairness argument posits that nobody should make profits 
only on the basis of superior information since this will always be at the expense 
of somebody else. There are some obvious practical difficulties with this position. 
A major problem for the jurisdiction has been that usually there are no direct 
victims of an inside transaction since stock market transactions occur in general 
via professional intermediaries. This is in sharp contrast to the case of the seller 
of a damaged car who does not fully inform the buyer. Moreover, it will be often 
very difficult for a court to define ex post what exactly was superior information 
and whether the accused really had this information. Starting from the famous 
”catch-all-clause” rule lOb-51 the history of prosecution of insider trading in the 
U.S. cases gives a rich illustration of these problems.
The practical limitations to sue every transaction based on (perhaps only slightly) 
better information, make it certainly useful to examine possible economic trade­
offs arising in the context of insider trading regulation. A better understanding 
of the economic effects of insider trading could potentially enable us to identify 
more clearly which forms of insider trading are more damaging and who actually 
is the victim of insider trading. Accordingly, it should help us both in defining 
the range of behaviour which we consider as unfair and in being aware of possible 
allocational and distributive consequences which might be the price to pay for a 
prohibition of insider trading.
One way to restrict the scope of fairness considerations and link it to economic 
arguments is the notion of "confidence” in the markets, i.e., to prosecute insider
1Issued by th e  SEC in 1942. On the  grounds of rule 10b-5 A m er ican  cou rts  u su a l ly  pro secu ted  
insider trad ing  as a v io la tion  o f  the  principle of eq ua l t r ea tm en t  o f  all sh areh o ld ers .
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trading only as far as it undermines the "confidence” in the financial markets. 
The broad objective of the U.S. securities laws of the 1930s was to restore public 
confidence in the capitalist economy as a whole and the capital markets as their 
central allocation mechanism for investments in particular. Confidence in capital 
markets is of course a rather vague term with many different connotations. Its 
intuitive appeal on the one hand and its missing precision on the other hand seem 
at the root of much of the confusion around the prohibition of inside trading. What 
exactly is meant with missing confidence in economic terms? How can confidence 
be undermined? What economic implications does this have?
Unfortunately the analysis of sections 2 and 3 dealing with the economic implica­
tions of trading on the basis of different information, does not give us any conclusive 
answers. As we have seen, already a precise description of the victims of insider 
trading, i.e., the ones whose confidence might be shattered, is not without prob­
lems. But even if one accepts that liquidity traders suffer most of insider trading 
(either in the form of higher transaction costs in form of higher bid-ask-spreads or 
through the premature resolution of uncertainty), I have argued that it is unclear 
whether a prohibition of insider trading will make liquidity traders really better 
off.
Also the consequences of missing confidence in the markets are not entirely clear. 
As we have seen, insider trading might lead to underinvestment, but it also might 
lead to more and better investment. And finally the fears that unrestricted pos­
sibilities of insider trading might render stock exchanges huge casinos in which 
immense sums are spent on the acquisition of information in order to place bets 
with better odds might be justified or not. The main problem with all arguments 
positing negative effects of insider trading is to cope with potential positive effects 
of new information which potentially enables investors and firms to take better 
investment decisions. The only tentative conclusion one might draw out of this dis­
cussion is that our intuition concerning the "classic” insider, i.e., somebody who 
by chance gets to know a valuable piece of information which shortly afterwards 
becomes public anyhow, is in some sense confirmed. His actions certainly do not 
involve any economic benefits which might be a possible price to pay by the society,
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if, based on fairness considerations, society decides to prohibit his trading. But of 
course, it is not these clear-cut cases of insider trading which pose problems.
In the light of this rather shaky assessment, it might seem more promising to focus 
on the issues of section 4. The discussion there introduces a somewhat different 
principle of equality which might be justified both on general grounds as on more 
specific efficiency considerations. Equality in this context is meant to be equality 
of interests between outside investors and the managers of their wealth, i.e., cor­
porate managers and financial institutions. These parties have concluded at least 
an implicit contract. This contract presupposes a relation of trust and duty as the 
basis of fair and equal behaviour between them. It also avoids problems of moral 
hazard and of an institutionalized inequality between groups of investors with dif­
fering return expectations. Apart from possible underinvestment results, this also 
gives a psychological content to the concept of confidence: nobody likes to deposit 
money with people whom he distrusts. Hence, a more restrictive way to interpret 
"fairness” would be to limit prosecution of insider trading to cases involving the 
breach of fiduciary duty; the mere possession of inside knowledge would not be 
sufficient. However, if insider trading is deemed illegal only in cases involving a 
breach of fiduciary duty, it is at least arguable whether one should criminalize in­
sider trading at all. In principle, the prohibition of insider trading could be written 
in the private contracts between the concerned parties. Any partisan of an insider 
trading law based on the breach of fiduciary duty would at least have to justify 
why such contractual arrangements are not feasible or at least not enforceable.1
The restriction of insider trading prosecution to cases involving some form of 
breach of fiduciary duty has been in particular advocated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the 1980s, for instance in the famous cases of Chiarella v. United States 
and even more pronounced in Dirks v. SEC (the Equity Funding case). The 
Supreme Court tends to focus in recent decisions on the concept of fiduciary duty 
rather than on the issue of equality concerning the possession of information: ”It 
is important in this type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do ...
1In W est -G erm an y , this reasoning  is one of the main a rgu m en ts  brought forward by the  banks  
aga inst  the  th reat  of an insider law. It is argued th a t  se lf-regu lation  could  solve all the  prob lem s  
of ins ider trading .
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rather than policing information per se and its possession...”1 The subtle, but 
in its implications decisive question is, how to define a breach of fiduciary duty. 
In a narrow sense it requires explicitly that one of the contractual partners is 
harmed. In a broader sense it covers also the misappropriation of information. The 
implications for the financial industry (in particular brokers and market makers) 
are obvious: the misappropriation rule would impose rather severe restrictions on 
their activities.2
At a first glance it seems quite attractive to restrict the prohibition of insider 
trading to cases involving some form of breach of fiduciary duty, because it might 
bring its justification on safer grounds from a practical and economic point of 
view. Still, the price to pay would be that a certain class of market insiders would 
still be able to earn extra returns which many might judge to be excessive, both 
judged from the personal effort which was necessary to achieve these profits and 
the potential social profits linked to the transactions of the insider. Moreover, there 
are also some internal problems with the concept of fiduciary duty.
First, some institutions like banks might have conflicting fiduciary duties towards 
different clients. Firm specific informations acquired by the corporate finance de­
partment in its function as a financial adviser is supposes to be confidential. The 
brokerage department owes investors optimal advice. What is the duty of the bank 
as a whole, if it obtains information that a certain firm will suffer from a large 
slump of profits in the next quarter?3 Second, even the concept of a fiduciary duty 
of the management towards the shareholders is not always unambiguous. Consider 
the case of a firm who considers its shares to be undervalued and starts a (secret) 
buy back programme. The old shareholders who do not sell shares to the firm 
(presumably the majority) profit from this programme, whereas the shareholders 
selling their shares make losses. Should the managers (or the firm?) be prosecuted
1V erdict o f  S uprem e C ourt in Dirks v. S E C , 103 Sup rem e C ourt R ev iew  3265 .
2T h e  s i tu a t io n  in the  U .S .  is still unclear. C hiarella  v .  U n ited  S ta tes  rejected the  m isappropria t ion  
theory. In a very similar case (U n ited  S ta tes  v .  N e w m a n ,  2d C ircu it ) ,  b u t  th is  t im e involv ing  
th e  em p loy ee  of an in ves tm en t  bank, the  sam e court which had taken the  or ig inal decis ion  in the
C hiarella  case  ruled against  the  accused insider on the  grounds of the  m isap p ropria t ion  theory.  
Finally , in F oster  v. U n ited  S ta tes  th e  Suprem e C ourt was sp lit  on the  issue o f  m isap p rop ria t ion .  
s T h e  fam ou s  "C hinese  W alls” are su p p osed  to circum vent th is  problem  by sp l it t in g  th e  banks  
up into several units  w ith  different fiduciary d u ties .
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on the grounds of a breach of fiduciary duty?1 Third, and perhaps most impor­
tantly, the fiduciary duty concept not only leaves many forms of insider trading 
legal, but in some sense even encourages them quite explicitly. Consider the man­
ager of a certain firm, who by means of his privileged position as an industry 
insider acquires information that a competing firm will make very high profits 
in the future. Since it is part of his fiduciary duty towards his own shareholders 
to maximize their profits, he should buy shares of this firm. Doing this he could 
not be considered as an insider: He does not breach any relation of trust to the 
target firm’s shareholders, because there is none. Moreover, he acts optimally in 
the interest of his own shareholders, just as they expect him to do.
Thus, regulators face a dilemma. On the one hand there are practical problems 
to sue any transaction based on information differentials and an insufficient un­
derstanding of the consequences of such a complete ban for the economy as a 
whole. On the other hand the prosecution of insider trading only in cases in­
volving a breach of fiduciary seems both too restrictive and may lead to internal 
contradictions. Given this dilemma one encounters a more restricted form of the 
equality-principle: the rule of equal access to information. As long as information 
has been obtained on a way which in principle is open to everybody, it is considered 
to be legitimate to trade on this information. The ” equal access to information” - 
rule is under many perspectives a typical middle-of-the-road solution. It covers 
both the ” classic” insider and the breach of fiduciary duty. It also covers a simple 
notion of fairness that nobody should earn money without having worked for it; 
hence the access to this work should be unrestricted. Moreover, it takes possible 
economic implications of an insider trading ban into account by ensuring that a 
certain amount of information still trickles into the market. Implicitly it takes the 
position that too much or too little information is undesirable, but that there is 
something like a optimal level of information necessary for the smooth functioning 
of the economy.
However, there are also problems with this position. The emphasis of the equal- 
access-rule should really lie on the ”in principle”. In principle market professionals
1For a recent d iscuss ion  of this problem in the  light of the  EEC  D irec t ive  see C a rb o n e tt i  (1 99 0 ) .
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and outside investors have the same, unrestricted access to the process of search 
for new information. But in practice the possibilities of banks and brokers to 
obtain new information are of course infinitely better. It is hard to conceive how 
market professionals and outside investors should ever have comparable access to 
new information. Accordingly, Kay (1988) in a comment on the U.K. legislation on 
insider trading2 argues that in practice the principle of equal access to information 
serves mainly to eliminate corporate insiders in favour of market professionals. 
Why the favourable treatment of a certain group of participants in the financial 
market should be fairer towards the other participants and in particular the outside 
investors is not really obvious in the light of our discussion in section 2.1. The equal- 
access-rule not only protects market professionals from insider activity but gives 
them a double advantage over ordinary investors. Neglecting our qualifications of 
the argument in section 3, their power to exploit their own inside knowledge at 
the expense of outsiders might be justified as a means to compensate them for 
their costly research activity, deemed to be beneficial by rendering prices more 
informative. But they would benefit from a prohibition of insider trading even if 
they were just lazy and would produce no information at all. Higher uncertainty 
over future returns leads to higher bid-ask-spreads and hence to higher profits, 
because the risk aversion component of the bid-ask-spread is rising.
Given that a first best solution is certainly not available, the equal-access-rule ap­
pears from the political point of view probably the second best solution, but it still 
remains unsatisfactory both from an economic and a fairness perspective. From the 
economic point of view, the rule remains unsatisfactory because a certain group of 
traders is exempted from prosecution without a convincing economic justification 
for this exemption. From the fairness perspective, its major drawback seems that it 
introduces a large ”grey” zone of behaviour which might be considered as unfair or 
not. Often a decision whether a certain information was acquired on a legitimate 
or illegitimate way will remain a matter of judgement, and this judgement will 
always be influenced by some subjective qualification of the concept of fairness.
This chapter did not try to solve delicate problems of what we perceive to be 
fair, but rather attempted to examine economic arguments which might help us in
3M ain ly  th e  C o m p a n ie s  A c t  o f 1980.
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determining possible implications of the desire for fairness. It has turned out that 
our understanding of the economic implications of insider trading is rather shaky 
and our assessment of the impact of regulations at the least ambiguous. Still, the 
preceding discussion highlights the relevant issues in any evaluation of the impact 
of insider trading.
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Appendix: Insider Trading and Take-Overs.
Up to now we treated the firm as given and shareholders only decision was whether 
to participate in a new investment project of this firm. During the production 
process, however, it may be the case that certain investors desire to buy the whole 
firm and its productive assets.
This desire can have many origins. Managers of other firms may draw some sat­
isfaction from managing a large conglomerate. Certain firms may feel the desire 
to diversify their activities and reduce their dependence on a specific activity. Or 
they may feel that the existing productive assets of the other firm may be used in 
their own firm in a more profitable way, for instance because of economies of scale 
and scope, exploitation of existing distribution channels for their own products 
or the renegotiation of contracts with suppliers and the workforce. Finally, they 
may feel that the firm is badly managed and that with the existing real assets and 
workforce much better results could be achieved. In particular this last point has 
received much attention in recent years. Since internal and debt financing of new 
investment have made the stock market rather obsolete for the direct determina­
tion of the conditions of new issues, the take-over threat has been regarded as an 
indirect disciplinary device for shareholders.
In the remainder of the appendix we shall only consider effects of insider trading 
when a take-over actually takes place. But for the disciplinary function of the take­
over process the mere threat of a take-over is of course sufficient. A take-over will 
be the more likely the lower share prices are. In this sense we can speak of a control 
function of prices. If the stock market feels that the incumbent management is not 
up to its job, this will depress prices. Together with the implied rising likelihood of 
a take-over this appears a rather effective mechanism to control the management. 
The analysts of banks and brokers are probably best placed to to monitor the 
management’s abilities and to distinguish inability from adverse economic shocks 
which do not fall under the responsability of the managers. Presumambly, the
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appeal of this argument determines to a large extent the special role which current 
insider legislation assigns to insider activities of banks and brokers.1
Concerning the process of take-overs itself a vast literature discussing the efficiency 
gains of the current take-over wave has evolved.2 We will not try to survey this 
discussion here. For our problem of the regulation of insider trading, it is more 
interesting, that take-overs allow us to study two peculiar types of insiders more 
closely. The first group of insiders concerned are the raiders themselves. The second 
group consists of arbitrageurs or simple speculators, who get to know of a bid before 
it is publicly announced and who begin to deal in the shares of the target firm. 
Given the large profit possibilities arising through take-overs, it is not surprising 
to see that most of the recent spectacular cases of insider trading involved this 
group.
A.l The Raider as an Insider
Every bid for a hostile or friendly take-over demands a great deal of preparation 
and research. At the time of announcing a bid, the raider has in general spent a 
considerable amount of money to acquire inside information on the situation of 
the target firm, its asset values, the situation in possible input and output markets 
and so on. In this sense he should be regarded as an archetypical insider, i.e., as 
somebody who knows existing information about the firm’s possibilities unknown 
to the broad public and trades according to this information. He takes advantage of 
the target firm’s shareholders and should be prosecuted under any insider trading 
law which is based on the fairness principle, regardless whether that is defined 
with respect to the possession of information per se or merely with respect to 
equal access to information.
However, at the same time the raider fulfils a further role. His information may, 
at least in principle, serve the efficient reallocation of already existing assets in 
a more productive context. Furthermore, the expected returns of the firm after
1See th e  d iscussion  of the  rule o f the equal access to in form ation  in sect ion  5.
2T h e  ev id en ce  seem s rather m ixed .  For em pirica l su rveys  see J e n se n /R u b a c k  (1 98 3 )  and Jar-  
r e l l /B r i c k le y /N e t t e r  (198 8 ) .
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a successful bid will also depend on himself, i.e., on his abilities to develop a 
successful concept how to integrate the target firm in his own firm and to manage 
the target firm better than the old management did. Thus, he delivers his own 
"goodwill” , i.e., human capital to the target firm. It is obvious that any raider 
expects a sufficient compensation both for his physical costs of launching the bid 
as for his effort.
It is apparently this last aspect which has led the two major countries with explicit 
take-over legislation, the U.S and the U.K., to allow raiders to purchase secretly a 
stake in the target firm. Thus, the raider is allowed to recoup at least part of his 
expenses through trading profits.1 If at the same time the general insider trading 
legislation is founded on the principle of equality with respect to information resp. 
access to it, such a rule produces at least an inconsistency. However, prosecution 
of insider trading on the grounds of a violation of fiduciary duty would eliminate 
this contradiction: the raider is in no contractual relation to the target firm, and 
thus no breach of trust in this sense occurs.
To make matters even more complicated, both countries have also imposed limits 
on the raider’s activities: shareholdings from a certain percentage on have to be 
disclosed, in a given time only a certain percentage of the shares may be bought 
without a public announcement, and from a certain point on there even exists 
the obligation to announce a formal bid.2 Thus, after having reached this crucial 
barrier the raider looses most of his informational advantage, i.e his insider status. 
There is of course still a difference between the announcement to be a large share­
holder and the formal obligation of a bid insofar as there still remain uncertainties 
about the real intentions of the potential raider. The first disclosure mark is a kind 
of hybrid: it enforces information disclosure, but only partially.3 It reduces profit 
possibilities for the raider without completely eliminating them.
1For a form al analys is  o f this process  see K y le /V i l la  (198 8 ) .
2In the U .K .  for exa m p le  the City C ode on Take-overs and th e  R u les  G overn ing  S u b stan t ia l  
A cq u is i t io n s  o f  Shares fix the  large share h o ld ing  disc losure  limit at 5%, the  b idd in g  limit at 
30%, and it is forbidden to purchase more than 10% of  v o t in g  stock  in less th a n  7 days if th a t  
results in m ore than  15% of a c o m p a n y ’s vo t in g  rights.
3T h e  U .K .  rules actually  enforce a step  by step  d isc losure . A fter  h av in g  reached the  15% -mark,  
the purchase of every further full percent p oint  has to be d isc losed .
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There has been a considerable debate around the height of these maximal toeholds. 
Given that most empirical investigations indicate that after a bid the raider has to 
pay on average the whole surplus to the old shareholders, the rule on admissible 
toe-holds may be very important in the decision to look for potential target firms, 
developing strategies for them after the take-over and the occurrence of the actual 
bid.
To justify the disclosure rules with the fairness principle seems quite odd, given 
that already the concession to raiders to acquire shares secretly is the major vio­
lation of this principle. Hence, a priori there should be no reason, why the raider 
should not reap the full benefit of his action and the disclosure mark should be set 
at 100%. However, from an economic point of view such a reward system might 
induce more costly research activity than society wants to encourage.
Therefore, policy makers should ponder at least on the following points. First, 
a decision should be taken whether take-overs on the whole can be regarded as 
efficiency improving and not merely as a resource and time wasting means to 
redistribute wealth. Second, it is not entirely clear whether secret share acquisitions 
of the raiders tend to favour the "right” take-overs. Kyle/Villa (1988) argue that 
it rather tends to benefit costly and unnecessary take-overs. Third, also the nature 
of the raider’s investigation may be important. Roell (1987) applies considerations 
from the patent literature to this problem. If the strategy after the merger can be 
implemented by many different firms, the maximum toehold should be very low 
to avoid duplicating of search activity. In the opposite case in which the strategy 
remains a private good even after the announcement of the bid, i.e., it can only be 
implemented by the finder, it should be set as high as possible in order to induce 
as much search as possible.
A.2 The Trading of Other Insiders Before the Bid
Before the official bid is announced, it is almost unavoidable that a substantial 
number of people and institutions know it in advance. These will include profes­
sional advisers like merchant banks and firms who are directly informed by the
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raider, but also employees of these firms and market professionals without any 
direct relation to the raider, who get hold of the news through tips, rumours or 
their own analysis. Under a regime relying on some form of a fairness principle all 
these people are obviously insiders and should ”abstain or disclose” . If the breach 
of fiduciary duty is required, then friendly and hostile insiders have to be treated 
differently.
As far as friendly insiders are concerned, i.e., insiders who have an arrangement 
with the raider to resell the shares later to the raider, no breach of duty occurs. 
They are in no relationship to the target firm, and they do not harm the raider 
(but rather help him to let the bid go through).1 As far as hostile insiders are 
concerned, their trading activity will usually be prosecuted if they are in a fiduciary 
relationship with the raider or their knowledge is derived from a source with such 
a relationship.2. The reason is that the hostile insider harms the raider by driving 
up the target firm’s share prices faster than it would have been the case otherwise. 
Thus, he reaps part of the potential profits of the raider.
A recent debate questions the presumption that a hostile raider is necessarily 
harmful for the take over process. The main argument is3 that by acquiring blocks 
of the outstanding stocks, they make the raider’s task after the announcement 
of the bid somewhat easier by eliminating the famous free rider problem (Gross­
m an/Hart (1980)). The free rider problem describes the ambiguous situation of a 
negligible small shareholder, who has every reason to believe that his own accep­
tance of the bid has no influence on the success probability of the bid and that 
he can only gain by keeping his shares. If everybody thinks this way, the bid will 
certainly not take place. However, if the shares are concentrated in the hands of 
few large investors, the raider has only to convince these shareholders, i.e., the 
problem is reduced to a bargaining problem.4 The remaining small shareholders
1A different q u est ion  is, of course, w h eth er  they  should  be su b su m ed  under th e  d isc losure  rules. In 
the  U .K .  for e x a m p le  the  recent G uinness  and B lu e  A rr o w -N a t io n a l  W e stm in s ter -U B S  scandals
are the  results o f very str ict  rules on "concert p ar t ie s” .
3In practice ,  the e x ten t  o f prosecution  will d ep en d  how far the  m isap p rop ria t ion  theory is 
ad op ted .  W ith o u t  the  m isap prop ria t ion  theory, th e  clerk of an adv is in g  m erch an t b ank , who  
finds sen s it ive  take-over new s in the  w aste -p a p er-b a sk et  does  not c o m m it  a crime.  
s See e.g . R oell  (1987)
4See e .g .  H o lm str o m /N a le b u f f (1 9 8 9 )  for a form al m o d e l  in w hich the  free rider problem disap-
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will then have an incentive to sell, because in the case of a successful bid they 
incur the risk of being diluted.
The empirical relevance of the argument is hard to judge. It actually might be 
in the interest of a raider to overcome this negative externality of the disclosure 
mark by leaking take-over news to arbitrageurs. He will loose money to them, but 
at least the chance of a successful bid will rise. The arbitrageurs’ activity might 
be even in the interest of the target firm’s shareholders, since they tend to drive 
prices up to their ” right” value. But at least on European markets shareholdings 
tend to be very much concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors 
anyhow, and then the need for arbitrageurs is much less apparent.
A.3 The Incentive Effect on Managers
The discussion of incentive problems is quite similar to the one in section 4 in the 
main text. Therefore we shall only briefly discuss the difference between the raider 
firm and the raider’s managers. On the one hand existing rules allow only the firm 
to purchase shares of the target firm; its managers are treated as ordinary insiders. 
On the other hand the main effort of finding an appropriate target firm, developing 
a new strategy and implementing the bid is not accomplished by the "firm”, but 
by its managers. The neo-classical school would argue in this case that the real 
incentives have to be set on the level of the managers and not on the level of the 
firm.1 But this would almost certainly set the wrong incentives. Since managers 
do not invest their own money in the bid but the money of their shareholders, 
there would be an obvious temptation towards purely distributional take-overs 
and mergers; even without welfare gains the managers could earn enormous extra 
returns before the announcement of the bid.
pears w ith  a finite num ber of large shareholders even w ith o u t  barga in ing .
1 A ga in  the  b est  reference for this line of reasoning is M a n n e  (1 96 6 ) .
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C h a p t e r  2
P r ic e  c o m p e t i t i o n  b e t w e e n  m a r k e t  m a k e r s  in  m a r k e t s
WITH INFORMED SPECULATION
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1. Introduction.
In recent years much attention has been devoted to the price formation on stock 
exchanges which are organized as dealer markets. Most models derive the bid 
and ask prices on such markets by inventory-theoretic considerations: The two 
main strands of the literature focus either on the fundamental risk for risk averse 
market makers who are forced to deviate from their optimal portfolio position (for 
a survey see Stoll(1985)), or on the adverse selection risk created by the presence 
of better informed ” insiders” (Glosten/Milgrom(1985), Kyle(1985)). Yet very little 
attention has been spent on a careful modelling of the strategic interaction of all 
the participants of such markets. In particular the adverse selection literature just 
imposes zero-profit conditions without explicitly modelling the interaction between 
competing market makers. While the bidding procedure of Glosten/Milgrom and 
Kyle might be justifiable in a specialist market in which the specialist observes the 
market demand before setting prices, the situation of typical dealer markets poses 
much more severe problems. On these markets competing dealers quote prices 
and quantities and are obliged by an explicit (London Stock Exchange, New York 
NASDAQ) or an implicit convention (Foreign Exchange Markets) to stick to their 
quotations.
In this chapter we will therefore provide an explicit game-theoretic treatment of 
the effect of adverse selection in such dealer markets. Potential clients on these 
markets are either ” innocent” liquidity traders or well-informed insiders, who trade 
via competing market makers. The market makers face the problem, that they 
cannot condition their prices on the respective type of trader. Thus they will incur 
in average losses on the well informed insiders and will try to compensate this 
by gains from the liquidity traders (who are forced to trade by some unspecified 
exogenous reason). They achieve this by setting an ask-price above and a bid-price 
below the asset’s underlying ”true” value. The spread between these two prices will 
depend in general on the probability of informed trading, the transaction volume 
and the asset’s volatility.
This chapter will investigate the impact of competition intensity (more precisely: 
the number of market makers) on the quality of the market, i.e., the size of the 
market spread. It turns out that in a market in which market makers have to
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commit themselves before observing the actual order flow, the number of market 
makers is an important determinant of the bid-ask-spread.
In our model first market makers quote prices for a certain quantity, and given 
these prices potential clients determine their optimal trading strategy. Under these 
circumstances risk-neutral insiders without capacity constraints have an incentive 
to deal with every market maker as much as possible as long as the quoted price 
is favourable to them given their information. They will choose for every mar­
ket maker the profit maximizing quantity given the prices of this market maker 
and independent of the prices of the competing market makers. Assuming that 
there is only a limited amount of uninformed liquidity trading, this leads to the 
phenomenon that a growing number of market makers induces relatively more 
informed trading: On the one hand the market makers compete for the limited 
amount of liquidity motivated trading, but on the other hand their risk to get 
informed trading is independent of their competitors.
Thus the individual market maker faces a bidding problem for an asset with an 
expected value which depends on the number of his competitors. Accordingly, his 
risk exposure is growing with the number of his competitors and in equilibrium 
he will balance this by a higher bid-ask-spread. While this seems an intuitive 
argument, it is however not clear whether it also induces a higher market spread,
i.e., a ”worsen market. The market makers can vary prices and quantities. Hence, 
the liquidity traders could try to distribute their demand among several market 
makers, such that their total cost does not become necessarily bigger.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a very simple model with 
fixed quantities that illustrates the intuition. In this model we can show in par­
ticular that the market spread, i.e., the difference between the best bid and the 
worst ask price is growing with the number of market makers. Moreover, we give 
conditions under which a monopolist might be preferred by the market. Section 
3 presents a general model, that allows for an endogenous choice of both prices 
and quantities. Section 4 discusses the role of discreteness vs. continuity in the 
class of such models. The final section discusses the relevance of the model for real 
markets, in particular the London Stock Exchange. An appendix contains parts of 
the proofs.
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2. Price Com petition w ith Fixed Quantities.
2.1 The Model
We consider a market in which a single risky asset is traded. Its liquidation value v 
after the market closes is randomly distributed with commonly known distribution 
function.
There are informed and uninformed traders in the market who can trade this asset 
only via market makers. We assume that there are n different market makers for 
the asset at the Stock Exchange. Furthermore we assume, that a regulator has 
imposed a certain minimum quantity, say q = 1. Every market maker sets buying- 
and selling-prices and is obliged to transact at these prices. We model this as a 
two-stage-game.
In the first stage every market maker i (i =  sets two prices (A i,B i ). He
commits himself to trade in the second period any quantity q with 0 < | q |<  1 for 
the ask-price A, and the bid-price 2?t . At this point we assume, that he will not 
trade quantities which are bigger than 1.
At the next stage nature draws the true realisation of the asset and the next 
trader. With probability /z he will be informed about the asset’s true value and 
with probability 1 — \l he will be uninformed. Both types observe all the different 
prices when they arrive.
If the trader is informed, we assume that he knows the true value of v. In this 
section we will assume that the asset’s liquidation value v has only two realizations 
with equal probability, a ”good” one and a ”bad” one. We normalise this such that 
v is given by
1 with prob =  -  
2
v =
—1 with prob =  -  
2
One could imagine this return structure as arising through a take-over-bid. Every­
body knows that a bid will take place, but only the insider knows in advance the 
value of the bid. The negative lower bid is just a normalization.
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The informed trader then determines quantities x x, xn which he wants to trade 
with the different market makers, such that his profits given the different prices 
are maximal. Informed traders are assumed to be risk neutral speculators without 
capacity constraints, that means their profits from trading with market maker i 
are given by
Ei =  (v — Ai)x{ resp. E{ =  (jB, — v)xt ,
if they buy shares resp. if they sell shares. Their problem is to maximize this expres­
sion for every market maker i and we obtain demand functions =  *,•({;, A,-,!^).
If the trader is uninformed we assume that his demand u is the realization of a 
random variable u which has only two realizations with equal probability, i.e.,
11 with prob =  -
u =
1— 1 with prob =  -  .
2
The problem of the uninformed trader is to determine quantities U u..,un such 
that his costs resp. his earnings are minimal resp. maximal, i.e. he minimizes
n n
^ 2  pi ui where ^  u{ = u ,
*=1 i = 1
where = A+ if he buys and P{ = if he sells. As a result we obtain demand 
functions =  u, (u, A x,.., An1B l i .., B n).
We are now looking for a subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in this game, i.e. we 
solve backwards first for the optimal quantity responses to the proposed prices, 
and then given these optimal responses of the uninformed traders we look for an 
Nash- equilibrium in prices at the first stage.
The optimal responses of the traders are in this case very easy to calculate. Since 
an uninformed trader only wants to trade one unit of the asset and the price 
schedules are flat, he will simply go to the market maker who charges the best 
price, i.e. to min(A, ), if he is a buyer and to max(iJj), if he is a seller. If several
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market makers charge the same best price, we assume that he trades with equal 
probability with each of them. The following results are independent of the form 
of the sharing rule.
If the trader is informed, he knows the true realization of v. Since he is a risk 
neutral speculator his optimal trading strategy is then given by
x{ =  1 if Ai < 1 and v =  1
Xi =  —1 if Bi > —1 and v =  — 1
Xi =  0 otherwise .
We note that the uninformed demand from market maker i depends on all prices 
whereas the insider demand only depends on the price of market maker i. It is 
this strategic behaviour of the insiders which drives the results of the chapter. The 
usual assumption that insiders only deal with one market maker, is not tenable in 
our setting.
Given these optimal responses we can now calculate the Nash-equilibrium in prices 
of the first stage. In the sequel we will assume that market makers only charge 
symmetric prices P{ = =  — Z^, i.e. the strategy space is only one-dimensional.
In fact, it is possible to show that the unique equilibrium in prices is a symmetric 
equilibrium, because of the symmetry assumptions on v and u. We will not show 
this, but assume instead the one-dimensionality of the strategy space.
We assume that the market makers are expected ex-post-profit maximizers, i.e. 
given the prices of their competitors they maximise
E< = [Pi - E { v \ q  = l)]Prob(q =  1) +  [E(v | q =  -1 )  -  (~Pi)]Prob(q =  - l )  ,
where q denotes the demand which the market maker expects in the second stage. 
Define <j>k =  yyy. We calculate E> then explicitly as follows:
If Pi = mm(P3) and P{ < P} for all j  ^  i then
3
= {(Pi ~ V ) \  + ~  H) \ )
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If P i ^  min(iy) then 
j
^  = ( W - l ) x  + « - l ) j )
=  (M(Pf - X ) )  ■
If Pi = mm(Pj ) but i is tied with k other market makers, then
3
F ( p _______ M ' M + ( l  -v)<i>k , p _______ t1 +  ( ! - / « ) &
*■ l i  n + i i - r i h 1 2 p + l i - r i h ’ 2
= ti(Pi - 1) + (l -  ii)Pi<f>k .
This form of the profit function is easy to see. If the market maker charges the 
best price he will earn in any case P{. With probability n  the next trader will be 
informed and he will make losses equal to 1. If there is another market maker who 
charges a better price there will be no trade with probability 1 — fi because the 
uninformed trader will not buy or sell from market maker i. If there is any trade, 
the market maker will make losses P{ — 1. The last term comes from the sharing 
rule if several market makers charge the same best price.
2.2 Existence and Properties of Equilibria
Since market makers now compete in flat price schedules we are in the situation 
of a pure Bertrand competition. However, in contrast to the standard Bertrand 
case, the strategic behaviour of the insiders implies
Claim 1:
There exists no equilibrium in pure strategies.
The proof is immediate from the discontinuities arising from the additional terms 
in the profit function. We only sketch the line of reasoning: Whoever charges the 
lowest price faces the most favourable potential composition of uninformed and 
informed demand (i.e. (1 — /x) : /x). However when both market makers charge 
the same prices, the probability that the next customer is informed is higher than 
/x. The reason is that the informed trader will come in any case, whereas the
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uninformed is indifferent between both market makers. Thus it is always profitable 
to undercut until P = fi. But if both traders charge these prices their probability 
to get informed traders is again too high and both are making expected losses. 
A deviation to P  =  1 can guarantee then zero-profits. Thus, a pure strategy 
equilibrium cannot exist.
This non-existence arises formally as in the other well known example of 
non-existence with Bertrand competition, the Bertrand-Edgeworth case. Non- 
Existence occurs because of the discontinuity of the payoffs at every P  with 
P = Px =  .. = Pn. Even a slight change of prices produces a discontinuous 
shift in the expected composition of a market maker’s clientele. If a market maker 
slightly undercuts a competitor, the probability that any actual trade comes from 
an uninformed trader increases sharply. A similar result in a bidding context has 
been observed in the first-price-auction literature with discrete signals (for the 
case of credit markets see Broecker (1990); see also footnote 1 of Milgrom (1979)). 
Since the informational content of the observation that somebody is willing to take 
one’s offer depends discontinuously on prices, undercutting in prices may produce 
a big change in the conditional expectations of v. This source of non-existence 
of pure strategy equilibria seems to be particular to models of price setting with 
asymmetric information.
In the first-price auctions with common values the bidders usually differ, because a 
priori they have obtained different information on the true value of the asset. This 
information is then interpreted conditional on the fact that at given prices trade 
occurs. Special to our example is that the information on v is contained in the 
traded quantities themselves, that is the information is not given exogenously but 
rather endogenously. We shall later show in Claim 4 that this implies non-existence 
even in the case in which we allow market makers to compete in arbitrary price 
schedules, and hence in the case in which a priori the quantities might take any 
value.
Fortunately there exists at least a mixed strategy equilibrium:
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Claim 2:
For every n > 1 there exists a finite number of mixed strategy 
equilibria. A strategy constellation (P !,..,P n) is an equilibrium if 
and only if: There are m  active market makers (m =  2 , n) and 
n — m  inactive market makers (i.e. market makers, who put all 
weight on P  =  1). The equilibrium distribution function is the 
same for every active market maker, it is atomless and defined on 
the interval [/z, l] as
Proof:
Assume player i plays the pure strategy Pi . If P, < fj. we have always Ei < 0. Thus 
we only have to show that player i is indifferent between all F<€[/z, 1], if the other 
players play the above mixed strategy.
Notice first that the probability that market maker i charges the lowest price is 
given by
(1 - F ( P i ))m- 1 .
Since the mixed strategies of the players imply that the probability of two players 
setting the same price is zero, the points of discontinuity are eliminated. The 
expected profits are therefore given by
Ei = [ii(Pi -  1) + (1 - M ^ l P r o b ^ p . v y j - i )  + n{Pt -  l J P r o b ^ y ^ i p , ^ )
=  M p  - 1) +  (i -  + n(p<—i ) ( i —( i —n R ) ) " * '1)
=  Pi -  It -  (1 -  v)Pi (1 -  (1 -  f ( P i ))m‘  ‘)
=  P i n  — (1 — n)Pi  M
=  0 .
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Furthermore, it cannot be profitable for a market maker m +  1 to become active, 
since
( l - F ( P ) ) m < ( l - F f P ) ) " * - 1 
and thus Em + 1 < 0 for every P < 1.
Uniqueness is shown in the appendix.
The above demonstration reflects the force of Bertrand competition. Bertrand com­
petition drives the average gains of every market maker just down to his expected 
losses, namely /z. The mixed strategy is then a combination of undercutting and 
loss reduction considerations. Low prices are charged with the hope to undercut, 
high prices are charged to limit potential losses. This also determines the range 
of possible prices. Since the market maker with the highest price will only obtain 
” lemons” , there will be an incentive to circumvent losses and to charge P  =  1. 
Since every market maker has this option, this immediately implies zero profits. 
Zero profits on the other hand imply that the lowest price which is charged in 
equilibrium, will be P  =  /x, the zero-profit price of the market maker with the best 
price.
We investigate now the behaviour of the spread for a growing number n of poten­
tial market makers. A priori nothing has to happen. Since an equilibrium with m  
active market makers is an equilibrium for any n > m  potential market makers, in­
troduction of new potential competitors may leave the actually played equilibrium 
unchanged. However, the set of equilibria becomes bigger.
This leads us to study the unique equilibrium with all n market makers active. 
An inspection of the equilibrium distribution function shows that the individual 
market maker’s growing risk exposure induces a growing average spread of the 
market maker (the distribution functions move monotonically to the right with 
a growing n). Since he cannot control the quality of his demand, the possibility 
to trade with ”bad” risks, i.e., informed traders, gets the bigger the more market 
makers are in the market. The reason being that the uninformed demand will only 
go to the cheapest market maker, whereas the informed trader will try to exploit 
every possibility to make profits and becomes the dominant player on the market. 
The only way to compensate for this higher risk is to set higher prices on average.
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However, in order to judge the overall impact on the market it is important to 
investigate the behaviour of the market spread, i.e. the lowest spread which is 
charged to the uninformed traders. Since quantities are not split up in | q |<  1, it 
is important for the uninformed trader that the best attainable price P  (which in 
this setting would be half of the market spread) is as low as possible.
A priori the behaviour of the random variable min(Pi) is not clear, since we have%
two opposing effects: on the one hand n is growing, and on the other hand the 
weight on the prices is shifted to the right. An inspection of the profit function 
shows however, that the lowest price is growing with n. A growing n and everything 
else equal would imply that the individual market maker has to do relatively more 
business with the insiders, which will induce losses. His only possibility to retain 
non-negative profit is to keep the probability to do profitable business at a given P 
constant, i.e., independent of the number of his competitors. But this probability 
is just the probability that the lowest price of his n — 1 competitors is bigger than 
P. This is only possible, if the probability that the lowest price of the n competitors 
is bigger than a given P , is growing with n. Claim 3 gives a formal proof of this 
argument.
Claim 3:
In average the lowest available spread in the market grows with 
the number of active market makers. More precisely:
£(m in(P()) /  •» 1 — fi
Proof: Since in the zero-profit condition
0 =  (M(Pi - l )  +  (l-M )^]P rob '‘(Pi < PyVi ?  0 + /i(P (—X)Prob“ (3y /  » | P< > J> )
the losses and gains are independent of the number of competitors, this must also 
be true for the according probabilities in the above expression. Because
Prob” < P, Vj ^  i) = Probn (P< < m in(P,)) ,
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this means, that for every n min(Py) has the same distribution and thus the same
expectation independent of n. But this implies, that the minimum of all n price 
distributions has a higher expected value than in the according equilibrium with 
n — 1 competitors, since the distribution function of min(Py) is shifted monotoni-
3
cally to the right:
Prob" (min(Py) < P) =  P r o b " ^  < P) +  Probn(P< > P)Prob"(min(Py) < P)
3 3
= Probn [P{ < P)Prob" (min(Py > P) +  Probn (min(Py) < P) .
3 #  * 3 *  »
Since the distribution of min(Pi) is independent of n, and the distribution of P{
3^i
moves to the right with a growing n, this expression is obviously falling in n.
The upper limit can be formally calculated as
i
£?(min(A)) = n f  P(1 -  F(P))n~l df(P)
V-
1
= / i+  f  ( l - F ( P ) ) ndP 
S - J L - l n £ )  .
l - I*
The fact that the convergence is monotone in n follows by a straightforward deriva­
tion with respect to n.
2.3 The Case of a Monopolist Market Maker
Traditional wisdom would expect that a growing number of market participants 
should lead to lower prices through growing competition. In our model the higher 
risk exposure of the individual market maker works against this. Nevertheless we 
see both forces at work. While it is true that prices get worse with the number 
of active market makers, these prices are still better than the prices a monopolist
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would charge, namely P =  1. The Bertrand type price competition implies that 
the advantages of competition are already fully effective for two market makers 
(i.e., prices are driven down to the expected value) and for more market makers 
the risk exposure effect gets dominant.
However, this is not a general result and relies on the fact that in our example the 
uninformed demand is completely price inelastic (translated in our model by price- 
independent arrival probabilities). In different examples the risk exposure effect 
may dominate the competition effect to such an extent that the lowest spread is 
charged by a monopolistic market maker rather than several competing market 
makers. We will now develop such an example.
Let us assume that the potential aggregate demand of uninformed traders is highly 
price elastic, i.e., the number of uninformed traders willing to trade falls drastically 
with slight price movements. We could think of that as a ”thin” market. We 
translate that in our model by assuming a different probabilistic structure of the 
arrival process. Since a informed trader does not care about prices, the probability 
that an informed trader comes next should grow with P . If we assume a very thin 
market, i.e., most of the noise traders are only willing to trade at prices around 
0, the optimal price for the monopolist may be a very low P, because it implies 
the best expected mixture of informed and uninformed traders. In that case the 
monopoly profits will be very low. If two market makers want to share this market, 
their potential gains are so low that they are forced to put most of the weight on 
high P ’s to limit potential losses.
The rationale for a monopolistic dealer market would thus be: Whenever the pos­
sibilities of the monopolist to exploit the market are already limited to such an 
extent that the benefits of potential competition become relatively small, the pres­
ence of the risk exposure effect may render a monopolistic market the alternative 
strictly preferred by the ” innocent” trader. In this example the limitation is given 
by an endogenous data of the market, its "thinness” . One could, of course, also 
conceive external regulations which limit the monopolist’s possibilities or a combi­
nation of both. An example for the latter could be the New York Stock Exchange, 
where specialists face both regulations and to a certain extent the competition of 
outside traders.
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To be more precise about our example, assume v as before and the following ar­
rival process (where for simplicity we restrict ourselves again to symmetric bid and 
ask prices): If P  is the smallest price offered by a market maker, the probability 
that an uninformed trader seller arrives next is given by A ^  and that an unin­
formed buyer arrives by as well. Accordingly the probability of an informed 
speculator arriving is given by 1 — A(P), where A(P)  is defined for a small e > 0 
by
1 -  £ if 0 < P  < 2e
A(P) =
1 _ £  1 _ £ P  if 2e < P  < 1 .1 — 2e 1 — 2t
With an analogous reasoning as before, the expected monopoly profits are calcu­
lated as
£  =  P - ( 1 - , 4 ( P ) )  , 
and P = 2e is the profit maximizing price.
With the techniques of Claim 2 one can easily calculate the mixed strategy equi­
librium for two active players, namely
if £ < P  <  2e
(1 -  e)P
F(P)  =  ; ■1 if 2e < P  < 1
x '  2 (1  - e )
1 if P  =  1 .
The probability that in equilibrium both players play P = 1, is given by
Prob(Px =  1,P2 =  1) =  ( -— —)2 > 2c for small e .
2 2f
Therefore the lowest average bid-ask-spread will be higher than the monopoly­
spread 4f. If there are more than two market makers the spread will become even
worse.
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3. The General M odel.
More natural than the introduction of a regulator who determines the minimum 
quantity for which market makers are obliged to quote prices, is the assumption 
that the market makers set prices and quantities, or even more generally that they 
compete in price functions. Therefore we assume now that at the first stage of 
the game the market makers set price functions (q) and commit themselves to 
trade any quantity q which arrives in the second period for the price P-fa). The 
informed speculator’s optimization problem
maxi?, =  (t; — Pt (xj))x, 
resp. the uninformed trader’s problem
n  n
min Pj (u^Ui where =  u ,
»=i *=1
become then obviously much more complicated.
In the sequel we show, that the results of section 2 will not change, if we allow 
for arbitrary price functions at the first stage. To avoid trivial non-existence of 
equilibria, we will impose that the quoted price functions are such that the maxi­
mization problems of the second stage are solvable. For the sake of simplicity we 
will furthermore assume symmetric price schedules, i.e., P(q) =  — P{—q).
Assume that the n market makers propose price schedules Pi, . . ,Pn at the first 
stage. The optimal strategy of the uninformed trader will then be a distribution 
r a ( u i , w h e r e  the arguments are solutions of the maximization problem 
and the form of is determined by any given sharing rule. For the informed 
traders we can assume without loss of generality that in case of indifference they 
trade the smallest profit-maximizing quantities X i,..,xn. We can now show the 
generalizations of Claim 1 and Claim 2.
Claim 4:
There exists no equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Proof:
The proof proceeds in two steps. We first assume that in equilibrium no mixed 
equilibrium will be played at the second stage, i.e., for every realization u of u 
there is exactly one optimal strategy (u !,..,un) of the uninformed players, where
n
£  u{ = u. For this case we show that any function implying a strategy with
»= i
| ut |<  1 can be broken by a function which induces | |=  1 and finally we
apply Claim 1, which gives us non-existence for the latter case. In the second 
part we show that indeed there is no mixed strategy equilibrium in quantities. For 
symmetry reasons it is enough to look only at the case u =  1 and v =  1.
1) Assume that the uninformed trader resp. the informed trader trade resp. x{ 
with market maker t. Profit maximization of the insider implies
(1 -  P ^ X ,)^  > (1 -  P ^ tt^ tt*  .
If the inequality were strict, it would be profitable for the market maker to raise 
P(xi) until equality is achieved. This reduces the losses from the insiders and leaves 
the profits from outsiders unchanged. Thus, in equilibrium we always must have
(1 -  Pt (Xi))Xi = (1 -  Pi(ut))ui .
In particular, for every q > we have
(1 -  # (« < ))« ,-  >  (1 -  Pi(q))q ,
and hence for i =  1, ..,n
Pi(q) > P» («» ) for all q > u{.
Now assume that there is a market maker i with 0 < < 1 and that P» (u,) =
min(Py(tty)). Then it is profitable for market maker i to deviate by setting Pi(q) =
j
1 for 0 < q < 1, and Pi(l) =  P<(uO +  e, for e sufficiently small. Since for all j  ^  i 
Uj < 1 and P} (q) > P} (uy) for all q > tty, the other n — 1 market makers cannot 
serve the whole market at the price Pi(tt*), and market maker i will attract the 
whole informed and uninformed demand. It is easy to see that this will raise
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profits: Because originally the informed traders were indifferent between playing 
u, and Xi, a deviation to = Pifoi) will multiply by the same factor both the 
losses from the informed and the gains from the uninformed traders. Since profits 
are nonnegative, they will at least not decrease. Thus, in equilibrium only price 
schedules inducing | u,- |=  1 can be played. But the argument of claim 2 shows 
that in this case no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
2) To show that there is no mixed strategy equilibrium in quantities, assume that 
uf < u? are both profit maximizing solutions of the uninformed trader. We first 
notice, that the case of 0 = uf is excluded by the usual undercutting argument. 
Thus assume 0 < u f. Then we have i*-(uf)uf =  i^(u?)u?, because if not, market 
maker i could eliminate the less favourable case by raising the according price.
Furthermore, profit maximization of the insider implies
(1 -  Pi(xi))xi > (1 -  Pi(uf))uf > (1 -  P<(uf))uf ,
and it is profitable to deviate for market maker i: Set i^(u?) =  1 and change 
Pi (a:,), such that
(1 -  P i(x ,))X i =  (1 -  Pi(u?))u? .
Hence, the only remaining candidates for an equilibrium are price functions, such 
that given a realization u there is exactly one optimal strategy (uf , . . ,u “) for the 
outsiders.
Now we show, that the mixed strategy equilibrium of section 2 remains an equi­
librium in the more general strategy space.
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Claim 5:
For every n > 1 there exist mixed strategy equilibria. For every 
m  =  2, ..,n  there is an equilibrium with m  active and n — m  
inactive market makers (i.e. market makers, who put all weight 
on P  =  1). The equilibrium distribution function is the same for 
every active market maker and atomless. It randomizes over the 
functions
Psign(q) if | q |=  1
P{9) =
sign(q) otherwise ,
where P  € [/j, l] is distributed as
Proof: Assume, that market makers i =  1,2, ..m play the above strategies and that 
market maker 1 tries to deviate with a price function Px (q). This will induce the 
informed quantities x x, with
(1 -  P (x i))z i > (1 -  P (ft))f t for all qt .
If u =  1, the uninformed quantities are given by
W’min if [PI (^min )^min "t" I l^ min) — min (P<) ,
t'= 2 , . . ,n
U X =
0 otherwise ,
where umin =  argmin(Pi (u^Ux + 1 — ux). An analogous expression holds, if u =  —1. 
Given the assumption of symmetry on the price functions, the profit functions can 
be expressed in terms of the positive quantities (as in section 2). Market maker
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l ’s profits are given by
m — 1
^ 1  M ( - ^ l  ( ^ 1  )  i ) ^ l  "I”  ( l  l  ( ^ m i n ) ^ m i n  ( l  P[Pl ( t t m i n  ) ^ m i n  “ I”  1  ^ m i n ) )
f n  e \  -«\ , n  f  \  i  (■* I ( ^ m  in  ) ^ m  in  “H 1  ^ m i n )
= M (-P i (a :1) -  l ) * i  + M ^ i ( « m i n ) « m i n  \   T 1 ------------------Pi (umin)umin +  l - u min
— f l U f n i n  ~|“ fJ>Pi (umin)umin . v j '
■ P l ( t t m i n ) t t m i n  +  1  ~  « m i n
<0 , 
because
P i  ( ^ m  in  )  — P i  ( ^ m  in  ) ^ m  in  "h  I in  •
With a similar argument it is shown that also for an inactive market maker a 
deviation is unprofitable.
It is interesting that the proofs of both Claim 4 and Claim 5 rely on a particular 
effect: The market makers always have an incentive to bid for the whole market. 
They quote competitive prices for large quantities, rather than trying to share the 
market between them.
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4. Discrete versus Continuous M odels.
Although the pure Bertrand competition leads to an intuitive result even in the 
generalized framework of section 3, the role of the discreteness of the example 
for the non-existence result is not entirely clear. To investigate this question a bit 
further, we propose to introduce in the general model continuous random variables 
v and u.
Assume that the liquidation value v has a continuous distribution function with 
support (—00 , 00), mean v0 and variance sjj. Let the uninformed demand u be the 
realization of a random variable t2, with continuous distribution function, support 
(—00 , 00), mean 0 and variance s*.
This model has a relation to the first-price-auction literature for divisible assets. 
There are, however, two crucial differences to the standard specification of such 
an auction (e.g. Wilson(1979)). First, we assume profit-maximizing behaviour of 
the traders at the second stage rather than a market-clearing-rule. Second, we 
introduce a cost-term in the market makers’ profit function, namely the expected 
losses arising through insider trading. Both the expected gains from outsiders and 
the expected losses from insiders depend on the whole price function. For con­
tinuous random variables u and v this price dependence becomes non-trivial, and 
the auction-theoretic approach to reduce the problem to a pointwise maximization 
problem in 2R does not work any more.
A priori it is difficult to see how to treat the problem in the rather large set of 
all functions. In a first, heuristic step we will therefore reduce the strategy space 
of the market makers to a more tractable function space, the space of all linear 
functions.
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Claim 6 :
Let n > 2 and 0 < /z < 1. Assume furthermore that the market 
makers compete in linear price schedules Pi(q) = a. +  6.<7.
Then there exists an unique equilibrium in this strategy space. It 
is symmetric and given by
The equilibrium profits of the market makers are positive and are 
given by
The spread for a given quantity | q | is thus given by
• " • D - i / S i / S j ' * '  ■
The calculations are straightforward and are contained in the appendix. The result 
is analogous to Kyle(1989), who considers a game in which insiders, market makers 
(called uninformed speculators) and uninformed noise traders draw simultaneously. 
Fixing the strategy space in the first stage has the same consequences as the Nash- 
assumption in a simultaneous play. The equilibrium has the intuitive properties 
familiar from Kyle’s work: the spread is growing with the asset’s volatility and 
falling with the volatility of expected turnover.
The linear strategies create a somewhat puzzling result concerning the number 
of market makers: Although the spread of the individual market maker becomes 
larger (i.e. his price schedule becomes steeper), the market spread is falling with 
the number of competitors. Since the price schedules are linear functions, an unin­
formed trader with demand u will always have an incentive to split up his demand 
between the market makers to reduce his total costs: in equilibrium his demand is 
given by
XL
Ui(u) =  — for all t = 1 ,..,n  .
n
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Thus, the costs of a noise trader with demand u (i.e., the market spread faced by 
him) is given by
C(u) = v0u +  b(—)u n
, 1 I M I n sv 2
= *'“ +  2 V w v ^ ^ : u  ’
and this expression is falling in n. Competition in linear price functions is less 
brutal than Bertrand competition, because it does not immediately reduce profits 
to zero. The stronger competition becomes (i.e. the more competitors are in the 
market), the more surplus has to be given up by the market makers. They can only 
partially compensate the adverse selection effect by widening their spreads. It is 
this effect, which makes the uninformed traders better off with more competition.
Nevertheless it is quite difficult to interpret this result, since the importance of the 
linearity assumption is unclear. The linearity creates somehow artificially positive 
profits of the market makers, and these positive profits in turn will be dimin­
ished by a growing intensity of competition. However, it is open what happens in 
equilibrium if we allow for a larger strategy space. It remains to be solved in the 
general case, how to treat an auction for shares in the absence of the usual market 
clearing rule with strategic behaviour of both insiders and uninformed traders at 
the second stage.
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5.Discussion.
This chapter tries to give an explicit model of competition in financial markets 
with asymmetric information. It replaces the usual zero-profit condition imposed 
on the market makers with a price setting mechanism of several utility maximizing 
auctioneers. We have seen that in a world with asymmetric information among 
traders and the auctioneers (i.e., the market makers) the strategic interaction 
between the price setters may create severe problems of non-existence of pure 
strategy equilibria. This phenomenon arises because the information content of 
traded quantities depends directly on the quoted prices. For a given quantity, 
changes in prices induce a revision in the forecasts of the future realization of the 
risky asset conditional on the observation that this quantity is traded. We have 
shown both in the special case of Claim 1 with fixed quantities and in the general 
case of Claim 4 with arbitrary quantities that this leads to the non-existence of pure 
strategy equilibria. However, a unique mixed strategy equilibrium always exists. 
It has the property that an increase in the number of market makers induces a 
higher market spread, because the risk exposure of the individual market maker 
increases.
Behind our analysis of the quality of a market lies an implicit assumption con­
cerning the nature of liquidity traders and insiders. Insiders in our model are best 
seen as speculators who have acquired on a more or less illegal way precise infor­
mation about the risky asset. This chapter takes the approach that one should not 
be concerned by the welfare of these speculators, but only by the welfare of the 
traders without access to the private information.
The implication of our model is then that a Stock Exchange deciding to organize 
trading via market makers with the obligation to quote bid- and ask- prices at 
every time, should limit the number of market makers to one or at most to two 
market makers. The argument is, that a bidding contest between risk neutral 
market makers implies zero profits (i.e. more precisely, zero excess returns), and 
that the incentive to bid always for the whole market will induce a higher risk the 
more market makers are present.
However, one could argue, that assuming risk neutrality biases the case in favour
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of our proposition. The attempts to derive results concerning the market structure 
from the assumption of risk averse market makers (Ho and Stoll (1983), Grossman 
and Miller (1988)), seem to indicate that the spread should fall with the number 
of market makers. Ho and Stoll consider imbalances in the market market makers 
inventories arising through trade and argue that competition prevents spreads to 
be set by the market makers with the less favourable inventory position. Grossman 
and Miller use the argument that a higher number of market makers will lead to 
a better allocation of the fundamental risk (which plays no role in a risk neutral 
setting), and thus to lower spreads.
From a regulator’s point of view one could oppose to these claims that the same 
goal could be achieved by designating a single market maker with a large capital 
basis and low risk aversion. Given the negative externalities of competition arising 
through insider trading, this should still be the best solution.
Moreover, from a descriptive point of view the robustness of these models is un­
clear. They neither incorporate the risk exposure effect in their models nor do they 
model the interaction between market makers as a strategic game. To reach more 
precise conclusions about the market structure of markets with designated market 
makers, a treatment of the risk exposure and the risk diversification effect should 
therefore be a natural extension of our game.
This will in particular imply a careful treatment of the obligation to deal with com­
peting market makers. On the one hand, the inter dealer trade is the basic means 
to redistribute fundamental risk. On the other hand, market makers should be rea­
sonably treated as ’quasi-insiders” . Their constant presence on the market gives 
them certainly an informational advantage over outside investors. Accordingly, 
since market makers can identify their competitors as potentially better informed 
traders, there is an obvious incentive to discriminate against them. The outcome 
of the interplay of fundamental risk diversification and insider risk exposure will 
then crucially depend on the possibilities to redistribute large quantities profitably 
among the market makers on the hand, and to quote only prices for small quanti­
ties to avoid the insider risk on the other hand. Dealing with a competing market 
maker always involves two possibilities: the redistribution of fundamental risk in 
a profitable way for both dealers and the danger that the other market maker just
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uploads his informed trading on the other market makers.
The subtle strategy choices of the market makers were demonstrated in late 1988 
by the developments on the London Stock Exchange. Some dealers had given 
up the practice of quoting prices for relatively large quantities. Instead, they only 
quoted prices for the minimum quantity (for which they are able to offer a narrower 
spread, since both fundamental and insider risk are falling). Implicitly they agreed 
to stick to the quoted prices for much bigger quantities as long as the clients were 
not professional or semi- professional traders; the latter could not trade at all or 
only for less favourable prices. Yet, given the market rule that market makers are 
only obliged to deal with each other up to the minimum quantity quoted by them, 
they were not able any more to redistribute the fundamental risk. Meanwhile, the 
obligation to deal with competing market makers has been abolished completely. 
Reducing fundamental and insider risk at the same time seems to be impossible.
This example shows that a richer strategic analysis incorporating risk aversion and 
the problems of inter dealer trade is certainly the most interesting extension of 
our approach.
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A ppendix.
1) Proof of uniqueness of Claim 2:
The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1 shows that no mixed strategy equilib­
rium with atoms is possible. Step 2 establishes that any atomless mixed strategy 
equilibrium is the one given in Claim 2.
Step 1: Assume first that market maker i puts in equilibrium positive weight a 
on a price P  with 1 > P > /x. First we consider the case that the other market 
makers do not charge prices in an interval [P, P  +  e], but charge prices above. 
Then, it would be profitable for the market maker to raise P. On the other hand, 
there must exist a constant c > 0 such that the other market makers do not charge 
prices in the interval [P, P  +  c]. If not, they should exploit the discontinuity of the 
pay-offs at P  and undercut. But if the other market makers only charge prices 
below P  it cannot be optimal to put positive weight on a loss making strategy.
If P  = /x then there exists for every weight a  a positive number e, such that 
the other players cannot charge profitably prices Py £  [/x,/x +  if], because for a 
Pi € +
Ej < Py — /x—(1—fi)P}Prob(Pi < Py) < (/x+e)(l —a ( l —p))— /x < 0 for small c . 
Thus it is always profitable to raise P from \i to /x +  c.
Step 2: We show now that every equilibrium with 2 < m < n active market makers 
and no atoms in [/x, 1) has the given form. Denote by Fx,.., Fm the distribution 
functions in equilibrium. The proof proceeds in three parts. We first show that 
every market maker makes zero profits in equilibrium. Second, we show that every
symmetric equilibrium (i.e., F* = Py for all i ^  j )  is the one of Claim 2. Finally,
we show that every equilibrium must be symmetric.
a) If equilibrium profits of market maker t are given by Ei9 we know from the 
definition of a mixed strategy equilibrium that for every P  which in equilibrium 
is played by market maker t
(1 .1 ) E{ = P — fi — (1 — M) P (  1 -  I J ( 1  -  P , ( P ) ) )  .
3*i
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To show that =  0 for every market maker, we have to show that for every 
market maker F<(P) < 1 for every P  < 1, i.e., that each market maker plays 
P  =  1 in equilibrium. Therefore assume that there is a Py < 1 such that for some 
market maker j  F3 (Py) =  1. If j  is chosen such that Py is the lowest of all prices 
fulfilling this condition for some market maker, then there will be a market maker 
1 (* 7^  j )  and a P  with 1 > P > Pj such that
E, = P - ^ - ( l - n ) P ( l - 0 )
= H ( P ~  1) •
Thus, equilibrium profits of market maker i would be negative which is impossible 
in equilibrium.
b) Assume that the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e.,
P (P ) =  Fl (P) =  .. =  Pm (P) for all P  6  [/*, 1] .
Since equilibrium profits are zero, we know from (1.1) that for all P  which are 
played in equilibrium
o = p - /x - ( i - ^ ) p ( i - ( i - f ( p ) r - 1) .
Solving this equation for F  and using the continuity of F  we obtain precisely the 
solution of Claim 2 for all P  G [//, 1].
c) Thus, it only remains to show that every equilibrium is symmetric. Assume the 
contrary and define
a := sup{P | P (P )  ^  Fj (P) for some i and for at least one j  ^  *} .
Clearly, n < a < 1 and F< (a) = F3 (a) for all j  ^  t . Moreover, the continuity of 
the F ’s implies that there is a positive number e such that for every P  G [a — 6, a] 
Fi (P) /  Fj (P ) for some i and for at least one j  ^  i.
The idea of the proof is now roughly as follows. With (1.1) we show that for prices 
slightly below a some market makers cannot play strictly increasing F ’s. But if
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some market makers do not put any weight on these prices, it cannot be optimal 
for any market maker to charge these prices in equilibrium. The rest of the proof 
makes this idea precise.
We first show that there exists a c > 0, such that in [a — e, a] there are k (k >
1) market makers with F{ constant and m — k market makers with strictly 
increasing. If all were increasing, then equation (1.1) gives for all P G  [a — 6, a]
r i u -  Fy(P))) for all t =  l ,. . ,m  .
y
Pairwise subtraction of equation (1.2) and subsequent division implies that 
F{(P) =  Fj(P) for all i , j  =  l,..,m , which is impossible by the definition of 
a.
Thus, assume wlog. that the k market makers with constant F{ are numbered as 
t =  1,.., k. The definition of a mixed strategy equilibrium and (1.2) imply then for 
every P  € [a — e, a)
m
(1.3) 0 > JP - M- ( l - M) P ( l - ( l - . F \ ( a ) ) * - 1 J ]  (1 -■*/(*’)))
y=f c +i
and for » =  k +  1,.., m
m
(1.4) 0 — P  — /i — (1 — fi)P(l  — (1 — Fi(a))k J J  ( 1 - ^ ( P ) ) )  .
j=k+l,jjti
But by construction a is chosen such that for all P > a Ft (P) =  F3- (P) for all i ^  j .  
Since Fk + 1 is increasing and Fx constant in [a — e,a], we obtain for P  G [a — £, a)
1 — Fk + i (P) > 1 — Fi (a) ,
and thus from (1.3)
m
0 > P — — (1 — p )P ( l  — (1 — Fi (a))* n  ( l - * ^ ) ) )  *
}  =  k +  2
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which is a contradiction to (1.4). Hence, a is not well defined, i.e., every mixed 
strategy equilibrium must be symmetric.
2) Proof of Claim 6:
The proof consists of three parts. We first solve the second stage of the game and 
derive the market makers’ profit functions. Part 2 constructs the equilibrium and 
part 3 shows the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Parti: Given the linear price strategies and the resulting quadratic profit functions, 
it is easy to calculate the optimal responses in period 2. The informed trader will 
choose as a response to prices
Pi(q) =a,i+ b{q
the strategy
Xi = ( v -  a{)/2bi, 
which is the solution to his first order condition
v — a{ — 2bi Xi = 0 .
The first order conditions of the uninformed are
n  — 1
2biUi — 2bn (u — ^  tty) =  an — , for i =  1.., n — 1
3 = 1
The general solution to this linear problem is given by
Ui = Ai +  BiU ,
where
, E ( I 1  i t )(o, -Oi )
ljVi
2  =-----------------e  n <>*
/= !** /
and
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n kk
D   * ^  *
~    *
f i  n t>k y= i kjtj
(To see this, just put the expressions in the first order condition.)
Denote by the strategy ut-(u ,a!, ..,an ,&i, ..,6n). In contrast to the insider de­
mand the uninformed demand is a function of all prices. Knowing these responses 
we can now treat the price competition in the first step. The market maker tries 
to anticipate the random demand in the next period given all the prices of the 
other market makers. The future demand will be given by
x^v^Pi) with prob. /z
with prob. (1 - /z) .
We assume that the market makers are risk neutral expected ex-post-profit maxi­
mizers. Given the prices of their competitors they will choose a; and bi to maximise
Ei = n Ev((Pi(xi) - v ) x i )  + (1 - / z ) £ tt((P<(u<) -  v0)iii) .
The expectations are formed with respect to the subscript random variable. For­
mally the expression can be derived by using Bayes* law. Intuitively the formula is 
clear. With probability /z the next trader is informed and in this case the market 
maker will earn and lose ux, =  to the informed trader. With
probability (l — /z) the trading contains no information and then his losses will 
just be v0tZj.
Since the strategies of the traders are linear, the arguments of the integrals are 
quadratic and this enables us to express the profit functions as simple functions 
in the variances of the asset and the noise. The first integral can be written as
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£.(<«. +  ^  -  - i *  <(s -  „>■)
= - - ^ - ^ ( ( v - V o ) 2 +  (v0 -fl»)2 +  2(5 — v0)(v0 -  a*)) 4ot-
=  - i 5« - i (u° - ai)2 •
Because the mean of u is zero, the second integral is simply equal to
(a, +  b{ A{ -  v0 )Ai + bi B] s2u , 
and combining these two expressions gives
Ei  =  o -  CLi) 2  +  (1 -  /x)(at +  bi Ai -  v0)Ai -  +  (1 “  /*)&*£?«2 •
Having obtained this simple analytical expression for the profit functions, we are 
now able to show the existence result for a Nash-equilibrium in prices.
Part 2: We first show that = v0 for all market makers. If all the market makers 
are playing a* = v0 a deviation can never be profitable regardless of the played, 
since then
~~r~ (u» Vq )2 < 0 and 4 ^
(a, +  b{Ai -  v0)Ai  < i(a< -  v0)Ai  < 0 .
To see the last inequality notice that
biA2 < ^ ( v 0 -a , i )A i  .
We obtain that in equilibrium both terms in the profit function arising from the 
intercept are equal to zero.
We construct now the symmetric equilibrium in the slopes bi. Assume wlog. that 
the market makers i = 2,.., n are playing the strategy
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-P(g) = V0 +bq 
and that market maker 1 plays the strategy
Pi (?) =  v0 +  aq .
The profit function for market maker 1 is then given by
Derivation with respect to a gives
dEj _  ^   ^&  ((n  ~  1)a  +  b) ~  2 (n  ~  2 2
da 4 a2 ((n — l)a  +  6)3
For 6 to be an equilibrium the profits of market maker 1 have to be maximal at 
a =  6, i.e.
dEi s2 . n63 — 2(n — 1)63 2
— - =  -  —  +  (1 -  u ) ------------- -----------— s2
da ia=b 4 62 ^  n3b?
= 0
(Notice that for n =  2 there is always an incentive to overcut. Together with 
the proof that every equilibrium must be symmetric (see below), this establishes 
non-existence for n = 2.)
Solving the above equation for 6 gives the desired expression if n > 2. Furthermore, 
a second derivation gives
d2E, , (1 y 2( n - l Y ( 2 a - 4 b ) _,
U *da2 2 a3 ((n — l)a  +  6)4
which shows that a = 6 is actually the maximum.
Part 3: Assume that an equilibrium is given by ((ai,6i),  ..(an,6n)). We show that 
always a» =  vQ and bx = ... = bn.
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To see the first assume wlog. that ax is the smallest and an the biggest intercept. 
If di =  an the claim is obvious. Assume therefore that di < an. If no profitable 
deviation from an shall be possible we must have
(an + bnAn -  v0)An > 0 ,
(if not a deviation to t/0 is always profitable) and since An < 0 this gives
(an +bnAn -  v0)) < 0 .
On the other hand
(- , l A \  ^ — i(an +bnA n -  v0) > an H   v0 ,
and we get
ax +  an
2 •
If no profitable deviation from dx shall be possible we must have
(dx + M x  “  *>o) i^ > 0 
and since A ± > 0 this gives with a similar reasoning as before
0 < (di +bxAi — v0) < di H   v0 ,z
and hence the contradiction
„ ^ a n + d  i
2 '
To show the second part observe first that 6* =  0 is impossible since then the 
profits are — oo. It follows that every 6, is an interior solution of
^  (bl t .,bi,.,bn) =  0 .
Obi |6, = 6j
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Define now P{ = b3 and — 5Z ?*• Calculation of the derivatives gives 
i * i  *'=1
* W » .  4 t?  1 w  ( E )» ■
= 0 for all i.
Rearranging this expression we obtain
4(1 - M) 4  ©  <n 6>) - y .  2 p < >
which implies that for all *, that P{ = const (independent of i). By dividing the 
different ’s we get the desired result.
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C h a p t e r  3
I n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  a n d  t h e  a l l o c a t io n  o f  r is k s
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1. Introduction.
A major issue in recent debates on the prosecution of insider trading has been the 
conflict between the broad concept of violation of a general equity rule of share­
holders and the more restricted concept of breach of fiduciary duty. Under the 
first the mere possession of inside information and its subsequent exploitation is 
sufficient for prosecution. Insider trading is conceived as a breach of an elemen­
tary principle of fairness among shareholders which includes in particular equality 
with respect to information. Under the second concept trading on the grounds of 
different information per se is not regarded as sufficient for prosecution. Instead 
it is required that the inside information in question has been obtained through a 
breach of fiduciary duty (e.g. between a manager and his shareholders).
The general fairness rule has been criticized mainly for practical reasons. First it is 
often hard to define who really was the victim of an insider transaction, since many 
stock market transactions occur via professional intermediaries and not directly 
between two private parties. It is also often very difficult for a court to define ex 
post what exactly was superior information and whether the accused really had 
this information or whether he had just a good intuition. Moreover, thought to its 
logical end, an absolute prohibition of trading on undisclosed information would 
eliminate any trading incentive except for liquidity reasons and hence stock prices 
might (at least without a very costly constant disclosure policy) become very poor 
indicators of recent developments.
This paper sets out to investigate whether apart from fairness considerations the 
principle of equality of shareholders with respect to information can also be sup­
ported by additional arguments relating to economic efficiency. Therefore, it is 
useful to remember that any justification of the prosecution of insider trading 
relies to some extent on the fear that with unrestricted insider trading the cap­
ital markets would break down. Investors will lose their confidence that markets 
are run in a fair and honest way and stay away from these markets. However, it 
is not entirely clear how this might occur. There are several ways to undermine 
investors’ confidence and precipitate the breakdown of markets. One possibility
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would be moral hazard on the part of managers and advising financial or legal 
professionals, which could lead to delayed, artificial or manipulated release of in­
formation. Both corporate and financial insiders can expect higher rate of returns 
than outside investors; this clash of interests might produce a misallocation of 
resources or underinvestment through adverse selection effects. Such an erosion of 
confidence through moral hazard and adverse selection would give a rationale for 
the prosecution of insider trading based on the concept of fiduciary duty.
An argument relating equity among shareholders to the breakdown of markets is 
much broader in its scope. It implies that the mere presence of expected informa­
tion differentials on secondary markets deters the financing of new investments. 
Confidence in markets and its economic consequences are not related to undis­
closed information of traders with whom one is linked through a relation of trust, 
but rather to information differentials per se. This chapter argues that such an 
effect might arise through changes in the allocation of risk due to insider activ­
ity. However, we will also see that, although insider trading influences investment 
activity, the direction of this influence is ambiguous.
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2. A n Outline of the Argument.
We noted already that the general fairness argument is an argument concerning 
trading on secondary markets. In modelling these markets we are faced with the 
problem that in a world without gains from trade, i.e., a world in which trading 
can only be generated by differences in information, there is no scope for insiders to 
profit at the expense of outsiders. In fact, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom/Stokey 
(1982) states that an outsider should always anticipate that at a price for which 
the insider is willing to trade, it must be profitable for the insider and hence 
unprofitable for himself. Since there are no gains from trade he will consequently 
refrain from any trade and the insider cannot inflict any harm on him. In order 
to overcome this problem one has to model a trading process with some form 
of gains from trade, which makes people willing to trade even in the presence of 
informational asymmetries.
One way to do this is to consider a world with risk averse investors who differ in 
their endowments. Hirshleifer (1971) argued that under these circumstances in­
vestors generally have an interest that information is revealed after a first round 
of trade. The argument is essentially an insurance argument. Investors want to be 
optimally insured against risk before the event occurs; afterwards insurance does 
not make sense. Applying this reasoning to our problem, insider trading will drive 
prices up to the true future realization of the risky asset, i.e., outside investors 
buy resp. sell at high prices if returns are high and at low prices when returns are 
low. But if prices already reflect most of the information on returns, the remain­
ing profit possibilities of the outsiders are accordingly low. Hence, insiders harm 
outsiders through their influence on prices and the resulting premature resolution 
of uncertainty. To make this argument precise, one must in general control for 
additional income effects of new information.
A second way consists in assuming that investors face sometimes liquidity con­
straints of some form and just have to sell. Intuitively one would expect that this 
class of people should suffer most from insider trading. One possibility to model 
such a constraint is the assumption of a finite lifetime, which forces investors to 
liquidate their positions when they are old.
82
/
As a simple means to model this idea, we will study a three-period-world with over­
lapping generations in which investment is longer lived than the original investors. 
At date 0 entrepreneurs invest in a risky venture and finance this investment by 
issuing shares to the first young generation. Hence, young investors buy the risky 
assets at date 0 and in the absence of bequests they try to sell their shares to the 
next generation of young investors at date 1 before dying. This creates the need 
for a secondary market for this share at which both generations have an interest 
in trading. At date 2 the risky asset pays dividends to the second generation and 
is liquidated. We assume that at date 1 there are insiders in the secondary market 
and investigate the effect of their trading activity on both investor generations and 
initial investment.
The overlapping generations framework allows us to study both the effects of the 
Hirshleifer effect and the effect on liquidity traders. In principle, for the young 
buyers of generation 1, insider trading reduces their profit possibilities, because 
insiders drive prices up to the asset’s true value. Given the capital stock of the 
economy, outsiders of generation 1 would prefer insiders to abstain from trading. 
Moreover, we are able to study the impact of insider trading on the first investor 
generation which finances the investment. We can study the effect of expected 
insider trading on both this generation and the initial investment, i.e., the capital 
stock of the economy.
The amount of ex-ante investment is influenced by insider trading through the 
prices at date 1. From an ex ante viewpoint the effect of insider trading on initial 
investors is to render future prices more risky. That is, the problem for investors 
in a new share issue will be that in case of an early liquidation of their positions 
they will face a higher variability of prices if informed traders are active. If risk 
averse shareholders anticipate this higher liquidation risk correctly, they will only 
be willing to hold the asset if the original issuer compensates them for the risk, i.e., 
the initial issue price must fall and as a consequence the investment might even not 
be undertaken. At a first glance this additional negative effect of insider trading 
on the cost of new capital seems to make the case against insider trading very
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strong. But while this first effect, i.e., that insider trading makes holding the asset 
riskier, might be expected, there is also a countereffect to this. Since share prices 
should be on average equivalent to the expected value of future returns minus a 
risk premium, the lower uncertainty concerning the future returns as a result of 
insider trading should lead to smaller risk premia of the prices on future secondary 
markets. Thus, with insider trading in the future, the expected mean of share prices 
should be higher than without informed trading. The anticipation of this second 
effect will induce a rise of the initial issue prices. A priori the overall outcome 
of the two opposed effects is unclear. The point we shall focus on is that insider 
trading changes the relation of expected mean returns and risk of the risky asset 
for different classes of investors in a different way. Shifting the risk from the final 
realization of the asset to the interim prices is not a neutral operation. Depending 
on how we model the markets, investors might appreciate lower uncertainty more 
than they dislike higher price volatility and vice versa.
In this paper we will investigate in detail how a given market structure will in­
fluence the overall effect of insider trading. Section 3 presents the basic model 
and studies the impact of premature arrival of new information on the alloca­
tion of risks among different investor generation. In particular, we explore the 
consequences of an unequal willingness to bear risk on the part of the different 
generations of investors. Section 4 considers several models in which market fric­
tions give insiders an informational advantage over outsiders. After the study of a 
model with outside investors who behave "irrationally” , we deal with models with 
exogenous and endogenous noise preventing prices from being fully revealing. It 
will turn out that depending on the interaction among information revelation and 
the chosen market frictions the effects on initial investment are ambiguous. Both 
less and more investment may occur if insider trading is expected in the future. 
Section 5 discusses in detail the welfare analysis of the most interesting of these 
models, the specification of an asset market with exogenous noise along the lines 
of Grossman/Stiglitz (1980). Section 6 concludes.
A final word concerns the particular way insider trading is modelled in this paper. 
Throughout the paper all the investors, including the insiders, are assumed to be 
risk averse. Furthermore, every investor and even the insider is small in comparison
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to the market as a whole and therefore acts competitively, i.e., as a price taker. 
This obviously conflicts with the popular image of an insider as a large trader who 
acquires important information shortly before it becomes public anyhow (and is 
hence assumed to be risk neutral and to act strategically). Instead, in this paper 
I want to focus on the impact of information differentials as such, regardless of 
the nature of the information and the way it has been acquired. Even then it is of 
course arguable whether a framework with price taking can ever be regarded as an 
adequate modelling of insider trading. (See Kyle (1989) and Gale/Hellwig(1988)). 
A more thorough discussion of the implications of a model with strategically acting 
insiders is beyond the scope of this paper.
The basic trade-off analyzed in the sequel seems per se to be independent of in­
siders being modelled as price takers rather than taking the price effects of their 
actions into account when submitting market or limit orders (demand functions). 
It relies, however, essentially on three ingredients: That all investors submit de­
mand functions (rather than compete in prices as in the last chapter), that all 
investors are risk averse, and that prices are separating in the sense that they 
are at least somewhat responsive to information. Separating equilibria in strategic 
games are, of course, quite different from the equilibria in a setting with price 
taking agents. In this paper we only focus on the welfare implications of prices 
which move with the inside information and neglect additional inefficiencies arising 
through the exercise of oligopolistic power and the insider’s incentive constraints. 
(See Gale/Hellwig(l988), Laffont/Maskin(1990).) However, issues linked to risk 
neutrality, pooling equilibria (in which prices are independent of information) and 
competition in prices can meaningfully only be analyzed in a strategic setting.
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3. The Basic M odel.
Let us consider a 3-period model with two investor generations and an original 
entrepreneur generation. The first investor generation (called generation 0 ), repre­
sented by the continuum [0 , 1], is active at date 0 and wants to sell all its assets at 
date 1 before dying. The second investor generation (called generation 1), which 
again is represented by [0 , l] is born at date 1 and can trade at date 1 with the first 
generation. At date 2 all assets are liquidated, the second generation consumes and 
dies.
The economy involves two assets, a riskless asset with a net interest rate 0 , serving 
as a numeraire, and a risky asset, i.e. shares of a firm. At the beginning of date 0 
the shares of the firm are owned by the old entrepreneurs who die at date 0 and 
have no other choice than selling the shares to the young investors of generation 0 . 
The going concern value of the firm at the beginning of period 0 is normalized to 
0. The firm however has the option to invest in a risky project with returns after 
two periods. For simplicity we model the investment decision as a simple Yes/No 
decision: an investment of c per share will result in future per share returns u at 
date 2 . The decision rule for the firm is assumed to take the veiy simple form:
Invest iff P0 > c 
Do not invest iff PQ < c ,
where P0 denotes the market value of a share after the issue, i.e., the price which 
balances generation 0 ’s per capita demand for the share with the per capita supply 
x. If the investment takes place, the stock exchange opens again at date 1, the old 
generation 0  submits its price inelastic supply of shares, the young generation 1 
submits its demand and we denote the market clearing equilibrium price at period 
1 by P i . At the beginning of period 2, the firm pays u and is liquidated.
Generations 0 and 1 are assumed to be expected utility maximizers with constant 
absolute risk aversions a0 and d i, i.e., they choose an optimal quantity X  of the 
risky asset in order to maximize
E (U ( (X)) =  1 -  E (e x jA ,-a i W i (X))) .' =  0,1 ,
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where Wt denotes the end-of-life wealth. Their initial wealth is W  units of the 
riskless asset. Hence, Wi is given by
W0{X) = W  + {Pl - P 0) X  resp. Wx (X) = W  +  (u -  Px) X  .
To make the model tractable we will assume that u is a normally distributed 
random variable with two independent components
u ~  0 +  e, where 6* ^  e ~ N ( 0 ,o f).
Investors at date 0 are assumed to have no further information about u than 
the a priori distribution. Whereas for simplicity we assume that at the date of 
investment no informational asymmetries exist, we shall later assume that at date 
1 before the opening of the stock exchange information about the true realization 
of the systematic component of u (i.e., 0) becomes known to at least a part of 
generation 1 (the insiders).
But before dealing in more detail with date 1, let us assume for the moment that 
the equilibrium price Px seen from period 0 is normally distributed. (In our subse­
quent examples Pi will always be normally distributed. We will not further men­
tion this point.) Then by well known techniques (see e.g. Grossman/Stiglitz(1980)), 
solving the investors’ maximization problem will lead to demand functions
E{Pl ) - P 0 
a0var(P1)
and hence to the market value
(3.1) P0 = E(P1) -  OoVar(Px)x .
Equation (3.1) is the basic equation of the whole chapter. In the remainder of this 
chapter we will investigate the behaviour of P0 as a function of Pi for different 
price formation models at date 1.
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3.1 No Information versus Full Revelation of Information
Before proceeding to the analysis of insider trading we shall deal with the bench­
mark case of the comparison of no disclosure with full disclosure of the available 
information. If at date 1 investors have no additional information about u apart 
from the a priori distribution, Px will be deterministic and given by
Pi =  E(u) — aiVar(u)x  
= E(0) - a j a *  +  o ,)x  .
Substituting this in (3.1) gives
(3.2) P0 = E(0) -  ax {pi +  o\)x  .
If, however, the realization 0 of 6 becomes publicly known already at date 1, then 
Pi will be given by
Pi =  9 — ax o\ x ,
and thus
(3.3) P0 = E(0) — CLi0*X — aorfx  .
A comparison of (3.3) and (3.2) shows the basic effect of an early release of in­
formation. For the original investor generation early disclosure will change both 
risk and average return of the investment project: The additional information will 
render Px more volatile, but on the other hand raises its mean. The premature 
arrival of information shifts risk from the future to the present and compensates 
for this risk shifting through higher expected returns. If the distribution of risk 
aversion over time is identical (a0 =  ax), these two effects will just cancel out. If 
generation 1 is more risk averse (ax > a0), shifting risk to generation 0  will raise 
the initial market value since this generation is more willing to bear the risk. In 
the opposite case ax < a0, initial market value will fall since generation 0 would 
prefer the additional risk at date 1 to be borne by generation 1.
In our framework full disclosure of information is just an extreme form of insider 
trading, i.e., every investor of generation 1 is an insider. If only a part of generation
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1 were informed about the realization of 0, the risk shifting effect could in principle 
be lower. Note however that with our assumptions on the information structure 
prices in a competitive equilibrium will always fully reveal the information of the 
insiders.1 If outsiders correctly update their expectations of 0 as a function of the 
price, insider trading will always end up in the same situation as if information 
were publicly revealed.
Even if outsiders did not deduce all the information from prices, the above phe­
nomenon due to a different willingness to bear risk would not completely disappear. 
If ax »  a0, insider trading at date 1 always leads to a higher market value at date 
0 , and accordingly for <C a0 market value at date 0 is always lower. In section 
4 we will study the effects of non-fully revealing prices. In order to isolate these 
effects we assume in the following sections that a0 =  ax =  a.
3.2 First Observations on Welfare
To conclude this section and to look at the risk-shifting-effect from another per­
spective we calculate the certainty equivalents of the investors’ utilities under the 
two regimes. Therefore we neglect any possible effects on investment and assume 
that the investment costs are low enough such that the investment is undertaken in 
any case. We compare the expected utilities of the investors in the two bench-mark 
cases.
Generation 1 suffers from the premature arrival of inside information. This 
”Hirshleifer”-effect is easily seen by calculating their ex ante utilities when inside 
information arrives:
E(U(W2)) = 1 - e x p ( - a 1W)E{exp(-a1(0 + e - P 1)x))
=  1 -  ex p (-a 1W )e x p ( -^ y -a e2) ,
'A s s u m e  th e  contrary th a t  for two different rea lizations of $ the  corresp o n d in g  equil ibrium  prices  
are equal.  A t  th is  price the  d e m a n d  o f  ou ts id ers  w ill be ident ica l w h ereas  th e  ins ider  dem a n d  
differs as a fu n ct ion  of 9.  T h u s ,  the  price ca n n o t  be an equilibrium  price for b o th  rea liza tion s .
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and comparing it to the ex ante utility without premature arrival of information:
E(U(W2)) =  1 — exp(—a1W)E(exp(—ax (0 +  e — Pi)x))
=  1 -  e x p ( - a l W ) e x p ( - ^ Y ~ ( a 2e + ( ? * ) )  .
The investors of generation 0 prefer the early arrival of new information. In equi­
librium, risk sharing between the entrepreneurs and generation 0 implies that the 
compensation for bearing risk rises more than the risk to be borne. We will inves­
tigate this phenomenon in more detail in section 5.3 of this chapter and in section
3.3 of chapter 4.
Turning to the welfare of generation 0 , we note that with insider trading generation 
0 ’s utility is given by
EiUiW,)) = 1 -  exp( W ) e x p ( - ^ j - ^ )  ,
and without insider trading it is just equal to
E(U(WX)) =  1 -e x p (W )  .
Finally, profits of the entrepreneurs who undertake the risky project will depend 
on whether the initial market value rises or falls. We have seen that depending on 
the differences of risk aversion between generation 0 and 1, this might both fall 
and rise: If generation 0 is less risk averse than generation 1, the profits of the 
entrepreneur generation will rise and vice versa.
Now consider a planner who can raise lump sum taxes from some investors and pay 
lump sum transfers to others. These payments occur in form of the riskless asset 
and cannot be conditioned on any information events. Assume furthermore that 
generation 0 investors are less risk averse than generation 1 (i.e., initial market 
value is higher with insiders than without them). Then the central planner could 
legalize insider trading and still make everybody better off through the following 
redistribution: Tax both the entrepreneur generation and generation 0 such that 
their ex-ante utilities correspond to the case without insider trading (resp. are
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slightly above it). Pay the revenue of these taxes as a lump sum transfer to gener­
ation 1 and generation 1 will be better off than in the old regime: Calculating the 
certainty equivalents of the above utilities one obtains that the per capita revenues 
from taxes expressed in units of riskless bonds are
2 - 2  2  - 2  i 2  - 2-  a0a;x  +
and the required per capita wealth to compensate generation 1 for their losses 
from insider trading is
a l  2 - 2  
2 a<*X ’
and revenues are clearly higher if <Lq < ax. Consequently, if the first investor 
generation is less risk-averse, it is better for the whole economy if this generation 
bears all the risk. In the opposite case, when generation 1 is less risk averse, it 
would be better that this generation bears more of the risk, and hence the case of 
no information disclosure would be prefered by the economy.
The drawback of our redistribution scheme is that there is no reason at all why 
we should prefer one generation at the expense of the other generation. Since 
there are victims and beneficiaries of the inflow of new information, both worlds 
cannot be pareto-ranked. Unambiguous welfare implications in our model can only 
be obtained, if a rise resp. fall of the initial market value influences directly the 
investment. If the investment does not take place because of a decrease of P0, then 
everybody is strictly worse off. Vice versa, if an increase in the initial market value 
allows an investment project to go ahead, this makes everybody better off.
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4. Insider Trading w ith Partially Revealing Prices.
In the last section we studied the "pure” effect of new information on stock mar­
kets: Both the volatility of prices and the size of the risk premia are changed. 
However, since prices were fully revealing, the role of ” informed trading” in a ra­
tional expectations equilibrium was merely to reveal the information to the mar­
ket. Thus, we have been unable to capture the notion of insiders making profits 
at the expense of their direct trading partners and cannot really judge the impact 
of asymmetric information. Outside buyers could infer all the inside information 
from prices and hence insiders and outsiders were identical. In order to generate 
a difference between insiders and outsiders in a model with all investors acting 
as price takers one has to introduce further frictions in the information structure. 
In this section we will study three different ways to introduce such a friction. We 
will first study the case in which outsiders do not infer the relevant information 
from prices although in principle this is possible for them. Next we deal with an 
economy in which prices cannot be fully revealing because exogenously given noisy 
demand for the risky asset prevents a unambiguous relation between information 
and prices. Lastly we treat an example in which the same occurs because there is 
too much information to be unambiguously reflected in prices. In all three cases 
there axe incentives to trade even if the original endowments were pareto optimal 
before the trading round. In the first case it is the "stupidity” of outsiders. In the 
second case it is the incentive of rational investors to exploit the noise traders. 
Finally, in the third case new information changes the optimal portfolio position 
for every investor in a different way; the new information itself creates a reason to 
trade.
In this section we will study how the pure effect of the inflow of new information 
interacts with the chosen frictions in the market. We investigate the overall im­
pact of the this interaction on price volatility and ex-ante investment. The results 
will turn out to be very sensitive with respect to the chosen specification of the 
informational structure.
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4.1 Insider Trading with ” Stupid” Outsiders
Assume again that at date 1 the realization 0 of 0 is already determined. Only a 
part of generation 1 however obtains some information about this realization. As 
in Grossman/Stiglitz(1980), we will assume a very simple information structure: a 
fixed proportion A of generation 1 knows the true value 0 before the stock exchange 
opens. The remaining proportion 1 — A of generation 1 only knows the a priori 
distribution of u. A more realistic assumption would be a world in which different 
investors receive independent signals with different precision (as modelled by Hell- 
wig(1980)). This more complicated assumption would not change our qualitative 
results, which essentially depend only on the pricing equation (3.1).
In order to give the insiders an informational advantage, we will assume in this 
section that uninformed investors at date 1 are stupid. They are stupid in the 
sense that, although insiders trade according to their information and in principle 
this information could be deduced from prices, they will determine their demand 
only on the basis of their a priori expectations. Exploiting the usual well known 
properties of the exponential utility and normally distributed returns (see again 
Grossman/Stiglitz(1980) we obtain the following expressions for informed and un­
informed per capita demand:
X,(P>) =
X V(P1) =
0 - P i
ao\ * 
E{0) -
In equilibrium must clear the market, i.e., the mean per capita demand of 
generation 1 has to be equal to the inelastic supply of shares of the old generation 
x :
AX,(P1) +  ( l - A ) X c,(P 1) = S  .
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and thus
Pi =  a xE(0) +  a20 — aa3x  where 
1 - A
a  i =  oc3 
a2 = a3 
ct3 = 1
  h,3 ' 1- A
Using E0{E1($)) =  Eo(0) and cti +  a2 =  1, substitution in (3.1) gives
P0 =  (ai + a2)E(0) — aa3x — aa%a%x
(4.4) =  E(0) -  a(a3 +  a2a2)x .
Equation (4.4) illustrates two general features of the class of models which we 
investigate. First, since insider trading per se only shifts risk over time but cannot 
alter the fundamental return expectations, its impact on the initial market value 
will only appear through the risk premium component. Second, it shows that the 
risk premium is composed of two opposed components.
The first component (aa3 x) reflects the beneficial impact of insider trading. Since 
insiders demand lower risk premia their orders will on average drive up prices at 
date 1. When the market consists of more and more insiders relative to outsiders, 
the aggregate risk premium of the market will approach insiders' risk premia. That 
is, a rising proportion of insiders A will always lead to lower aa3x. In a loose sense 
one could attribute this to the beneficial effect of competition between the insiders. 
The source of their extra returns, i.e., the difference between the risk premium of 
the market and the risk premium which they know to be justified, disappears 
slowly as more insiders compete for it. The second part (ao^ajx) contains the 
harmful aspect of insider trading. It reflects the additional risk created by the extra 
volatility of P i . This risk component will typically rise with growing A. Since more 
insiders means more insider orders, mean per capita demand will become more 
and more volatile (as a function of the realization 0) and thus also the equilibrium 
price P i .
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Comparing the overall outcome of these two effects we first observe as in section 
3 that the two extreme cases A =  0 (no insiders) and A =  1 (full disclosure) are 
equivalent. Given that we assume now Oq = = a9 the two effects just balance
out. For the case of asymmetric information, i.e., 0 < A < 1, we collect the results 
in Claim 1 (see also figure 1).
Claim 1:
If 0 < A < 1 the initial market value PQ is always higher than in 
the case A =  0 and A =  1.
Po is a concave function of A, i.e., the initial market value first 
increases in A, and then decreases in A.
Proof: See appendix.
Since outsiders at date 1 do not react on the incoming information, price risk rises 
initially less than risk premia fall. Formally this is reflected in the fact that risk 
aversion falls with A, whereas price variance rises with A2: Risk effects are second 
order effects whereas mean effects are of first order.
4.2 Insider Trading in a Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium
In this and the following section we shall drop the assumption that outside in­
vestors do not infer information from prices. Instead we will look at the other 
extreme and assume that investors are perfectly rational Bayesian individuals, 
who calculate the distribution of $ conditional on the equilibrium price and thus 
on the inside information contained in it. To avoid that investors can deduce the 
information completely from prices, we have to impose some mechanism which 
renders prices only partially revealing. First we shall treat the case in which prices 
do not reflect unambiguously all information because of the presence of some ex­
ogenously given noise in the supply of shares.
To keep matters simple we remain in the Grossman/Stiglitz(1980)-framework of 
the last section. Thus we obtain the following expressions for informed and unin-
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formed per capita demand:
e - p 1
X ' ( P l ) =  .acA
X v (Pi) =
o\
E ( 0 \ P 1) - P l
a(var(0 | Pi) +  a?)
In equilibrium Px must clear the market, i.e., the mean per capita demand of 
generation 1 has now to be equal to the inelastic supply of shares of the old 
generation x  plus the random noise supply x:
AX/ (P1) + (1 -A )X C,(P 1) = S  +  * ,
where we assume that x ~  N(0 ,o^).
Defining
~ o2 wx = 0 — a — 2;
the linear equilibrium price can then be written as (see Grossman/Stiglitz(l980))
Pi =  a x E(0) +  a2 wx — aa3 x  with
Clx — 1 CL<i
, A 1 — A a2
«2 = (— + -5 ----------(— r))V  ™r(u;A)
ot3 = 1A , 1 - A ’
«l».
where the conditional variance is given by
2   2
~  ° u \ P
= oi +  at - K 2)2
uar(u;A)
For our later purposes it is useful to rewrite a 2 and a3 in the following form (which 
follows after some algebra):
A a2 -ha2(a2 + o \ )o \o l
0-2 — AA 2o2e +  a2(Xa2 +  a2)a2a2
22 A2o2e + a 2(o2 + o 2t )o2t o_
3 £ \ 2a2 +  a2 (Aa2 +  o2)a2al
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Observe1 that
0=2 (0 ) = 0 , = a 3 (0 ) =  <r2 + a 2,
A | A = 0
and
a2(l )a2 =a 3(l) = a2 .
Substituting the equilibrium price in (3.1) gives
(4.5) P0 =  E(6) -  a(a3 + a2cr2 + a2 —2~ -~ a2x)x .
The risk premium component of (4.5) resembles closely the one of (4.4). The first 
part stems again from the reduced risk premia at date 1 , but will now be lower 
than in the last section since outside investors will use instead of a% the conditional 
variance o i |F . The second term reflects as before the higher risk today created
by the additional variance of Plt but will in general be higher than in the last 
section. Since outsiders learn from prices and change their demand accordingly, 
prices will contain more of the true realization of 0. The third part is new. It 
stems from the additional risk for the initial investors created by the noise traders. 
Noise traders create a ” bid-ask-spread” around the average estimation of the asset 
value. Accordingly, the third term reflects the additional price volatility created 
by this ”bid-ask-spread” , i.e., the random bouncing back of transaction prices 
between the price in the case of excess noise demand and the price in the case 
of excess noise demand/supply. The term bid-ask-spread is here somewhat loosely 
adopted from the literature on the microstructure of financial markets. Since we 
consider aggregate order flows rather than assuming that liquidity traders arrive 
sequentially, it should be interpreted as an aggregate or average bid-ask-spread. In 
section 5 we will give a more detailed discussion of it; we show in particular that 
the bid-ask-spread can be decomposed in a risk bearing component and an adverse 
selection component. The risk bearing component has to be paid by the noise 
traders in order to compensate the counterpart of a trade for the additional risk 
he has to bear. The adverse selection component is similar to the one encountered
1N o te  th a t  a i ,  a 2 and a 3 are always funct ions o f  X.  H ow ever,  we will usually  drop th e  arg um en t
and p u t  it only  w hen necessary.
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in chapter 2. It is the amount a liquidity trader has to pay because the uniformed 
speculators suspect him to be an insider.
The behaviour of the three terms as a function of the proportion of insiders at date 
1 takes again different directions. As a consequence of rising competitive pressure 
among insiders, the first term is as in the last section falling in A. The second 
term is again rising in A, since with more insiders prices convey more information. 
Both movements will be much sharper than in in the case with ” stupid” outsiders. 
Since outsiders infer the information on u from prices and adapt their demand 
accordingly, prices at date 1 will reflect the true realization of 0 more concisely
than in the section 4.1. But since the second term still reflects a risk effect (i.e., a
second order effect), the first term should at least for small A dominate the second 
term.
Hence, the overall outcome will be determined by the third term, reflecting the 
interaction between noise trading and informed speculation. To understand the 
direction of this term, note first that the presence of noise trading at date 1 adds 
from an ex-ante view an additional liquidation risk for the initial investors. The 
size of this additional risk is not independent of the information on u. Investors’ 
demand at date 1 will be the less price elastic the riskier the asset becomes. If 
there is no information on u available at date 1 already minor changes in noisy 
supply will imply major changes in equilibrium prices, because the risk bearing 
component of the bid-ask-spread is relatively large. If information is fully disclosed, 
demand will become more price-elastic because the risk bearing component of the 
bid-ask-spread will be lower. Hence, seen from date 0 equilibrium prices will be 
more volatile without premature arrival of information than with fully disclosed 
information. Insider trading at date 1 will always have a tendency to raise initial 
market values since it eliminates the noise induced additional risk. An inspection 
of (4.5) for the cases of no resp. full disclosure shows this effect clearly. For A =  0 
we have
P0 =  E(0) -  a(a2 +  a2 +  var(A ))^
= E(9) -  a(a2 -t- o 2 + a 2 (a2 +  o2t f o 2x)x  ,
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whereas for A =  1
P0 = E(6) -  a(a2 +  var(Pj))x
= E{0) - a ( a 2 + a2 + a2(a2)2a2)x  .
Clearly the initial market value in the full disclosure case is higher than in the case 
of no disclosure. The behaviour for intermediate values of A is unclear. Intuitively, 
one could expect that in the case of very high noise induced risk (high a2), the 
positive, risk-reducing effect created by the third term should dominate the overall 
outcome. However, for low a2 one has to take a further effect into account. If 
o2 is very low, the behaviour of the bid-ask-spread will be determined by the 
reaction of the adverse selection component on shifts in A. It turns out that at 
least for sufficiently low A, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask-spread 
is increasing with A to such an extent that the induced higher price volatility leads 
to a decrease of the initial market value.
Claim 2 :
For a2x and A sufficiently small, P0 is decreasing in A.
For o2 sufficiently small and A sufficiently large, P0 is increasing 
in A.
For o2 sufficiently large, PQ is increasing in A.
Proof: See appendix.
For a\ sufficiently small, initial market value will fall for small proportions of in­
formed traders, and only for relatively large A the initial market value will rise 
above the initial market value level of the case without insider trading. Accord­
ingly, an increase in A will first create a decrease in investment, and only with A 
sufficiently high the benefits of the new information, i.e., the reduction of the noise 
induced price risk due to noise traders, leads to more investment.
For a full intuitive understanding of this result, a detailed analysis of the properties 
of the ”bid-ask-spread” , i.e., the price impact of noisy excess demand and supply,
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is required. The properties of the bid-ask-spread will also determine the welfare 
results. Given that this analysis turns out to be quite complicated, we defer it to 
section 5.
4.3 Insider Trading in a Partially Revealing REE without Noisy Supply
We have seen already that in order to give a role to insider trading in a rational 
expectations equilibrium prices have to be partially revealing. One way to make 
prices partially revealing is to introduce in the model some unspecified random 
noise trading. The purpose of this section is to show that the trade offs developed 
so far are independent of this specification, but depend merely on the partially 
revealing nature of prices. Therefore, we will study an example in the spirit of the 
second main strand of constructing partially revealing equilibria, i.e., equilibria in 
which prices cannot reveal all information because the space of pay-off relevant 
informations has higher dimension than the price space. (For a survey of partially 
revealing REE see e.g. Jordan/Radner(1982).) The example claims no generality 
and is constructed in order to stay as closely to our previous discussion as possible. 
It preserves the basic trade-off between risk premium and price volatility effect, 
but it will turn out that this trade-off takes a rather extreme form.
We deal with the same time structure as before and also generation 0 is assumed 
to behave as before. However, we will consider a different utility for generation 1. 
Assume that random returns at period 2 consist of two components 01 and 02, 
where the 6* are i.i.d. and
~  N ( E ( B ) , o l )  f =  l , 2  .
Furthermore let the individual members of generation 1 differ in their relative 
appreciations of d1 and 02, characterized by some parameter a  £ [0,1]. Let the 
date 2 wealth W% of individual a be given by
W ; = w -+  aO1 +  (1 -  a)02 +  e2 -  Px .
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The a  are assumed to be distributed according to some given distribution on [0,1] 
with mean J- and density f }  The economic interpretation of the a  is obviously 
difficult; they are chosen not for realism but rather for obtaining a closed form 
solution of a partially revealing REE without noise supply. A possible story could 
run along the lines that returns are partially paid out through direct dividend 
payments and partially through the buying back of stock by the firm. If these two 
modes are taxed differently and investors do not face the same tax rates, the a* 
would stand for these different tax rates.
Again a proportion A of generation 1 is informed. To avoid any interference between 
the fact of being an insider and the preferences, we assume that the distribution 
of the a  over the informed and uninformed investors is the same. Before the stock 
exchange opens at date 1 insiders learn the true realization of 01 and 02, whereas 
outsiders only know the a priori distributions. Outsiders are Bayesian, i.e., outside 
investor a  calculates the distribution of
a0l +  (1 -  a)02 +  c2
conditional on the equilibrium price Px. Mean per capita demand is now given by
0
J a(var(o:01 +  (1 — a)02 \ Px) +  a2)o
In equilibrium Px must again clear the market, i.e., the mean per capita demand of 
generation 1 has to be equal to the inelastic supply of shares of the old generation 
x :
AX/ (P1) +  ( l - A ) X tf(P1) = *  .
We show now that a linear rational expectations equilibrium price (distribution) 
can be calculated as follows.
1T h e  use  of the  a  is similar to an e x a m p le  o f  L a ffon t(1985).  T h e  a ssu m p tio n  on the  m ea n  of the
a  is in essen tia l .  It serves merely to guara ntee  prices which are sy m m etr ic  in 9 l and 02 . W ith o u t  
m en t io n in g  it in the sequel we a ssu m e furtherm ore th a t  th e  a  are d is tr ib u ted  such th a t  the  
fo llow ing integrals  ex is t .
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Claim 3:
There is a rational expectations equilibrium of the following form:
For A =  0 : Px =  E(0) — ap0x  ,
for A > 0 : Px =  -^0l +  \ b2 — apxx
& &
For A =  0 p0 is given by
1
Po -  ~
f  ( ( a )3 + ( l - a ) 3 )<73 + <73 ^ ( a ) 
0 *
and for A > 0
Px =
£  +  ( ! - * ) / ( ( a ) 3 +  ( l - a ) 3 - 0 . 5 ) c r ’ +  <r37 <*/(<*)
Proof: To derive the equilibrium, we first solve the equilibrium condition for Px 
and obtain
(1 -  A) f  B{a8' + [l-a)P[p_) >y* J J v a r ( a 0 1 +  ( l - a ) 0 3 | P 1 ) +  <73 y  '
^ ------------------------------------------
^  var(ae3 + ( i - a ) 0 3|p1) + <r3
+ 1 ( 2 +  2  ^
a2 +  (1 A) f  vartae^fi-ajesiP ij + ff3
x
+  (1 A )/ var(ae1 + (i-a)e3|pI) + «T3
For A =  0 we can drop the conditioning on Px and the claim follows. 
For A > 0 we set
— ~/ii _l_ «,/)2
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Since the random variables are normally distributed we obtain the linear regression
E ( t J l + (1 -  a)02 | A )  =  E(d) + - ^ - ( A  -  £ (A ))
W o ?
- ! L  —
~  2 +  2 ’
and the conditional variance is given by
varfotfl1 +  (1 -  a )02 | A )  =  ((a )2 +  (1 -  a )2)* , -  y  •
Substituting in the price equation and comparison of the coefficients gives
a6 = --------------------------------------------------------- x
and
+  ( 1  A )  f  ( ( a j3 +  ( 1 _ a j 3 _ 0 5) <y3 +  <y3 d / ( a )
o
=  CLpx % j
. L L i A l  f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ df(a\
2 a 3 ' 2 J ( ( a ) 3 +  ( l  — a ) 3 — 0 . 5 ) a 3 +  a 3 ^ V /
0
i  = ---------------------;----------------------------------------------
+ U “  /  ( ( a ) 3 +  ( l  — a ) 3 — 0 . 5 ) a 3 +  a 3 ^ ( tt)
_ 1
“  2
This gives the desired form of the equilibrium.
In order to determine the initial market value P0 we substitute the equilibrium 
price in equation (3.1) and obtain
For A =  0 : P0 = E(0) — apQx ,
2
(4.6) for A > 0 : P0 =  E(0) — a(px +  t t)®  •z
Comparison of (4.6) with (4.5) and (3.2) shows that the structure of the initial 
market value equation is similar. The effect of insider trading is contained in the 
risk premium, and the risk premium consists again of the two opposed factors
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reflecting the higher price volatility of Pi and the lower risk premia of date 1 
prices. The difference between (4.5) and (4.6) is that in contrast to the case with 
exogenous noise trading, Pi reflects immediately all the information, and this 
regardless of the proportion of insiders. A higher proportion of insiders does not 
render the prices more informative. Its only effect is to raise the expected value 
of Pi through the competition effect. Thus, the mere presence of a few insiders 
creates a discontinuity in both the variance and the mean of prices at date 1 and 
might even lead to a discontinuous change of initial market values. However, initial 
market values will always be higher with insider trading than without it (see also 
figure 3).
Claim 4:
The initial market value P0 is an increasing function of A. In par­
ticular, for A > 0 the initial market value P0 will always be higher 
than in the case without information.
Proof: For the second statement, we show in the appendix that for all A > 0
aePx +  ■ y  <  Po
For A > 0, a derivation with respect to A shows that the market risk premium 
apx x  is decreasing in A. Hence, P0 is increasing in A.
Accordingly, price volatility rises less fast than the average risk premia demanded 
by generation 2 fall. A rising number of insiders will even strengthen this effect 
through the competition effect and induces the initial market value to rise in A. The 
inflow of new information is beneficial, because it eliminates risk. Moreover, there 
are no trading frictions due to noise trading as in the last model. Accordingly, 
investment levels are unambiguously increasing with the intensity of informed 
trading. We show in the appendix that insider trading not only induces higher 
investment levels, but also leads to a higher welfare (defined as the sum of the 
certainty equivalents of investors’ expected utilities) of the economy as a whole.
These observations highlight also a general difference between partially revealing 
REE models with and without exogenous noise. In the model of this section all
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the available information is immediately incorporated in the prices (independent of 
the number of insiders), whereas in a noisy model this takes only place gradually. 
In both models new information is ultimately valuable. Thus, after information is 
fully reflected in the prices, the market risk premium at date 1 has always fallen 
stronger than price volatility has risen and the initial market value is accordingly 
higher. Only if the new information is not yet fully included in the price, price 
volatility might rise stronger than the risk premia fall.1
1T h e  im p lica t ion s  o f  the m o d e l  of this sect ion  concern ing  th e  in v es tm en t  levels resem ble c lose ly  
the resu lts  o f  A u su b e l  (1989) ,  w ho considers a different partia lly  revealing  m o d e l  w ith o u t  e x o g e ­
nous noise trad ing .  A detai led  com parison  of th e  two m od e ls  is how ever difficult, s ince A u s u b e l ’s 
m o d e l d oes  n o t  allow for explicit  so lu t io n s .
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5. Welfare and the Bid-Ask-Spread.
In this section we will further investigate the example of section 4.2 with exogenous 
noise trading. We have seen that the effects of insider trading in this model depend 
on a rather complex interaction between the impact of premature arrival of infor­
mation and the properties of the term which we dubbed ”bid-ask-spread” . We shall 
investigate in this section the properties of this bid-ask-spread more closely. In 5.1 
we justify the terminology. 5.2 studies the effects of shifts in the intensity of insider 
trading on the bid-ask-spread. Finally, in 5.3 we study the welfare implications of 
these changes in the bid-ask-spread.
5.1 Transaction Costs and the Bid-Ask-Spread
Consider a trader who for some unspecified liquidity reasons wants to trade the 
amount x  of a risky asset. The asset will pay u in the next period. Denote the price 
on the stock exchange for a quantity x by P  =  P (u ,x ), where P  may depend on 
u if we allow for premature resolution of uncertainty. The expected trading costs 
of the liquidity trader are then given by
TC = E*(x(P -  u)) ,
where the subscript indicates that the expectation is formed with respect to u. 
Assuming that x  is the realization of a random variable x, which represents the 
distribution of possible liquidity trades, the average expected trading costs for 
liquidity traders are given by
A TC = Eit&{x(P -  u)) .
Now reconsider the example of chapter 2 on the price competition between market 
makers. There we set E(u) =  0 and x  takes the values 1 and —1 with equal proba­
bility | . As long as no informed traders have been active before the liquidity trader
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arrives, P  is independent of the true future realization of u and the transactions 
costs can be calculated as
A T C = i ( P ( l ) - 0 ) - i ( P ( - l ) - 0 )
2
Hence, average transaction costs are just given by the half of the bid-ask-spread, 
defined as the difference between the ask price P(  1) and the bid price P (—1).
Our discussion of the bid-ask-spread in chapter 2 took place in a static one-shot 
game. However, from a more dynamic perspective it will be very important for 
a liquidity trader at exactly which time he arrives on the market. Assume for 
instance in our example of chapter 2 that a liquidity trader arrives shortly after an 
insider has traded. If the market is transparent in the sense that market makers 
have to announce their previous trades, every market maker knows at this moment 
the true realization of the asset: Since liquidity traders trade only with one market 
maker whereas insiders trade with every market maker, the observation that every 
market makers has traded reveals the insider’s information. Thus, the bid-ask- 
spread faced by the liquidity trader in this case will be 0. The example shows 
that depending on the chosen dynamic specification, the link between the bid-ask- 
spread at a certain period and the average expected trading costs of the liquidity 
traders might be quite complex. The average transaction costs will certainly be 
determined by the average bid-ask-spread, but the precise nature of this relation 
depends on the specific dynamics.
In section 4.2 we have considered the trading of insiders, market makers (i.e., 
the uninformed speculators) and liquidity traders in a competitive world. In this 
setting, the dynamics of the arrival process are eliminated by assuming that all 
traders arrive together on the market and submit their orders simultaneously. 
Accordingly, one cannot speak any more of a bid-ask-spread faced by a single 
trader, since prices react only on aggregate market demand. However, as before 
we can meaningfully define the average transaction costs of the liquidity traders 
arising from the price impact of noisy excess demand supply as
ATC = Eitii( x ( P - u ) )  .
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If the distribution of the liquidity demand x  is symmetric around 0, we can rewrite 
this as
ATC  =  i j S * > o , a ( z ( . P ( t t , x )  -  u)) -  i # 5 > o , f i ( x ( P ( t t , - x )  -  «))
_  Ej>0yii(x(P(u,x)  -  (P (u ,-s ) )
2
In analogy to our discussion in the case with sequential arrival of traders one 
might call this last expression half of the "average” bid-ask-spread faced by the 
net liquidity demand x. The bid-ask-spread in the competitive setting is precisely 
the amount to which prices move in order to allow the market to absorb a noisy 
demand/supply shock. The reader should however bear in mind that the term bid- 
ask-spread remains only an analogy. There is no model which would give a clear 
link between the bid-ask-spread faced by traders on real markets and this "average” 
bid-ask-spread of a competitive model with simultaneous arrival of traders. Given 
that the sources of transaction costs in the competitive setting are exactly the same 
as the ones we usually associate with the bid-ask-spread of real markets, the use of 
the term here is quite suggestive. Indeed, we will later see that the "bid-ask-spread” 
in a competitive model can be decomposed as the one in markets with sequential 
arrival of traders in two parts: it consists of a risk bearing component and an 
adverse selection component. The latter arises as in strategic models, because the 
market can only imperfectly distinguish between a demand/supply shock due to 
noise trading and additional demand/supply due to new information.
5.2 The Size of the Bid-Ask-Spread
5.2.1 The Competitive Case
In this section we shall investigate the size of the bid-ask-spread in the Gross- 
man/Stiglitz model of section 3.2 of the last chapter. For convenience we just 
recapitulate the basic assumptions of the model. The future returns of the risky 
asset are given by
u ~ 0  +  e, where 9 ~  N(f£(0),<7£), c~ N (0 ,a* ).
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Investors have constant absolute risk aversion a. A fixed proportion A of the in­
vestors (the insiders) learns the true realization 0 of 0 before the stock exchange 
opens. The remaining proportion 1 — A of generation 1 only knows the a priori dis­
tribution of u. There is a given supply of the shares, denoted by x, and additionally 
a random noise supply x ~  N(0,<r2).
The linear equilibrium price can then be written as
^ 2
A  = a xE{0) + a2(0 — — aa3x  where
a x =  1 —  a2
\a l  + q 2K2 + a2)a2ol
2 \ 2a 2 + a? (A a] +  a2)o2 a\
_2 AV,2 + a2{a2 + g? R 2g2
3  '  X2a2 +  a2 ( A a2 +  a2 ) < 7 ?  a *
Recall that
2
a2 (0) =  0, =  a3 (o) =  o\ +  cr ,^ and a 2 (l)a£2 =  a 3 (1) =  a 2 .
A | A = 0
This formulation shows that a 3 can be interpreted as the average risk perceived 
by the market. It is nothing else than the weighted average of the risk estimates of 
the two classes of investors. The coefficients a x, a2 and a (^ -a £ — a 3) are weighted 
averages of the coefficients of the (linear) estimations of u ’s future realization.
Now calculate the average expected trading costs of the liquidity traders as
ATC(X) = E{x(P -  u))
= ~  as ) ^  + aa3o\ .
This decomposition allows us to distinguish the two components of the transaction 
costs.1 The second part (aa3) is the risk bearing cost which would also be present 
without asymmetric information, and which has to be paid in order to compen­
sate the counterpart of a trade for the additional risk he has to bear. The first 
component is analogous to the adverse selection component of the bid-ask-spread 
which we encountered in chapter 2. It is the amount a liquidity trader has to pay
1For a d eta i led  trea tm en t  o f  the two co m p o n en ts  of the  b id -ask-spread  in the  m ore general
fram ework of the  H ellw ig  (1980) m o d e l  see A d m a t i /P f le id e r e r ( l9 9 0 ) .
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because the uninformed speculators suspect him to be an insider. We characterize 
the behaviour of the two components in the following proposition. The size of the 
bid-ask-spread also helps us to determine the behaviour of the price volatility at 
date 1 as a function of A, as we show in the last part of Claim 5.
Claim 5:
Let A S [0,1].
a) The risk bearing component of the bid-ask-spread is decreasing 
inA: < °  •
b) For A sufficiently low the adverse selection component is in­
creasing in A: —  a3) > 0 .
For A sufficiently large the adverse selection component is decreas- 
mg in A: £ ( ^ - < 13) < 0 .
c) For a\ and A sufficiently low the bid-ask-spread is increasing in 
A: £ .( ^ rC (A ) )> 0  .
For o\ sufficiently low and A sufficiently large the bid-ask-spread 
is decreasing in A: ^(i4TC(A )) < 0 .
For a\  sufficiently large and for every A the bid-ask-spread is de­
creasing in A: j ^ ( A T C ( A)) < 0 .
d)The bid-ask-spread with full information is lower than the one 
without information: ATC(0) > ;4TC(1).
e) For o\ sufficiently small, var(Px) is increasing in A for suffi­
ciently small A and decreasing for sufficiently large A: +
fla j a^2) > (<)0. However, var(Pi) is higher for A =  1 than
for A =  0.
For a2x sufficiently large, var(i^) is monotonically decreasing in 
A: + a2{— < 0- In particular, for o\  sufficiently
large, var(Pi) is lower for A =  1 than for A =  0.
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Proof: See appendix.
Statements a) and d) are quite intuitive. Prices become the more informative the 
more insiders are active in the market. Accordingly, holding the asset becomes less 
risky, risk premia fall and therefore also the risk bearing component of the bid-ask- 
spread. The same effect makes liquidity traders prefer the situation in which every 
investor is informed (which is equivalent to a public disclosure of information) to 
the situation without any informed speculators. In both cases the adverse selection 
cost is obviously zero, but in the case of A =  1 the risk bearing costs are much 
lower. Ultimately, liquidity traders are always interested in a very high insider 
activity, because they profit from the induced reduction of the risk bearing costs.
In order to understand the behaviour of the transaction costs in the most inter­
esting case, i.e., for low levels of A, we have to study more closely the behaviour 
of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask-spread. The adverse selection 
costs first increase and then decrease with A. For low levels of noise trading this 
effect will dominate the reduction of the risk bearing costs, for high levels of noise 
trading the reduction of risk becomes dominant. It turns out that results b) and c) 
depend partially on the risk aversion of the agents and partially on the competitive 
setting of the Grossman/Stiglitz model. This will become clearer if we compare 
the previous results with the properties of the bid-ask-spread in a strategic setting 
with risk neutral market makers. Therefore, we will study in the next section a 
strategic model of a market with insiders, uninformed speculators and liquidity 
traders. This will help us in the more detailed discussion of the determinants of 
the adverse selection costs.
5.2.2 The Strategic Case
We shall analyze a modification of Kyle’s (1985) model. There are n informed 
traders who know the true realization of the systematic component 0. In contrast 
to Kyle we allow the informed speculators to have constant absolute risk aver­
sion a > 0. Each insider submits a profit maximizing market order & =  <fc(0)
I l l
(i= l,..,n). Noise traders submit the realization x  of x. The market makers observe 
the realization of the aggregate order flow
n
Q =  X ) ^  +  *  •
* = 1
Following Kyle we assume that the market as a whole has infinite risk bearing 
capacity and that market makers set prices such that the market is efficient, i.e.,
p {Q) =  e ( 0  + ( \ q  =  q )  .
Insiders future wealth given the realization 0 is
W  =  (6 + I -  P{q{ +  ^ 2  q3 +  x))qi .
There is a certain problem here how to treat x  and c, because the uncertainty 
concerning x  is resolved much earlier. Moreover, by submitting demand schedules 
as in Kyle (1989) the insider could condition his demand on the true realization of 
x  and thus avoid any risk concerning the realization of the noise demand. Mainly 
for the technical convenience of being able to deal with the mathematically simpler 
case of market orders we define their maximization problem as the problem to find 
a q such that
Et (iU(Ei (W'))) =  Et (exp(-a(0 + i - E ,  (P (9i +  £  9/ +  £)))«)) >
is maximal. The qualitative results would remain unchanged if we allowed insiders 
to submit demand functions. We solve now for a symmetric linear equilibrium in 
prices and quantities.
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Claim 6:
There exists exactly one symmetric and linear equilibrium of the 
model. It is given by
e - E ( 0 ) r .
(n + 1)6 +  ao\
P(Q) = E(e)+bQ ,
where b is determined as the unique positive solution of the equa­
tion
6((n +  1)6 +  aa2)2o2x =  n(6 +  aa2)a2 .
Proof: The proof is a straightforward extension of Kyle’s proof and is contained 
in the appendix.
As in the last section we calculate the average expected trading costs of the liq­
uidity traders and obtain
ATC(n) = E(x(P -  u))
= bol .
Since market makers are assumed to have infinite risk bearing capacity, transaction 
costs consist only of adverse selection costs. The next claim characterizes these 
costs.
Claim 7:
If aa2 is sufficiently large and n sufficiently low, then 6 is an 
increasing function of n; for sufficiently large n or sufficiently small 
aa2, b is always decreasing in n.
Proof: See appendix.
Consequently, as long as the informed traders’ risk aversion (resp. the risk itself) 
is not too low, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask-spread behaves as in 
the competitive case. First it increases with the intensity of informed speculation, 
and only after a certain point more insider trading reduces the bid-ask-spread
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1again. Only for a low risk aversion (resp. a low residual risk) the bid-ask-spread 
is highest for a single insider and decreases if the number of informed traders 
increases. In the case with risk neutral informed speculators where b is given by
(n + 1)2 a\
which is clearly decreasing in n, this has already been shown by Admati/Pfleiderer 
(1989).
5.2.3 Comparison of the Two Cases
The basic observation for the strategic case is that in equilibrium insiders always 
have an interest to mimic the liquidity traders: given that they can anticipate that 
equilibrium prices are efficient and given that prices are linear in quantities, their 
profits from taking speculative positions are maximal when they are as indistin­
guishable as possible for the market makers. This is seen most clearly in the case 
without risk aversion and a single insider (a =  0 and n =  1). Calculation of the 
equilibrium quantities gives
q = M ( e - E ( § ) )
V 9
and thus
var(g) =  a\ .
In equilibrium the distributions of the informed trader’s quantities and the liquid­
ity trader’s quantities are exactly the same. If the number of insiders increases, 
the weight in the equilibrium distribution of the aggregate quantities of insiders 
is shifted to the right, i.e., on average the aggregate amount of informed trading 
will be higher. The reason for that is quite similar to the well known phenomenon 
in standard Cournot games that an increase in the number of competitors raises 
the equilibrium supply. The variance of the aggregate demand is given by
n
v a r C C * )  =  v ^  •
X- 1
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Hence, it becomes easier for the market makers to separate liquidity demand from 
informed demand and to offer better bid-ask-spreads to the liquidity traders.
With risk aversion the situation is slightly different. Risk aversion reduces the will­
ingness of insiders to take speculative positions. This limited risk bearing capacity 
shifts in equilibrium the weight in the distribution of the informed demand to the 
left of the distribution of liquidity demand:
V ar(9' } =  (Tb + a o ^
<>
6 +  aa 2 *
< a 2x .
An increase in the number of informed traders shifts again the distribution of the 
aggregate informed demand to the right and this shift creates exactly the effect 
which is responsible for the behaviour of the bid-ask-spread in Claim 7. As long 
as the distribution is not shifted sufficiently to the right (i.e., for sufficiently low 
n and sufficiently high influence of the risk aversion effect), the two distributions 
move actually closer together. Thus, it becomes harder for the market makers 
to distinguish between informed demand and liquidity demand and he has to 
charge higher bid-ask-spreads for the liquidity traders. Ultimately, if the number 
of insiders becomes large enough, the aggregate informed demand becomes so 
high that it becomes easier to distinguish between noise traders and insiders. 
Accordingly, bid-ask-spreads will become lower, if enough insiders are active.
A very similar reason is responsible for the behaviour of the bid-ask-spread in 
the competitive setting. In the competitive setting, informed speculators have no 
market power. Given that every insider knows that he has no influence on the ag­
gregate demand and hence on prices, there is no incentive for him to try to mimic 
the liquidity traders, since the informativeness of prices is independent of his own 
actions. Consequently, the weight of the distribution of the informed quantities 
will lie to the left of the one of the noise traders as long as the proportion of 
insiders A is sufficiently low. A raise in the proportion of insiders increases the 
variance of the aggregate informed quantities and hence moves the two distribu­
tions closer together. Insiders and noise traders are harder to separate and the
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bid-ask-spread faced by the liquidity traders becomes higher. If the amount of 
informed speculation becomes sufficiently large, it becomes again easier for the 
uninformed speculators to distinguish noise trading from informed trading, be­
cause noise traders trade on average much lower quantities than the insiders as a 
whole. Hence, for high A the bid-ask-spread is falling.
This last description explains our statement that the behaviour of the bid-ask- 
spread in the competitive framework is partially due to price-taking and partially 
due to risk aversion. It is due to price taking because this assumption guarantees 
that for a low number of insiders the aggregate informed demand will be on average 
lower than the liquidity demand. It is due to risk aversion in the sense that in a 
strategic setting in which insiders can actively try to become undistinguishable 
from noise traders, the result only persists if their risk aversion is sufficiently high 
in order to prevent them from taking too large speculative positions.
5.3 More Observations on Welfare.
Since liquidity demand is not really specified in the standard rational expectations 
models in the spirit of Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), it is hard to 
draw any specific welfare conclusions for the noise traders. Behind the notion of 
a liquidity trader stands the idea that agents use capital markets to smooth their 
consumption over their life time. Young investors tend to borrow, middle aged 
investors tend to save and old investors will dissave and consume. Stochastic liq­
uidity trading may then exist both on an aggregate level and an individual level. 
Individually, agents might face unanticipated borrowing or lending constraints. 
On an aggregate level liquidity trading will depend on the stochastic population 
dynamics. Given the absence of a dynamic model which allows us to integrate 
this dynamic savings behaviour of economic agents and the performance of the 
financial markets at a given date, it is not clear how to measure exactly the wel­
fare properties with exogenous noise. In our model noise traders can reasonably 
only be interpreted as punters. Reflecting this dilemma the literature has taken 
three different ways to measure the welfare of liquidity traders. One strand (e.g.,
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Admati/Pfleiderer (1989, 1990)) considers only the size of the transaction costs. A 
second line assumes noise traders to be risk averse (e.g., Leland (1990)). Finally, 
some authors integrate the rational investors and the liquidity traders by assuming 
that the noise occurs in the form of stochastic changes in the endowments of the 
informed and uninformed speculators (e.g., Verrechia (1982)).
In two senses the magnitude of the bid-ask-spread might be a good indicator for 
possible welfare implications for liquidity traders. First, given that there are many 
ways to specify the ex-ante utilities of noise traders it is in some sense the most 
neutral indicator of what the noise traders stand to loose. Second, we have shown 
in section 4.3 that the size of the bid-ask-spread is also a good indicator for the 
possible ex-ante influence of price volatility. Recall that the initial market value of 
an investment was given by the equation
P0 -  E(02) =  —a(a3 +  a2a2 +  a2 .
Our analysis in chapter 3 has shown that the first and the second term on the 
right hand side (reflecting the lower risk premia and the higher price volatility due 
to the inflow of new information) roughly balance each other. Decisive whether 
investment ultimately increases or decreases is the behaviour of the third term on 
the right hand side which reflects the price volatility created by the bid-ask-spread. 
A higher bid-ask-spread will induce higher price volatility and in this sense the 
size of the bid-ask-spread is a good indicator also for the initial investment.
The common procedure in welfare comparisons of different regimes in models of the 
Grossman/Stiglitz type is to compare the aggregate welfare under these regimes. 
Aggregate welfare is defined as the weighted sum of the certainty equivalents of 
the utilities of the different investor classes. However, this procedure has three 
disadvantages. We have already mentioned the first one, namely that it is unclear 
how to measure exactly the utility of liquidity traders. Second, as we have observed 
in section 3.2, the calculation of the aggregate welfare does not make sense if 
changes in the secondary markets influence ex-ante investment. If the outcome of 
a change in regulation is less investment, it becomes meaningless that the aggregate 
welfare on the secondary markets increases conditional on the investment taking
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place. Without the risky asset the secondary market for this asset just does not 
exist. The third point concerns the fact that different regimes can in general not be 
pareto-ranked: Some investors will lose, others will gain. Hence, a political decision 
has to be taken in favour of which class of investors we want to redistribute. This 
is a bit odd since we do not exactly know for what reasons the liquidity traders 
trade. For instance, noise traders might just be speculating "opinion traders” , and 
there is no reason why we should redistribute wealth in favour of them. Moreover, 
even if the redistribution issue could be decided unambiguously, the redistribution 
schemes would in general require much more information on the part of the central 
planner than can be reasonably expected.
For these reasons we will restrict ourselves in the sequel to characterize the utility 
gains and losses of the different classes of investors and ignore the issue of aggregate 
welfare. We will first assume that shifts in the intensity of insider trading do not 
influence the capital stock x, i.e., all our calculations treat the capital stock as 
fixed. We have already analyzed the behaviour of the bid-ask-spread as a function 
of the amount of informed speculation in the market. Therefore, we will now study 
the utility of informed and uninformed speculators. At the end of this section, we 
will briefly study the welfare of the initial investors of generation 0 .
We first calculate the utilities of the informed speculators. All our calculations 
follow closely the techniques of Grossman/Stiglitz (1980)1. Also, some of our com­
parative statics results have already been obtained in their paper. Insider’s wealth 
is given by
(u -  P)2
WT =  —-------- — .
Integrating with respect to e we obtain
(  a2 a2 + r?a-Q 2<72 _ \
E(U(W,) = l - E ^ e x p (  * .*- ^  > ’ Z ) j  ,
1To sim plify  the  form ulas we set the coeffic ient of risk aversion a =  1 and th e  in it ia l  e n d o w m e n t
of the  riskless asset W =  0.
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where
- a i ( $ - E ( 0 ) )  + ^ x  + a , x
s / v W  + C -r1 )2" 3,
is distributed as x2 • Exploiting the properties of the moment generating functions 
of the x 2-distribution, we obtain
E(U(W,)) = 1 -  J  ^ ------ ;------ e x p [ ~ l ----------- ,-------------------).
V a\  +  alo* + )V J 2 of +  of of +  ( ^ J ’ of
Furthermore, Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) have shown that
e (u (w „)) =  i  -  ^ vaj(*jWx) - 1) •
We can decompose the utility in two different components. The first is contained 
in the factor in front of the exponential function and reflects the profits from noise 
traders; it would arise even if the capital stock of the economy were zero. The 
second, namely the profits from holding on average the quantity x  is contained 
in the argument of the exponential function; the profits stem from risk sharing 
and amount to roughly half of the risk premia times the capital stock x  (plus an 
additional factor stemming from the noisy transaction prices which distort the 
optimal risk sharing between generations).
We begin by comparing the situation with full revelation and without information. 
Claim 8 :
The expected utility of both insiders and outsiders is higher in 
the case without information (A =  0) than in the case with full 
revelation (A =  1).
Proof: See appendix.
There are two intuitive reasons for this result. The first is contained in the argu­
ment of the exponential function and has to do with what we dubbed ” Hirshleifer”- 
effect in the last chapter. Since we assumed investors to start from a zero endow­
ment they suffer from a premature arrival of information, because the asset become
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less risky. But investors prefer holding a more risky asset because in equilibrium 
their compensation for the higher risk from the sellers increases stronger than the 
risk. The size of this effect depends strongly on the size of the capital stock; in 
particular it would disappear if we set x  =  0 .
The second reason stems from the ”pure” effect of insider trading and is contained 
in the factor in front of the exponential function. Also this factor is higher in the 
case with full information. Since everybody is informed there is nothing to gain on 
the additional information. However, the risk bearing component of the bid-ask- 
spread decreases because the asset becomes less risky after the information arrival. 
Accordingly, investors’ profits from the risk bearing service offered to the liquidity 
traders fall. With a continuity argument we can conclude that also for sufficiently 
high levels of A both informed and uninformed speculators will be worse off than 
in the situation without information. Liquidity traders will face lower transaction 
costs because of the substantial decrease in the risk bearing component of the 
bid-ask-spread.
Therefore, we turn now to the more interesting case in which only a small part of 
investors is informed, i.e., to the case of sufficiently low A. We concentrate first on 
the "pure” insider effect and ignore the additional influence from the exponential 
term.
Claim 9:
Let x  =  0 .
If is sufficiently large the utility of every informed and every 
uninformed speculator is monotonically decreasing in A.
If a \ is sufficiently small, the utility of every informed and every 
uninformed speculator is increasing in A for small A.
Proof: See appendix.
The reasons behind this result1 are as follows. The income of both insiders and 
outsiders include the compensation for risk bearing which liquidity traders have to
i m p l i c i t  in the  form ulation  of the  result is th a t  we treat A as a kind o f  na tura l  c o n s ta n t .  If 
we com p are  two regim es which differ w ith respect  to A we perform co m p a ra t iv e  s ta t ic s  on two
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pay. The higher the volume of a liquidity motivated trade, the higher the profits 
from risk bearing become. If on average the traded quantities in the market are 
large (characterized by a high a*), this income from risk bearing becomes the 
dominant source of income for both insiders and outsiders. Since more informed 
speculation reduces uncertainty, the profits from risk bearing are reduced as well 
and both insiders and outsiders suffer.
If a \ is relatively small, this source of income is less important and insiders profit 
mainly from their inside knowledge. We have shown in the last section that at least 
for small A an increase in A makes it more difficult to distinguish insiders from 
liquidity traders. Hence, the aggregate profits of the insiders should rise. Claim 
9 shows that even the profits per insider are rising for small A, but there is no 
intuitive reason why this should necessarily be the case. Even less obvious is the 
result for the outsiders. The outsiders are not really hurt by more insider trading, 
since they can widen their bid-ask-spreads. Ultimately, the liquidity traders have 
to pay for the increase in informed speculation. But a priori it is hard to see how 
outsiders might profit from more insider trading. Apparently, outside investors 
(which one might also consider as market makers) are able to widen their bid-ask- 
spreads more than would be necessary to compensate them for the higher insider 
risk.1
If we introduce additionally the effects arising from the ” Hirshleifer effect”-term 
by allowing for x > 0, the results become ambiguous. Although in general the 
argument of the exponential function tends to decrease (and hence also utility),
in d ep e n d e n t ,  different worlds in which we ignore th a t  an in d iv id u a l  w ho was an insider in the  
first world has a lower utility  if he is an ou ts id er  in th e  second  world. S ince the  levelt o f  insider  
utility  are alw ays higher than  the  ones of the  outs iders ,  every ou ts id er  w ould  prefer to  be an 
insider. A m ore sop h is t ica ted  analys is  would treat  A as an en d o g en o u s  variable ,  for ex a m p le  
determ in ed  by the cost  of in form ation  a cquis it ion .  If the costs  o f  in form ation  acq u is it ion  were  
equal for every investor , net u ti lit ies  o f insiders (i.e., net  o f  ex p ec ted  co st s )  in equilibrium  would  
be equal to o u ts id er  utility  and the  issue of u ti l i ty  losses o f insiders w ho  b eco m e  ou ts id ers  would  
then  d isap p ea r  (as in G r o s s m a n /S t ig l i t s  (1 9 8 0 ) ) .
1T h e  term ino logy  is su g ges t iv e ,  but in a s e t t in g  where agents  act as price takers not entirely  
tru e .  U nin form ed  sp ecu la tors  ca n n ot  actively  influence the  "average" b id-ask-spread . T h e  fact  
th a t  the  "average” b id-ask-spread b eco m e s  larger for a h igher A is an equilibrium  p h e n o m en o n .  
N o tice  how ever, th a t  a very sim ilar p h en o m e n o n  occurred in the  s tra teg ic  se t t in g  w ith  p o s i t ive  
profits of ch ap ter  2. Inspection  of the  m arket m a k ers ’ profits in C laim 6 show s th a t  th e y  are 
increasing in the  arrival probabil ity  ft of informed sp ecu la tors  as long as ft is sufficiently sm all .  
In equilibrium m arket makers *et a higher b id-ask-spread .
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this is not true for all parameter values. But even in parameter regions in which it 
decreases, the overall effect on utility is not clear. Consider for instance the case
a
of low A. In the proof of Claim 9 we have shown that increases
in A for low A, and that the risk premium component a3 is always decreasing in A. 
Hence, the risk reduction decreases the argument of the "Hirshleifer”-component. 
But the overall effect of the increase in the speculative utility component and the 
decrease in the ”Hirshleifer”-component will depend how strong the latter effect 
may become. Both the level of the capital stock x  and the extent to which ex-ante 
investment responds to shifts in A are important. We will not pursue this discussion 
here, because without a more general formalization of the initial investment stage, 
utility gains and losses are hard to judge. We will discuss this point in more detail 
in section 5.5 of the next chapter.
Finally we turn to the welfare of the initial investors in the model of chapter 3. 
The gross revenues of the entrepreneurs are given by the initial market value of the 
risky asset, i.e., their revenues will fall for low A and they will ultimately rise above 
the level without informed speculation if enough informed speculators are active. 
For the initial investors the situation is different. Since the entrepreneurs have to 
share the risk with them, the initial investors are actually interested in projects 
which are as risky as possible. The discount on risk which the entrepreneurs have to 
offer to the initial investors in order to induce them to invest, becomes the higher 
the riskier the project is. Accordingly, the utility of the initial investors increases 
if and only if the price volatility increases. Calculating the certainty equivalent of 
his utility we obtain
E(U(W) = E(P1 -  P0)x -  §var(A  -  P0)x
= % ar(A )x  ,
which is clearly increasing with the variance of future prices. We characterized 
price volatility at date 1 in Claim 5. Accordingly, generation 1 will incur welfare 
losses, if the early release of information reduces the overall risk of the economy 
(<rI large), and he tends to gain if this risk reducing effect is small (a* small). Only 
if the lower initial market value prevents the entrepreneurs from undertaking the
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investment, generation 0 would be worse off with a higher price volatility at date 
1.
To conclude this section, we summarize our results on the welfare gains and losses 
created by an increase in the number of informed speculators on secondary mar­
kets. For a sufficiently low number of insiders an increase in A leads to less in­
vestment, lower revenues for the entrepreneurs and higher transaction costs for 
liquidity traders, if the average liquidity volume is not too large, i.e., o\ is small. 
Neglecting effects arising from the size of the available capital stock z, initial in­
vestors, insiders and uninformed speculators (resp. market makers) tend to gain. 
If the number of insiders is sufficiently high, the risk reducing effect of new in­
formation becomes dominant. This induces higher investment, increasing revenues 
of the entrepreneurs and lower transaction costs for the liquidity traders. Initial 
investors’, insiders’ and uninformed speculators* welfare tends to decrease.
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6. Conclusions.
We have shown in a very simple and stylized model how expected differences in 
information among shareholders may influence investment ex ante. We have argued 
that the indirect effect of insider activity on secondary markets is to shift risk 
forward and to alter allocation of risk among the investors. On the one hand insider 
trading raises the risk of holding an asset through a higher price volatility; on the 
other hand it also raises the expected returns via lower risk premia in the future. 
Through this effect insider trading might lead to the "breakdown” of markets: With 
insider trading expected in the future certain investments might not be undertaken 
today because of a lower market value of the investment. However, we have also 
shown that "more” insider trading need not necessarily lead to lower initial market 
values. Depending on the specific environment, more insiders can also lead to a 
higher investment activity ex ante. Premature resolution of uncertainty is not a 
neutral phenomenon: lower uncertainty might be appreciated less or more than 
lower price volatility.
The examples of this chapter show that for the judgement of the effects of insider 
trading one has to be very careful in dealing with the interaction between the value 
of new information per se and the market frictions which create the informational 
advantage. For instance, in the examples of section 4.2 and 4.3 the full revelation 
of information induced higher investment because it reduced the overall risk to be 
borne by the economy. However, the behaviour of price volatility, risk premia and 
initial investment in the presence of asymmetric information depended strongly on 
the respective specification of the market frictions. In the example of section 4.3 
the beneficial effect dominated any effects arising from asymmetric information, 
whereas in the example with exogenous noise trading of section 4.2 and section 
5 the effects of the asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders domi­
nated in certain parameter ranges the risk reducing effects of the new information 
and led to lower investment.
At this point the reader might wonder, in which sense actual observed regulations 
of insider trading correspond to shifts in the variable A of our model. Discus­
sions on the prohibition of insider trading often turn around the introduction of a
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”disclose-or-abstain” rule, i.e., a rule which in our model should automatically lead 
to A =  0 or A =  1. But in practice, such a rule will only increase the expected costs 
of insider trading. The observed intensity of insider trading will depend strongly 
on the precise definition of insider information and the zeal with which the regu­
lator enforces the law. Hence, even the introduction of a ”disclose-or-abstain”-rule 
will be at least implicitly a decision on the desired A. Moreover, the ” disclose-or- 
abstain”-rule is not the only observed rule to regulate insider trading. Competing 
rules are the ”equal-access-to-information”-rule and rules which prohibit insider 
trading only if some breach of fiduciary duty is involved. In practice, the choice 
of one of these rules is equivalent to choosing a certain level of insider trading. 
Under the ”equal-access’-rule, market insiders like market makers, brokers etc. 
are typically exempted from the prohibition of certain forms of insider trading. 
This should lead to a higher A than a ”disclose-or-abstain”-rule. An even higher 
A should be expected under the fiduciary-duty-rule, which basically regards only 
corporate insiders. In our model a regulator would need extraordinarily detailed 
information to take any sensible decision among these different rules.
A final word regards the limitations of our model. The three-period framework is 
very useful to highlight the basic effect of the premature arrival of information, 
i.e., that it shifts risk over time and alters the allocation of risks among differ­
ent classes of investors. However, there are also several drawbacks of our model. 
First, one might be tempted to suspect that our results are mainly driven by the 
assumption of an economy with a finite number of trading dates. In an overlap­
ping generations model with infinite horizon the benefits of new information might 
disappear because each generation faces now risky prices in the next period. Sec­
ond, the existence of only two trading dates forces us to treat traders at date 
0 and date 1 asymmetrically in the welfare analysis; a symmetric treatment of 
generations would certainly be desirable. Third, the investment structure of our 
model is rather rudimentary. In particular in the (perhaps most interesting) case 
of section 5, we have seen that the capital stock interacts in a rather subtle way 
with redistributional effects. In order to understand these effects better, one would 
need a richer investment structure. To deal with these issues the next chapter will 
consider an infinite horizon version of the model with exogenous noise trading.
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A ppend ix .
1 . Proof of Claim 1
To show that the risk component of P0 is always lower (and hence PQ always higher) 
than in the case without information resp. full disclosure we simply calculate the 
derivatives. We shall see that
Q
—  (a3 + c%o2e) < 0  for A =  0 ,
Q
—  (a3 + a l r f )  > 0 for A =  1 and
O  A
d2 (a3 +  ac%a%) changes sign at most once.
(7A
Therefore, define
1 ^ 1x = —  and y =
at *
and observe y < x. We obtain
d_ 2 2, y - x  ^  2 \ x  2Xx A( y - x )  x
a x \ a * + a , o , )  (Al +  ( l _ A)y)2 l 1 y y  Ai +  (1 — A)y ’
and thus
and
d  ( . 2 2\ y  ~  x
< 0  for A =  0
+  =  V * ) )a A x2 N y y 7
= ( y - i ) ( - ^ - )  > °  for A =  1 .X
A further derivation with respect to A gives
+  =  V + * ( ! - % ) «  ((1  "  X) y  ~  X x ) ( x  ~ y)  +  Xy)  ’
which only for large A may become negative.
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2. Proof of Claim 2
The comparative statics of the Grossman/Stiglitz model is quite tedious and esti­
mates over the whole range of possible A’s are difficult. Therefore, for a\ sufficiently 
small we will restrict our attention to the behaviour of the initial market value for 
A close to 0 resp. A close to 1. More precisely, we will show that
d 2 2 2 2 (°*)2 2 \—  (a3 + a 2a0 +  a a2—^ - o \ ) |A = 0 > 0  ,
and
d 2 2 2 2 iae)2 2 \
— (<*3 + < * X  + « = i < 0 .
if a\ is sufficiently small. For intermediate values of A in principle anything could 
happen. By continuity we only know from (4.5) that for very high A the initial 
market value has to be higher than in the case without any insiders. However, it 
seems reasonable to conjecture that P0 as a function of A takes the shape of figure 
2 , i.e., the graph takes a U-shaped form.
For the proof of the previous inequalities we first recall the expressions for a2 and
a 3:
Act2 + a 2(ga
2 A2crJ + a 2[Xa2s +  CT2)cr(2cr2 ’
and
_  2 +  °2(g» +  g? R 2g2
3 ‘ A2g2 +  a2 (Act* +  ct*)ct*ct*
We first calculate the derivatives of the three terms in the above expression.
a x a$
2 2Act*(A2g* + a2(Act* +ct*)ct*ct*) -  (A2g 2 +  a2(g2 +  ct*)ct*ct;)(2Act| + a 2g 2P?g
(A2 g 2 +  o2 ( Act2 +  p 2 )p? ct2 )2 
(A2 -  2A)o2(g2)2g fg f -  a4(g2)2(g2)2(g2)2 ~  a<g2(g?)3(p2)2 
(A *ct2 +  a2 (Act2 +  p 2K 2p2)2
< 0  .
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H t
o
—  tn \ -3  (*  ~  AX 2 A g » +  a’1° l at al)) +  X2° l  +  (Xal  +  g ? K g i
3A l 2' * (A2o 2 +  a2(Ao2 +*?)*?®2)a
—  f — ) 
dA A
_ c«(^2(r« +°2(^g?+g?R2g2) -  + ° a w + <7?)g?g«)(2Aga + ffl2g8g?^)
(A2o 2 +  a2 (Act* +  o 2)o2o 2)2 
_  “‘ " ik T 1'] -  -W  -  a2(gg +  o,2)a2o|(2A g2 + a ‘ 0*< T *al)
(A2 o', +  a2 (Ao2 +  o2)o2o2)2
We first observe that
503 _  + g ? )
dA |a = o a?
Moreover, we have that a2 (0 ) =  0 and hence
d d^ K ) | a =„ =  2 a 2 (0) —  (a2)|i= „ = 0
Finally we calculate
^ ( a ' c i ^ o l )  =  ( 2 f  A ( ^ ) ) | i  =  o ( a 2 ( o 2 ) ^ )
3A
= 2 < ± * CT«(! ~ a2{al  + at ) ° l )
Combining these three expressions shows the inequality in the case A =  0 .
Similar calculations show the inequality in the case A =  1 (see also the calculations 
in the proof of Claim 5).
For the last proposition of Claim 2 it is sufficient to show that var(JPi) is mono- 
tonically decreasing in A. This is shown in the proof of Claim 5.
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3. Proof of Claim 4
For the comparative statics of equation (4.6) observe that
(a )2 +  (1 — a )2 — 0.5 > 0 for all a  E [0,1]
and thus
dp\ < 0 for all A E [0,1] .d \
To see that the initial market value in the case of no insider trading is lower than 
in the case with insider trading we show that
Pa|a = o + ~  < Po
This follows in particular if we can show that for any g E C([0, l]) and every 
c E [0,max(y)) we have
1 + C <  1
f  7fc)df ( a )
0 0
But it is easily seen that this is an implication of Holder’s inequality. First observe 
that the inequality is trivially fulfilled if c =  0. Derivation of the left hand side 
with respect to c gives
1— + < )  =  - - — 1— ; ( / ( ^ ) W d/(a)) +  1 - 0 •
0 0
where the last inequality is just Holder’s inequality. Since the right hand side is 
independent of c this shows the claim.
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4. Welfare analysis of section 4.3
Consider first the outsiders of generation 1: we have
W ‘ = W  + (a§l +  (1 -  a)$l +  i2 -  P ^ X u  (A )
=  W  +  ((a  -  .5)(fl» -6 1 )  + U +  «*P*)a((a ,  +  (1 _ Z y _  .5)g,  +  g?) ■
Since W  is normally distributed, we know that
E(exp(—aW)) =  exp(—aE(W) +  ^-va.i(W)) ,z
and since
E(W2°) -  % ar(W “ )
 __________(a/>A s )2_______________ (2(a -  .5)2of +  q2)(flpAs )2
a((a2 +  (1 — a )2 — .5)of +  o f) a2 ((a2 + (1 — a )2 — .5)af +  o f )2
 _________ (aPA^)2___________/ _  (a2 +  (1 -  a )2 -  .5)a2e +  a\ .
a ((a2 +  (1 — a )2 — .5)o2 +  o2) '  2((a2 +  (1 — a )2 — .5)of +  o f) '
=  __________ (apA x)2__________
2a((a2 +  (1 — a )2 — .5)of +  o2)
where we used
2(a — .5)2 =  a 2 +  (l — a )2 — .5 ,
we finally obtain
E m * * ) )  =  1 -  esp(—aiy)exp(—a2x2 ^  +  (1 _  ^  ^  +  g, ) .
For the insiders observe that
Wi“ =  W +  (affj +  (1 -  a)fl2 +  ?3 -  A ) * / ( A )
=  W  +  aa* ~~ -5)(^2 _  $1) +  a2 P> ) 2 +  £2 ^ - ( ( “  -  -  &l) + o.xpy) .
Integrating first over e and exploiting the normality of c one obtains 
EeiZ(exp(-aW2 )) = exp(-aW)Ee( e x p ( - ^ —- ( ( a  -  .5)(0j -  §1) + axpx) 2 .I  (LO,
130
Now rewrite the argument of the last expression as
2 <kt?U A 3  31 "k> o't K y/to* y / 2 ^ f ( a - . S y
observe that the term in the right bracket has a noncentral x2- distribution and ex­
ploiting the properties of the moment generating functions of the x2 -distributions 
we get
E{U(W?)) =  1 -  exp(-aW)-
___________ ??_____________  , 1 J & P l  <
(a2 +  (1 -  a )2 -  .5)<r2 +  a 2 2 (a2 +  (1 -  a )2 — .5)a2 +  a 2 
Note that insiders are only better off with their inside information, if a 2 is small.
Finally we calculate the ex ante utility of generation 0 investors. Their future 
wealth is given by
Wl = W  + {Pl - P 0)£ , 
and since Px is normally distributed
a2E(exp(-aW )) = exp{-aE{W)  +  — var(PF))z
= e x p { -a * £ .  s ’ +  y f * ’ ) 
a2 (p
=  f )  •
As in section 3 we consider now a planner who can raise lump sum taxes from some 
investors and pay lump sum transfers to others. Again, these payments occur in 
form of the riskless asset and cannot be conditioned on any information events. 
However, in this example the central planner must be able to pay personalized 
transfers (i.e., as a function of a) in order to be able to make everybody better 
off. Per capita income from taxes is now
a (p o  -  Pa ~  ^ r ) x 2 ,
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and the required transfer to outsider a  is
/ _______________ P?_________________________ p|___________________ x _ 2
2((a2 + (1 -  a ) 2 ) a 2 + a2) 2((a2 + (1 -  a)2 -  .5)a* +  a2)
Integrating over a and substituting the definitions of p0 and px , one sees that the 
per capita revenue exceeds the per capita expenses
i
/ ^2 ^2  
a^2((a2 +  (1 -  a ) 2 ) a 2 + a2) 2((a2 +  (1 -  a)2 -  .5) a %  +  <?*) ^
o
Hence, at least under certain conditions appropriate redistribution policies might 
make everybody in the economy better off if insider trading is legal rather than 
prohibited.
5. Proof of Claim 5
The claim follows with appropriate derivations of a2 and a 3. 
a )
d \ a 3
22 \a2e ( \ 2al  +  a2(Ag2 +  g ? K V 2) -  (A2g2 +  a2 (g2 +  ge2)geV^)(2Ag2 +  a2g2gt2g^)
(A2g2 + a 2 (Ag2 + g 2R V 2) 2
(A2 -2 A )a1( c l Y o l c l - a i ( o l f ( a l f ( o l f - a i aiM ) 3(o lY  
(A 2g2 +  a2 (Act’ +  g2R 2g2) 2
< 0  .
b)
OJ2 2 2 2 A A— g2 -  a 3 =  g 'g*
A • " A2g2 +  a2 (Ag2 + g 2R 2g2
Hence
_ * (£ Vd \ K A £ -  as)
2 2 
=  <7, <7*
(1 -  2A)(A2gf +  a2 (Ac2 +  g f R g f )  -  (A -  A2)(2 Ag2 +  a V R 2^ )  
(A2g2 + a2 (Act2 + <Jt2)g«2g2)2
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For A =  0 we get
a2 o'] o] ol
(a2 a 2 a 2 a 2)2
and for A =  1
—  _  r. \ -2-2 K 2 + a 2K
dX X * 3j|A = 1 ‘ '(<T,a + o * ( < 7 * + < 7 * ) f f » o * ) »  '
Thus, for A sufficiently small, the adverse selection component is increasing in A, 
and for A sufficiently large it is decreasing in A.
c)
— ( - )3A A
_  + « a(Aog +o?)g?of) ~  (Act? +  aa(g? + g f)g fg ^ )(2 Ag  ^ + a2a2a 2al)
(A2 <7* + a2 (Act2 +  ct2)ct2ct2)2 
a 'o K o lY o l  -  A2(ct2)2 -  c?(„l +  ct2)ct2ct2 (2Act,2 +  a2CT2CTt2CT;) 
(A2ctJ +  a2 (Act2 +  ct2)ct2ct2)2
For A = 0 this becomes
a2CT2(CT2)2CT2 - a V 2(CT2) >  
(A2ct2 +  a2 (Act? +  ct2)ct2ct2)
2 \ 2
which is positive for o \ sufficiently small. By continuity this is true for small A. If 
A =  1 and hence for all large A the expression is clearly negative. The same is true 
for all A, if <j2 is sufficiently large.
d) For A =  0
^2 =  o2e +  o \
A , A = 0
and for A =  1
=  Ol +C72
A | A =  1
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e) We calculate
^ ( < * X  +  =  2 f - { a ,  +  (A ( ^ ) ) ( A V ,s +  (a,2)2*’ )} .
From c) we know that is decreasing in A, if o\ is sufficiently large. Since
0 < ot2 < 1, this shows that the price variance is monotonically decreasing in A, if 
o\ is sufficiently large.
If a\ is sufficiently small, we know from c) that for small A is increasing
in A. Hence, the price volatility is increasing as well.
If o\ sufficiently small and A sufficiently large, set A =  1 and show that the 
derivative becomes negative. From c) and because a 2 (l) =  1 we have for A =  1
“ 2 +  (J ^ T ))(V a '  +  )V ' )
( y W Y o l  +  ° l  +  2 +  K  +  i
W  + K  + al ) al al Y  *
Estimating this expression gives the desired inequality.
6 . Proof of Claim 6
If insider i buys/sells the quantity q{ his future wealth is given by
W = E-x (0 +  e -  P(q{ +  ^  q3 +  x))fc .
Assume that P(Q) = c + bQ and consider the quantities of the competing insiders 
as given. Because of the normality assumptions the maximization problem is then 
equivalent to
max E(W ) — -var(W ) .n 2
Solving the first order condition gives
and the second order condition
26 +  ao\ > 0 .
Requiring symmetry gives
0 — c (n — l)bqino: = n --------------- n-------- -—26 +  2b + ao2€ ’
and thus
0 — c
nq* =  n ~,— , 'x .  ,  r  for * =  1, ..,n  .(n + 1)6 + ao\
Market makers observe the realization Q of Q = nfa -f- x and set prices such that
p (q ) = e (o + z \ q  = q ) .
Normality makes the regression linear and hence
c =  E(9)
and
   o2^   (i»+1)6+o«t* 0
( ------  )2c 2 4- a2\(n+l)b+a<rl ) U0 ^  Ux
Before rearranging to obtain the desired expression of Claim 6 , we note that any
solution 6 < 0 must fulfil 6 < — t t ^ 2» + 1 «
In order to show uniqueness rearrange the above expression and note that b is 
given is given as the roots of the polynomial
F(b) =(n + l )2 a^b3 +  2 (n + l)ao 2a 262
+ (a2 (a2)2a 2 -  no2)6 -  naa2a 2 .
Clearly, F(0 ) < 0 and calculating the second derivative we see that the positive 6 
are in the convex part of the polynomial:
J^ -F (6) =  6 (n +  l)2o26 +  4(n +  l)aa2t a2x 
> 0  for 6 > 0 .
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Hence there is only one positive root.
Since the second order condition allows also for — tto ?  > b > — ~a2, we have ton +1 e i  e
check that there is no root in this domain. For a =  0, this is trivial. Thus consider 
the case a > 0 . In the hypothetical case a2 =  0, there are only two roots of the 
polynomial, i.e., 6 =  0 and 6 =  — . Since the latter 6 is a double root, we
have in particular that with a2 =  0 also F(b) < 0 for all 6 < — ^ 7 ^  • For positive 
o2 we can estimate in the relevant domain of 6
—na^b — naa^a2 < -n a c 2<72(—]- +  1) < 0 .
Accordingly, F(b) < 0 for all — 7 7 7 ^  > 6 > — |o f ,  which establishes the unique­
ness of the equilibrium.
Proof of Claim 7
Divide F  by (n +  l )2 to obtain the polynomial Q:
Q(b) =o\b3 +  2 acr*olb2(n +  1)
+  7 — *  —  (a2(cr*)*ol — nai)b — . ao*< 7 . .(re +  1)2 '  v "  (n + 1)2 ‘ '
The equilibrium 6 is still given as the unique positive root of Q. Furthermore, 
Q(0) =  — y  aa2a2 is decreeing in n, and
±Q {b) =  3a26’ +  J ^ ^ c l b  + ( O X  -n o * )  .
At least for those n with
a2(a2)2a2 - n a 2 > 0 ,
the first derivative of Q is decreasing in n for every 6 > 0 . Hence, the positive 
unit root of Q is increasing in n. This establishes the first part of the claim. The
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second part follows from a continuity argument and the observation that in the 
case a =  0 , 6 is a decreasing function of n.
7. Proof of Claim 8
We first compare the arguments of the exponential functions and show that they 
are lower in the case with full information. This amounts to showing that
to  + »?)’_________ t o l l —  > 0
+ t o + < ^ ) to  +  t o ) t o
To show this, observe that the expression is equal to 0 for a\ =  0 , and calculate 
the derivative with respect to .
We next show that the "pure” information effect is lower in the case with full 
revelation. For the insiders this is clear since
«tf +  t o + « t f ) t o > t o ) t o  •
For the outsiders we have to show that
This follows by rewriting the inequality as
1 1
i + t o  < i  +  ^ t o
8 . Proof of Claim 9
The first part of the claim follows by calculating
+ ( y ) 2t o ) t o )  =  (-2(1  -  <*aW +  y t o 2)2° x ) ^ y  •
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<
t o + ® ? ) t o  +  t o ) v
For o\ sufficiently large, the first term on the right hand side is clearly positive 
and the derivative on the right hand side becomes negative according to Claim 5.
In order to show that the ”pure insider effect” is decreasing in A for A and o\ 
sufficiently small, we consider the derivative of with respect
to A at A =  0 . We show that this expression is increasing in A for small a*, and 
thus expected utility is increasing as well:
d 2 2  a2 v 2 /  2 \ 2  2 \  o  2 ^ + < T t2 l - ( l + f l y K 2 a ]
+ ( t 0  > < ) X )|a = oa A v “ ‘ “ «  ■ v A  ; V“ « /  - *  a ,  a 3 ( < T ? ) 2 < 7 =
which is positive for small.
For the uninformed speculators we calculate the additional factor as
«ar(u I wx) _  >?a\ +  (g2 +
A2ct? +  (ct2)2<j 2
and a derivation of this expression with respect to A shows
\Figure 1
o \ large
o \  smallx
XFigure 2
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140
C h a p t e r  4
A  DYNAMIC ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH INFORMED SPECULATION
141
1. Introduction.
In this chapter we present a model of dynamic asset pricing in markets with noise 
trading and asymmetric information. We will study an overlapping generations 
economy with infinite horizon, and with one risky and one riskfree asset. At each 
trading date the inelastic supply of "old” individuals is bought by risk averse 
"young” investors. Some of these investors are assumed to be informed about the 
future dividend returns of the risky asset. Moreover, at each trading date there 
are noisy demand and supply shocks which are not further specified.
We can show that under certain conditions this economy possesses (multiple) 
steady state equilibria. Our analysis of these equilibria focuses on two main points. 
First, we study the impact of noise trading on the behaviour of price volatility and 
risk premia. We show that the presence of noise trading allows for feedback effects 
of the kind that expectations of a high price volatility become self-stabilizing. Ex­
pectations of a high future price volatility induce a high perceived risk of holding 
the asset at present. Accordingly, already minor noisy demand shocks may produce 
a high present price volatility, since prices have to move a lot in order to let the 
market absorb the extra demand. We show in particular, that there are equilibria 
in which this feedback effect prevents the convergence of the share prices towards 
the risky asset’s fundamental value even if the investors’ risk aversion becomes 
arbitrarily small.
Second, the analysis of the effects of the premature arrival of information and 
asymmetric information allows us to overcome some defects of the three-period- 
model of the last chapter. In particular, we can separate the analysis of the effects 
of new information from the analysis of asymmetric information.
We show that in an economy with zero interest rate, investors are indifferent 
between the premature arrival of new information and no information at all. The 
decrease of dividend risk is exactly compensated by the increase of price risk. If 
the interest rate is positive, the early release of information may decrease the risk 
to be borne by the economy. Since future returns are discounted with the interest
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rate whereas future risk is not, the early release of information may in certain 
equilibria be beneficial.
In contrast to the analysis of the noisy rational expectations equilibrium of the 
last chapter, the existence of an equilibrium in which the new information per se 
is neutral allows us to study the effect of asymmetric information in isolation. The 
analysis focuses again on the properties of the bid-ask-spread. Even with neutral 
information we can show that shifts in the intensity of insider trading may lead 
under certain circumstances to higher price volatility, higher risk premia and less 
investment, but that it may also induce the contrary. Moreover, we show that the 
welfare implications of insider trading are ambiguous.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and shows that 
under certain assumptions there are exactly two steady state equilibria. We charac­
terize all other equilibria and study the stability of the steady states. Furthermore, 
we investigate how price volatility and risk premia in the different equilibria depend 
on the amount of noise trading and the risk aversion of the investors. Section 3 
studies the impact of the early release of information and asymmetric information 
on price volatility, risk premia and welfare. We close this section with a detailed 
analysis of the behaviour of investment levels. Section 4 discusses the implications 
and limitations of the model.
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2. The M odel.
We consider an overlapping generations model with two-period lived agents. To 
concentrate on the portfolio choice of the young generation we drop any additional 
decision like first period consumption and labour supply.1 The economy has an 
infinite number of periods, indexed by t =  .. ,—1,0,1,.... At every date t a new 
generation t is born which can invest in a riskless and a risky asset. At date t +  1 
the dividends of the risky asset are paid out to generation t. Generation t sells all 
the assets to the new generation t +  1 and leaves the market. Each generation is 
represented by the interval [0 , 1] and every investor of a generation has constant 
absolute risk aversion a. For each unit of the riskless asset investors obtain R  units 
in the next period, where we assume that R  > 1. In period t the risky asset pays 
per capita the realization of a random variable ut where the ut ’s are assumed to 
be i.i.d. and distributed as in chapter 3, i.e.,
ut ~0%+£ti where 0t ~  N(E(0),aJ), et ~  N(0 ,cr2).
We assume that a proportion A of the young investor generation t knows at date 
t the true realization of the systematic component 0t+i of ut+i • There is a fixed 
stock per capita x  of the risky asset in each period. Moreover, we assume that 
in each period there is an additional noisy supply xt , where the xt are i.i.d., and 
distributed as xt ~  N(0 , a 2).2
Each generation is assumed to maximize its expected utility, i.e., given a price Pt 
generation t chooses a quantity X t of the risky asset in order to maximize
£ (£ /(* )) =  1 -  E(exp(-aW t+ x (X))) ,
1In th e  c o n te x t  o f f inancial m arkets  s im ilar  m odels  have been  used by D eL o n g  et.  al. (1988)  and  
P a g a n o  (1 9 8 9 ) .  T h e  overlapping  g en eration s  stru ctu re  m igh t  be a ltern ative ly  in terpreted  as an 
eco n o m y  w ith  m yopic  investors.
a For a general equilibrium  analys is  the  n orm ality  a ssu m p tio n s  are o f  course an im p oss ib le  as­
s u m p tio n  and are only im p osed  for tractab ili ty  reasons. N orm ally  d is tr ib u ted  noisy  su p p ly  plus  
no restr ic t ion s  on short sales m ean s  th a t  there are som e agen ts  w ho offer arbitrarily large b e ts  
on th e  o u tc o m e  of the  p rod u ct ive  activ ity . B u t  since these  b e ts  have to  be  h o noured  in any case,  
this im plies  th a t  these  noise  traders have p o ten t ia l ly  infinite  w ea lth .  T h e  an a logous problem  
(n eg a t iv e  c o n su m p t io n )  arises for the  rational investors.
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where Wt+1 denotes the end-of-life wealth. Their initial wealth is W  units of the 
riskless asset. Hence, Wt+l is given by
Wt+ l(X) = RW  + {ut+ l+ P t+ l - R P t)X  .
We will look for rational expectations equilibria in normally distributed prices, 
i.e., a sequence of price distributions {..,Pt_ ! ,P t ,P t+1, ..}, which at each date t 
fulfil the following conditions:
(i) Pt is a function of (0t+ l,x t), such that ut+1 and Pt are jointly normal.
(ii) Each investor maximizes his utility taking Pt as given and knowing the true 
joint distributions of (ut+1,P t ) and (ut+2 ,P t+1).
(iii) Pt (0t+1,x t ) clears the market at date t , given the realizations of 0t+1 and xt .
Assumption (ii) is a kind of "double” rational expectations hypothesis. All in­
vestors need for their maximization problem an expectation on the joint distri­
bution of (Ot+2,Pt+1)- Moreover, the uninformed investors at date t also need an 
expectation concerning the joint distribution of (0t+ x, Pt) in order to deduce infor­
mation on^t + 1 from prices at date t. We assume that in equilibrium both expecta­
tions axe self-fulfilling. Assumption (i) is necessary to keep the model tractable. It 
implies the normality of (ut+1, Pt), as well as the pairwise independence of the Pt . 
Thus, any equilibrium can be characterized by a sequence of price means and price 
variances {.., (P(Pt_ 1), var(Pt_ 1)), (# (A ),var(P t )), (P(P«+i), var(Pt+1) ) , ...}.
2.1 Existence
In order to calculate equilibria of our economy, we first note that formally investors’ 
decision problem in each period is the same as in the Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) 
setting of chapter 3. However, the returns on the risky asset are now given by 
ut+1 + Pt+1 rather than only by u. Accordingly, the per capita demands at date 
t are given by
X  ( p  \  — ^ * + 1 t + 1 ) ~  -fl-Pt
a (°f + var(Pt+i)) 
g  t p  \ _  -^(tt*+ i +  A +  i 1 Pt =  Pt) ~  RP\
avar(ut+1 +  Pt+1 | Pt = Pt )
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In equilibrium Pt must clear the market, i.e., mean per capita demand of generation 
t has to be equal to the inelastic supply of shares of the old generation x  plus the 
random noise supply x. Observing that instead of the residual risk the investors 
face now the residual risk o\ +  var(Pt+1) we obtain with a similar reasoning as in 
section 4.2 of chapter 3 that equilibria fulfilling (i)-(iii) are given by the following 
recursion formula
(2 .1) P, = ±  ( a iE{9) +  E(P t+,)  +  a 3 (0t+1 -  a * -  aa3x )
where
= 1 — 0-2
= \ +  <*2W  + +var(P t+ 1))(ge2 +var(P t+i))g*
2 A2 a2e +  a? (A o2d +  o2 +  var(Pt+ x)) (a2 +  var(Pt+1 ))o2
xx +  a2( t f  +<r? +  var(Pt+1))(ae2 +  var(Pt+1) ) ^
3 £ t+1^A 2a 2 +  a2 (A<r2 +<72 +var(P t+ i))(cr2 +  var(Pt+ 1))cr2
a l9 a2 and a3 are always functions of A and var(Pt+1). However, we will usually 
drop the argument and put it only when necessary. Observe that
a 3 (0,var(P,+x)) =  0 ,
a 3 (A,var(P,+ x))(<72 + var(P ,+ x)) _  _ f n  , n  u  _  _3 , _ 3 , ___ , D x
------------------------ r------------------------  — oc3 (0, var(Pt+ 1 )) — o t -\-od + v a r ^ /t+ ij  i
A | A = 0
a 3 (A,var(Pt+x))(CTe2 + var(P ,+ x)) . »  j  . _ r , p  ^- — ol3 (1, var(Pt+ 1 J j — <7e +  var(Pt+ iJ
A IA = 1
In a first attempt to solve the existence problem we will restrict our attention to 
steady state equilibria. We define the economy to be in a steady state, if the Pt 
are identically distributed, i.e., if there is a P  such that
Pt ~  P  ~  N (P (P ),a2 ) for all t.
Inspection of (2 .1) shows that we can deal with the problem of finding a steady 
state mean and a steady state variance separately. We shall first deal with the 
problem of finding a steady state variance. Calculation of the price variance in 
equation (2 .1) gives as the equation for the steady state variance
146
(2 .2 ) =  £ ( « ? « ; + « ’ ( y ) * M + ‘4 )**:) •
Substituting the expressions for a2 in (2 .2), one sees that solving this equation for 
Op is equivalent to solving for the roots of a polynomial of order 6 . Therefore, we 
will deal first with the two bench-mark cases of A =  0 and A =  1 in which the 
equation reduces to a second order equation.
Claim 1:
Let A =  0 , 1.
If o\ =  0 , there is a unique steady state variance, i.e.,
■ * * = a£  .
p  R 2
If ol > 0 we have to distinguish two cases:
If \o 1 +  (1 — A)R2o% + R 2o* > 4 there is no steady solution.
If Ao'l +  (l — A)R 2ol + R 2o* < ~ 5~ 3* there are two steady state 
solutions. They are characterized by the price variances
- 2  /  R 4 R?{(7e+°?) R 2  2 2
4a*{ol)2 ~ a2a2x + 2a2a\ ° e t
T *m  J  Rt , R2 ^
pUJ V ia*  (c l)2 a2 c l 2a2 c l  ' ’
resp.
„* M  =  f R i  -  g W + g?) . R 2
) v  4a4 (c l)2 a2c2x la 2a2,  * ‘ ’
2 / , \  /  R* g g + J P o f  , g  .
F V ^ fl4(a *)2 fl2<7* 2o2a J  e
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Proof: (2 .2) becomes for A =  0 resp A = 1
(o) =  ^ ( “2W  +  al  + ( ° ) ) X )  .
resp.
^pW  =  + aS(°? + o 2r ( l ) ) 1<>l) ■
Solving these quadratic equations gives ap and a2p .
The two steady state variances highlight a general feature of the introduction of 
exogenous noise trading in a model of dynamic asset pricing: the presence of noise 
traders creates a very peculiar feedback effect in the economy. If the investors 
at date t expect a very variable price p ,+„  holding the asset at date t becomes 
very risky. Accordingly, the risk premia at date t become very large. This in turn 
will create a very high volatility of Pt itself. In the high volatility equilibrium o2p 
the beliefs of a very high price volatility become self-fulfilling. Price volatility is 
basically created by the expectations of price volatility. Note that this phenomenon 
arises although the Pt are pairwise independent.
Feedback effects of this sort cannot occur in the models of Pagano (1989) and 
DeLong et. al. (1988), because of the special form which the noise takes in their 
models. Price volatility in their models is basically given by the "real” variance of 
the asset plus the noise variance. The most striking feature of our feedback effect 
is that low levels of noise trading or risk aversion may even strengthen it. In the 
high volatility equilibrium a2p a low risk aversion or a low variance of noise supply 
lead to a very high price variance; price volatility is nearly independent of the 
”real” return characteristics of the asset. Investors expect such a high volatility 
in the future that even small noisy demand or supply shocks lead to major price 
movements, and hence to a high price volatility today.
While in the high volatility equilibrium o2p volatility expectations dominate the 
intrinsic risk characteristics of the asset, the low volatility equilibrium <Pp repre­
sents the opposite extreme. cPp is the lowest steady state variance such that both
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the risk of the asset and the feedback effect are taken into account. This will be­
come clearer in the stability analysis of 2 .2 . Heuristically, it is easily seen by the 
following thought experiment in the case A =  1 (see also figure 1). The lowest pos-
<rasible candidate for the price variance would be But because of the feedback 
effect this cannot be an equilibrium: the lowest possible price variance would be
3 3
+  a2 (a2 +  The iteration of this argument will lead to the steady state
price variance ap .
The difference between the two equilibria becomes also clear by looking at the 
behaviour of the equilibria for a\ —► 0 . For o2 —> 0 we have obviously that 
dp —* oo: because the feedback effect disappears, variance expectations have to 
become higher and higher to become selffulfilling. For <7p one sees (for instance
3
with l’Hopital’s rule) that —► A^-: the feedback effect disappears and only the
intrinsic risk of the asset is taken into account.
In the general case 0 < A < 1 existence of steady state equilibria would have to 
be shown with a general contraction argument. Since for our comparative statics 
analysis we will concentrate on the cases in which A is close to 0 or 1 , we will not 
show this here. However, for A sufficiently close to 0 or 1 and a2 > 0 1 we obtain
Claim 1’:
Let A sufficiently close to 0 or 1 and a2 > 0 .
•j there are exactly two steady state solutions
for the price variances. There is a low volatility equilibrium (A) 
with
(A) -» ff2P (0 ) (a2p (1)) for A -+ 0 (1) ,
and similarly a high volatility equilibrium o2P (A) with
aP (A) —► aP (0 ) (<7p (1)) for A —> 0 (1) .
1For a \  — 0 the case A > 0 is equ ivalent to A =  1, b ecause  prices are fully revealing .
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Proof: Rewriting equation (2 .2) as a polynomial in A, and noting that a2 and s^ - 
are continuous functions of A, the claim follows by continuity.
We turn now to the price means in a steady state equilibrium. Inspection of (2 .1) 
shows that for R  =  1 there cannot be a steady state equilibrium. For R  > 1 we 
show Claim 2 .
Claim 2 :
Let R > 1 and A sufficiently close to 0 or 1.
If ctJ > 0  and if a2e +  , then there are are exactly two
steady state equilibria given by the form
=  ^ ( KY Z l E ^ ~ Y ^ i a a 3 i + a 2 ^ ,+L~ E ^ ~ a T ^ a ‘ + a ^ i ‘ ) '
In the first equilibrium
= £ p ( A)> a2 = a 2 (A,gJ(A)), ce3 =  a3 (A,o£ (A))
and in the second equilibrium
a2P =  a£(A), a 2 =  a 2 (A,o£ (A)), a 3 =  a 3 (A,a£ (A)) .
If a\ = 0  there is a unique equilibrium of the above form in which 
Op (0 ) =  0 and o \  (A) =  for all A > 0 .
Proof: For the variances the claim follows from Claim 1*. For the means, form the 
expectations on both sides of equation (2 .1), replace E(Pt ) and E(Pt+i) by E(P) 
and solve for E (P).
2.2 Multiple Equilibria and Stability
As with all overlapping generations models, our model allows for a plethora of 
equilibria. In the following we will therefore investigate these equilibria and com­
pare them to the steady state equilibria of the last section. Again we separate the
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discussion of equilibria price means and price variances. We will first deal with the 
price means.
Choose any equilibrium with the equilibrium variances
{.., var(Pt_ i), var(Pt)j var(P<+1) , ...} .
Assume furthermore that for a given t and a given constant c, the price mean at 
period t is given by E(P t ) =  c. Solving the recursion formula (2 .1), we obtain the 
equilibrium means at the other dates:
»-i *-i
E(P,+I) = R ‘c -  R’ E W  + E  R‘P ^  +  i )  '
1 = 0  1 = 0
E ( P t - i ) = j F c + ' E ± E ( i ) - ' E ± f i ( t - j )  i = 1 , 2 ,.. ,
3 = 1 1 = 1
where p(t +  j)  indicates the risk premium of the prices at date t +  j .
Even if the price variances are in one of the steady state equilibria, there is still 
an infinity of equilibria with "bubbles” in the price mean. This is a consequence 
of the myopic behaviour of the investors (see e.g. Tirole (1982)). For R > 1 the 
bubbles are exploding: Denoting by c the steady state mean, the above recursion 
formula implies
P (P t+<) c — R* (c c) .
Since our main focus later will be on price volatility and risk premia, the existence 
of these bubbles is not too disturbing for most of the comparative statics and the 
welfare analysis of section 3.
In section 3 we will mainly be concerned with the behaviour of equilibrium price 
variances. Fortunately, it turns out that Claim 2 characterizes essentially all equi­
librium price variances. This is clear for the case o\ =  0 in which there is only a 
unique equilibrium. For the case a\ > 0 we will first restrict the analysis to the 
cases A =  0 and A =  1 and characterize all equilibrium price variances. We show 
that the high volatility steady state is "stable” in the sense that the variances
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of all other non-steady state equilibria converge towards o2p for t —> oo (see also 
figure 2).
Claim 3:
Let A =  0 ,1  and a2 > 0 .
If A a2 +  (l — X)R2a2 + R 2a2 > there is no equilibrium.
°  s
If A a2 +  (1 — X)R2a2 + R 2a2 < there is an infinity of equi­
libria. The variances {..,var(Pt_ 1),var(Pt ),var(Pt+1) , ...} of any 
equilibrium have the following properties:
inf(var(Pt )) > g*p 
If inf(var(Pt )) > oj, then
var(Pt ) —> o2P for t —► oo .
Proof: The proof is basically a contraction argument. Define the operator 
T x : 2R+ —> 2R+ by
r*(*) =  +  ( ^ ) , W  +  * M )  .
where a 2 (A,x) is defined as in (2 .1) by replacing o2p by x. Observe that the vari­
ances of any equilibrium are defined by the recursion
var(Pt ) =  T x (var(Pt+1)) t = . . , - 1 ,0 , 1,..
In order to show that there is an infinity of such equilibrium paths, one estimates 
that for every x > g?p
T x (x) > a2p .
Hence, any given initial value x > ap at some date t defines together with the
recursion formula an equilibrium path.
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The lower bound for possible equilibria is obtained by showing that there is a 
k < 1 such that for all 0  < x < a*p
Op — T x (x) < k (oj, — x ) .
The latter inequality implies that any possible equilibrium path with a price vari­
ance var(Pt ) < Op for a date t must have negative variances at some date t +  i. 
This is a contradiction.
The proof of the convergence result consists in showing that for each S > 1 there 
is a /c(6) > 1 such that for all x > 6a2p
| T x (x) — Op |> k(S) | x — op |
The details are left for the appendix.
To obtain the analogous result in the general case 0 < A < 1 would be technically 
quite difficult. Since for the comparative statics in section 3 it is sufficient to look 
at A close to 0 or 1, we will not pursue this question here. However, it is possible 
to show that with the above proof plus a continuity argument an analogous result 
can be obtained for A sufficiently close to 0 resp. 1 .
On the basis of Claim 3 one would be tempted to concentrate on the high volatility 
equilibrium paths with ap =  ap as the unique stable equilibrium .1 However, there 
is also a reason to prefer the low volatility steady state. The dynamics of Claim 3 
have assumed that all agents know the true model. A somewhat weaker assump­
tion would be that agents do not know the model, but form optimal forecasts of 
the variables they are interested in. We would like to study the dynamics of a 
given learning rule if investors start with expectations on Pt+i off the equilibrium. 
Off the equilibrium paths there are of course innumerable possibilities for beliefs. 
Given that we restrict our equilibria to normally distributed price functions, we 
will assume that all investors know this and have only normally distributed beliefs. 
In general, there will also be a a considerable number of plausible learning mech­
anisms. These mechanisms may involve very complicated calculations and their
xT h a t  is, stab le  in the  variances . T h e  m ea n s  are o f  course h ighly  u n sta b le .
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1convergence in general is far from clear (see e.g. Bray (1982)). We will not spell 
out a particular learning mechanism but rather follow a cruder approach which is 
similar to the one used by Lucas (1978).
Consider the following learning mechanism in the cases A =  0,1. Assume that 
at each date t investors start with some expectations over Pt+i characterized by 
P tl\  ~  N (^(P^1l , a ^ 1^ ). Given these beliefs investors calculate at each t their 
demands and markets clear, i.e., we obtain a ”temporary” equilibrium with price 
distributions Pt which clear the market at each t. Now assume that investors re­
place their initial beliefs P ^  by the observed temporary equilibrium distributions, 
i.e., P ll\  ~  Pt+1 and iterate this argument. If this process converges against an 
equilibrium we call this equilibrium stable under learning (resp. locally stable if it 
only converges for initial beliefs which are not too distant from the equilibrium).
It turns out that under this "learning” rule, there is only one locally stable equi­
librium, namely the unstable one of Claim 3. Given that the contraction argument 
of Claim 3 is shown independently of the fact whether we axe on or off the equi­
librium path this is not really surprising. Stability under learning requires exactly 
the opposite direction of convergence as the stability of Claim 3.
Claim 4:
Let R  > 1, A =  0 ,1  and a2 > 0.
If Aa2 +  (1 — X)R2c 2 + R 2o2 < 7^ 7 7 , then there is exactly one
equilibrium which is locally stable under the above learning rule.
It is given by
E, = h  ~  ~  X a^° + + ~F
+  A(0,+ x -  E ( 0 ) )  -  a( (l  -  X)0% +  d \  +  )(£, -  £)J
Proof: We will only sketch the proof. For the equilibrium variances we use the 
properties of the operator T x established in Claim 3. If the investors start with
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a variance expectation a2p (1) < a» , the temporary equilibrium variances will be 
closer to ap than ap^K  This follows directly from the proof of Claim 3. If the 
initial belief ap^  > ap , then the learning process will not converge.
For the equilibrium mean, we use the observation that all price bubbles are ex­
ploding. Hence, if investors start with initial beliefs with mean which are
different from the steady state mean, this will lead to a temporary equilibrium 
mean E ( P ^ )  which is closer to the steady state mean.
Again, with a continuity one would be able to extend the scope of Claim 4 to all 
A with A sufficiently close to 0 or 1. The above "learning” mechanism is of course 
rather crude. The aim of Claim 4 is merely to stress that there is no clear selection 
device which would make us prefer one of the two equilibria with steady state 
variances over the other.
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3. Comparative Statics.
Even if we restricted comparisons of equilibria only to steady state equilibria, the 
existence of two steady state equilibria renders comparative statics somewhat du­
bious. Changes in A might switch the economy from the low volatility equilibrium 
to the high volatility equilibrium and vice versa. Nevertheless, we will assume in 
the sequel that changes in A will not lead to switches from the low volatility equi­
librium to the one with high volatility. Our main justification for this is that the 
stability analysis of the last section indicates that we can concentrate at least on 
one of the two steady state equilibria. For a full analysis of changes in regulation 
an additional investigation of dynamic adjustment processes would certainly be 
desirable. Assume for instance that the economy is in a particular steady state 
with a given intensity of insider trading and that at some date t an unanticipated 
change in insider regulation occurs which leads to a new level of insider activity. 
After this change the economy finds itself off the new steady state level. Then we 
might consider three possible cases. First, the economy might immediately jump 
to the new steady state we have selected. This is the view we will take in the 
sequel. Second, we might assume that the investors do not know the true distri­
bution of the equilibrium prices and adapt their beliefs only slowly over time. The 
specification of such a procedure would involve learning of a similar kind as dis­
cussed in the last section and would presumably favour convergence towards the 
low volatility equilibrium. Lastly, we could assume that the economy is always in a 
rational expectations equilibrium, but that some endogenous variables only adjust 
slowly over time to a new steady state level. A candidate for such a variable would 
be the capital stock of the economy (if appropriately endogenized). If adjustments 
of the capital occur only slowly because of the presence of adjustment costs, one 
could study the convergence of the resulting equilibrium path. Given the stabil­
ity analysis of the last section such a procedure would probably tend to converge 
towards the high volatility equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss the impact on price volatility, 
risk premia, bid-ask-spreads and investment of changes in A for each of the two
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classes of equilibria. We will compare the low price volatility equilibria with the 
equilibria in the three-period-world of chapter 3, sections 4.2 and 5. In particular, 
we will distinguish between effects due to new information per se, and effects due to 
asymmetric information. The comparative statics of the high volatility equilibria 
are mainly dictated by the effects arising from the selffulfilling beliefs.
3.1 Volatility and Risk Premia: Full Revelation vs. No Information
We begin with the two bench-mark cases of no information and full information. If 
R  =  1 then price volatility in the case with full information includes the additional 
variability of the information on 0t+1, and is exactly c 2 higher than in the case 
without information. However, the risk of holding the asset remains constant. 
Instead of facing the intrinsic risk concerning 0t+ i, investors face the higher price 
risk, which arises because prices at date f -f 1 move now with 0t+2 * Accordingly, 
although the price variance increases in the case full revelation of information, the 
variance of the returns at date t +  1 conditional on the information on 6t+i is the 
same in both cases. Without information the variance of returns is given by
2 2 2 f \  1 a e + 1
« 3  -  o e +  a t  +  Op  -  + ( - ) \ /  /  w  o \ o  T “  +4a4 (o2)2 2a2 o\ ’
and with full information it is just identical:
2 2 l \ \ 1a 3 = a t + a F =  + ( - ) » /  — r T - r r r  -  * +4a4 (a2)2 a2 a 2 2 a2a j
We turn now to the case R > 1 . If the interest rate is positive, the premature 
resolution of uncertainty changes the risk to be borne by the economy. The variance 
Op rises by less than o2e , whereas the variance d2p rises by more than a \. From
Claim 1 we know that for a2p
a w - a o l
< o
4a4( ^ ) 2 V (a2)2 a2° 2
2
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An analogous formula holds for o2p . For large a2, ap might even be lower in the 
case with full information. This is similar to the three-period case of the last 
chapter. The heuristic reason is that for large a2 the noise induced risk 0 2o2 is 
larger than the direct risk a2.
As a consequence of the behaviour of the price volatilities, the risk premia in 
the low variance equilibrium fall, whereas the risk premia in the high volatility 
equilibrium rise. Without information the conditional variances are given by
/  2 2 2 \  /  \  /  - E 4 R2(al + a ? )
< * 3  =  W  +  < 7 ?  +  O p )  =  +  ( ~ ) \   1 *  +4a4 (a2)2 a2 a 2 2 a2a 2 ’
and with full information they become
t 2 2 \ / \ I R 2o * + o 2 R 2a 3 =  + 4 )  =  + ( - ) . / _ _ --------- t— L +
4a4 (a^)2 oaaJ 2a2 a 2
In order to understand this result, it is useful to decompose the steady state 
equation (2 .2). For A = 0 we can write
R 2c 2P = a2(a2 + o2)2o2x +  2 a2 (a2 +  a \)o 2p a2x +  aa(<rj)aa* ,
and for A =  1
R 2a2P = a 2 -ha2(a2)2a2 + 2a2a2a2 a2 + a2(a2 )2o\ .
The first two terms on the right hand side represent the "intrinsic” price risk, 
i.e., the price risk which is unavoidable given that information is reflected in the 
prices and prices move with the risk premium demanded from noise traders. The 
two remaining terms arise through the feedback effect between price risk and noise 
trading. Observe that even if the intrinsic risk were zero, i.e., if the risky asset were 
effectively riskfree, there would still be a high volatility price equilibrium given by 
&P — Ja'aa'ga • The difference between g?p and ap is now simply that in the case 
of ap the price risk behaves essentially as the intrinsic risk, i.e., lower intrinsic 
risk leads to lower price risk, and that in the case of op the opposite applies, i.e.,
158
lower intrinsic risk leads to higher price risk. The latter is due to the fact that the 
only factor which imposes some limits on the selffulfilling belief is the intrinsic risk 
characteristics of the asset. The higher the intrinsic risk of the asset the lower the 
equilibrium volatility, because equilibrium volatility is more and more dominated 
by the dividend risk, and the feedback effect linked to the expectations becomes 
lower.
Hence, the effects of changes in information on price risk can be explained by the 
effects on the ” intrinsic” price risk. It is easy to see why the intrinsic risk of holding 
the asset in the low variance equilibrium becomes lower with full information: 
Prices discount only future returns with the interest rate, but not the risk. Seen 
from date t the price Pt+i becomes more variable, because the realization of 0t+2 is 
announced. But the returns of period t + 2 are discounted with R  and accordingly
3
the price variance rises by less than a* (in the extreme case a\ =  0 to ^V). 
Therefore, premature arrival of information reduces the intrinsic risk to be borne 
in every period. Accordingly, the price risk in the low volatility case will decrease 
and the price risk in the high volatility case will increase.
In this sense, the analysis of the three-period case in section 5 of chapter 3 should 
be best understood as the extreme case of an economy in which everybody an­
ticipates that interest rates at date 2 become infinity (and hence prices 0). The 
premature release of information can only have a real effect on the risk to be borne 
by the economy, if the interest rates are positive. The static models of asymmet­
ric information in the spirit of Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) or Hellwig (1980) are 
just a very extreme case of this risk reducing effect of new information by setting 
implicitly the interest rate in subsequent periods to infinity.
3.2 Volatility and Risk Premia with Asymmetric Information
The advantage of the infinite horizon model is that it allows us to disentangle the 
effects of new information and the effects of insider trading. Therefore, we will 
first study the case with zero interest rate, when the new information per se has 
no effects. We state the results in Claim 5.
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Claim 5:
Let R = 1.
For A sufficiently small the price volatility £p(A) (resp. <?p(A)) 
and the risk premium aa3 (A, g?p (A)) (resp. a a 3 (A,a£(A)) ) are 
increasing (resp. decreasing) in A.
For A sufficiently large the price volatility o j  (A) (resp. ap (A)) 
and the risk premium aa3 (A, ap (A)) (resp. a a 3 (A,a£ (A)) ) are 
decreasing (resp. increasing) in A.
Proof: See appendix.
In order to characterize the behaviour of price volatility fully, one would need 
explicit solutions of equation (2 .2) also for intermediate values of A. However, 
in all numerical solutions price volatility and risk premia were either concave or 
convex in A, i.e., they were first increasing (decreasing) up to a certain maximum 
(minimum) and then decreasing (increasing).
To understand this result heuristically it is useful to rewrite the steady state 
equation (2 .2) slightly:
(2 .2) ‘7f = F ( 0,’<7’ +<‘, ( ^ ^ + '7f ) " a s ) +  “ 1)!^ )  ‘
Now assume a change in A and, hypothetically, hold ap fix to study the effects of 
this change on the ” intrinsic” risk. As we have shown in chapter 3, a rise in the 
intensity of insider trading has three effects which are linked to the real character­
istics of the asset. First, prices will incorporate more of the information and hence 
vary stronger with 0t + 1  (as expressed in the term a\o*). Second, the adverse selec­
tion component of the bid-ask^spread (i.e., the term ^-(of + tfp ) — a 3) will change. 
We have shown in chapter 3 (section 5) that for low A it will rise and for high A 
it will decline. Finally, since more information on future returns becomes known, 
the direct risk of holding the asset decreases and the risk-aversion component (i.e., 
a 3) of the bid-ask-spread decreases. In chapter 3 we have explained why for suf­
ficiently low noise levels and for small A the adverse selection effect dominates
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the risk bearing effect. The same effect happens here: The intrinsic price volatility 
increases because the volatility component due to the adverse selection component 
of the bid-ask-spread increases. The opposite effect takes place for high A: both 
the adverse selection and the risk bearing component decrease and dominate the 
volatility increase due to the fact that more information is reflected in prices.
This discussion is only heuristic, because holding ap in the above formula constant 
can only be considered as a thought experiment. But the proof of Claim 5 shows 
that in the case 0 < A < 1 something very similar to the case A =  0 , 1  happens, 
i.e., the behaviour of Op (A) and ap (A) is mainly dictated by the behaviour of the 
intrinsic risk. Accordingly, (A) resp. ap (A) increase resp. decrease for low A and 
vive versa for high A.
The behaviour of the risk premia differs from the results of chapter 3, section 5. 
For low A, both the price volatility Op (A) and the risk premia are rising with A. 
The reason is that for low A the rise of the price volatility is mainly due to the 
adverse selection effect, whereas there is no risk reduction from the inflow of new 
information.
The preceding discussion of the low volatility equilibrium gives a good illustration 
how the results in the three-period world of chapter 3 depend both on asymmet­
ric information and the risk reducing effect of new information. Without the risk 
reduction from new information (R = 1), price volatility and risk premia depend 
only on the intensity of insider trading. Price volatility goes up because more in­
formation is reflected in prices and because the adverse-selection-component of the 
bid-ask-spread goes up. Risk premia increase because the price volatility increases.
If we introduce additionally a real effect of information by allowing R > 1, the 
comparative statics of the low volatility equilibrium becomes more similar to the 
one of the three-period model. However, in order to let the effects of new informa­
tion dominate the effects of asymmetric information, interest rates would have to 
be unreasonably high. We restrict our attention to the low volatility equilibrium 
and small A and leave it to the reader to derive analogous results for A close to 1 
and the high volatility equilibrium.
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Claim 6:
Let R  > 1.
For R  < y/ 2  and A sufficiently small, the price volatility (A) 
and the risk premium aa3(\,C p  (A)) are increasing in A.
For R > y/ 2  and A sufficiently small, the risk premium
(A,(jp (A)) is decreasing in A. The price volatility £p(A) is 
increasing in A if small, and decreasing in A if o\ large.
Proof: See appendix.
For low A and a positive interest rate the arrival of new information reduces the 
intrinsic risk of holding the asset and hence the corresponding part of the risk- 
bearing component of the bid-ask-spread. If the interest rate and the average 
quantity of noise trading are sufficiently large, this will dominate the increase of 
the adverse-selection component of the bid-ask-spread and decrease price volatility. 
The risk premia always decrease in the case of a sufficiently high reduction of 
intrinsic risk.
3.3 Welfare Comparisons: Full Revelation vs. No Information
As in the last chapter, the welfare effects of changes in A depend very much on the 
specification of the model. For the noise traders it is hard to find any convincing 
welfare measure, given that in this model we can only interpret them as punters. 
The most neutral indicator is probably their average transaction costs, i.e., the 
size of the bid-ask-spread. The transaction costs can be calculated1 as
A TC (A,c% (A)) =  +  „ l (A))*’ .
The behaviour of the transaction costs follows immediately from our discussion 
of the last section. In the cases with resp. without information the bid-ask-spread
1For n o ta t io n a l  con ven ience  we set in th is  and the  fo l low ing  sect ions  th e  coeff ic ient o f  risk aversion  
a =  1 and the  initial en d ow m en t of the  riskless asset W  =  0.
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consists only of the risk bearing component because there is no adverse selec­
tion problem. Accordingly, the size of the bid-ask-spread will depend only on the 
increase resp. decrease of the risk to be borne by the economy. For R  =  1 the bid- 
ask-spreads do not differ with or without information. For R  > 1, bid-ask-spreads 
in the low volatility equilibrium are lower with full information, and in the high 
volatility equilibrium they are higher: For oP =  a2p we have
ATC(0,Op (0)) =  ^ ( e 2 + ° \  +  (°))CT*
=  _ I f  /  Ri _  + ° 2t )
R \ 4 { ° 2, ) 2 2<r*
> _ I r  I R i -  R2°> +  g» j .
~ R ^ 4 { c 3)3 e l + 2o*J*
=  ^ ( e 2 + a 2P ( l ) ) e l  
=  A T C ( l , g * p ( l ) )  ,
and for o2p =  ap
A TC (0,o2p (0)) =  ^ ( o 2 + o 2 + e 2 (0))a2
R2{°1 + ° 2) , R1 ' 2  
<r? 2 a i ’ *
R 2 a 3 + a 2e t R 3
+  ^
= + e 3P(l))a l
= A T C (l,5 2p (\)) .
Our next step will be to calculate the welfare of the informed and uninformed 
speculators. With the techniques of Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) we obtain in a similar 
way1 as in section 5 of chapter 3 that the expected utility of the informed is given
1N o te  th a t  the  residual risk is now given by o* +  <7p rather than  by o * . A lso  n ote  th a t  for the  
ca lcu la tion  o f  the  e x p e c ted  uti l i t ies  it is irrelevant w h eth er  th e  price means are in a s tea d y  s ta te  
equilibrium or w h eth er  price m ean s follow a bubble .
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by
E(U,) = 1- + °)
o* +  a \  +  a \a l  +
/ _ ! ____________(«3£ ) 2____________
V 2 <rt3 +  <r3 +  aja,3 +  (ii< 2 l± £ il)V 3 ) •
and for the uninformed investors
E(Vu) = 1 -
var(0 | u)i) + <7^  +  <7
o f  + < 7 3
A
<r2 +  a;
exp
of +  o 3 +  a? of +
/ I ______  (a3 x)2
 ^ ^ tr? +r f o 3 +afo„3 + ( 2 l h l ± l l l ) = o f
Again we can decompose the utility in two different components. The first is 
contained in the factor in front of the exponential function and reflects the profits 
from noise traders; it would arise even if the capital stock of the economy were 
zero. The second, namely the profits from holding on average the quantity x is 
contained in the argument of the exponential function; the profits stem from risk
sharing and amount to roughly half of the risk premium (plus a factor factor
stemming from the noisy transaction prices which distort the optimal risk sharing 
between generations). We compare now the case of no information with the case 
of full revelation of information.
Claim 7:
E{Ui) is always lower for A =  1 than for A =  0 .
For R = 1, E(U u) is the same for A =  0  and for A =  1.
For R > 1, E(Uu) is lower for A =  1 than for A =  0 , if the low
volatility equilibrium is played.
For R > 1, E(Uu) is higher for A =  1 than for A =  0 , if the high
volatility equilibrium is played.
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Proof: See appendix.
It is obvious that the welfare of insiders is lower, when they lose their informational 
advantage, i.e., in the case with full revelation of information. More interesting is 
the case of the uninformed speculators. If R  =  1, we have already seen that in­
formation does not change the distribution of returns. Accordingly, the welfare of 
the outsiders does not depend on the fact whether they do know the information 
or not. If R  > 1 , new information reduces the intrinsic risk of the asset. We have 
already shown that in the low volatility equilibrium this implies that investors bear 
a lower risk in the case with full information. Thus both components of the utility 
are increasing (and hence utility decreasing). The direct profits from noise traders 
decline, because the risk-bearing component of the bid-ask-spread decreases. The 
second component decreases because of the ”Hirshleifer”-effect already encoun­
tered in the welfare analysis of chapter 3, section 5.
The opposite applies to the high volatility equilibrium. We have shown that a 
reduction of the intrinsic risk increases price risk to such an extent that holding 
the asset with full information is more risky in the case with full information than 
in the case without information. Accordingly, both components of the utility are 
lower (and hence utility higher) in the case with information than in the case 
without information.
3.4 Welfare Comparisons: Asymmetric Information
We will see that for the rational speculators the welfare effects depend on several 
effects and the overall outcome depends strongly on the parameters. In order not 
to overburden this chapter we will restrict ourselves to the welfare comparisons for 
the noise traders and the uninformed speculators in the low volatility equilibrium, 
which is more interesting for a comparison with the three-period-case.
We begin again by discussing the transaction costs of noise traders, i.e., the size of 
the bid-ask-spread. With asymmetric information, the bid-ask-spread is composed 
of the adverse selection component and the risk bearing component. For 0  < A < 1
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we can write
itTC(A,o» (A)) =  +  «* (a)) - « , ( a,«* (a)))«*
+  i a 3(A,<7= (A))cr2 .
The properties of both components have been shown as a by-product in the proof of 
Claim 5. For R  =  1, both components increase with A for low A and decrease with 
A for high A. Accordingly, the bid-ask-spread is increasing for low A, decreasing for 
high A and has its maximum value for some intermediate value of A. For R  > 1 and 
sufficiently large, we have seen in Claim 6 that the reduction of intrinsic risk due to 
the inflow of new information may decrease price volatility if o2x is sufficiently large. 
Since price volatility is the sum of the volatility due to the information contained 
in the prices and the volatility due to the bid-ask-spread, we can conclude that 
at least for small A and for R  and a\ sufficiently high, an increase in A leads to 
a lower bid-ask-spread and hence to lower transaction costs for the noise traders. 
Combining the calculations of the proofs of claim 5 and of claim 5 of chapter 3, one 
can even show that the bid-ask-spread decreases monotonically with the intensity 
of insider trading, if R  and a\ are sufficiently high. This is just a reaffirmation 
of our observation that for R  sufficiently large, the welfare analysis of the low 
volatility equilibrium is essentially the same as in the three-period model.
Concerning the utility of informed and uninformed speculators, the reader should 
by now be familiar with the different effects. The profits from trading with noise 
traders will go up if the bid-ask-spread increases. The profits from holding on 
average the capital stock x  are determined by the ” Hirshleifer” -effect. These profits 
decline, if the risk to be borne decreases. The impact of shifts in A on the utility 
of outsiders and insiders follows then from the analysis of the preceding sections. 
If R  is close to 1, both the bid-ask-spread and the riskiness of holding the asset 
increase in A for low A, and decrease in A for high A. Accordingly, the utilities first 
increase and ultimately decrease. In particular, there is an intermediate level A of 
insider trading at which the utility of both insiders and outsiders is maximal. If the 
effect of the inflow of new information becomes stronger, i.e., for a sufficiently high 
R , the welfare analysis becomes again similar to the one in section 5 of chapter 3
166
(in particular Claim 8 and Claim 9). The riskiness of holding the asset decreases 
with an increase in A, and accordingly profits from this source decrease. Profits 
from noise traders depend on the reaction of the bid-ask-spread to a shift in A. 
If is sufficiently large, they will decrease with A. Hence, the utility of both 
insiders and outsiders will decrease with A. If is sufficiently low, the bid-ask- 
spread may increase due to a strong increase of the adverse-selection component 
and the profits from trading with the noise traders increase for both insiders and 
outsiders. The overall effect on utility will again depend on the relation between 
the two components of the utility.
We leave it to the reader to make these assertions precise. The proofs follow by 
combining the proofs of Claims 5, 6 and 7 of this chapter with the proofs of Claims 
8 and 9 of chapter 3.
3.5 Welfare with an Endogenous Capital Stock
The purpose of this last section is to improve our understanding of the two sources 
of profits for the rational investors. We focus especially on the profits arising from 
holding the asset as such, which are contained in the argument of the exponential 
function in the expected utilities.
Therefore, we will first assume that there is no noise trading in the market, i.e., 
o\ =  0 . Assume furthermore that R  > 1. From Claim 2 we know that in this case 
there is exactly one steady state equilibrium given by
p< = -  (CT« + CT<)£)
for \  =  0  and
1 :  1 , .  <7?
P, =  rE(9) + - f l , +  1 -    ( o f  +  -$-)x -  1) v ' R  + R  -  1 v ‘ R 2 'R ( R
for A > 0 . Calculating as before1 the expected utilities, we have for A =  0
1Obaerve th a t  a 3 (0) =  a?  +  a f  and oc3 (1) =  o*  +
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and for A > 0
E[U„) = + •
Although the risk to be borne by each investor is lower with full information, 
his expected utility from holding the asset decreases. The riskier an asset, the 
more it is preferred by the investors. At a first glance this seems surprising. One 
might suspect that if shareholders know that they have to sell their stock in the 
next period and the returns of the stock become less variable, this should raise 
their utility. However, in an economy beginning at — oo with a given capital stock 
this is not true. Each generation just shifts the burden of the additional risk 
backwards. Because in equilibrium the compensation for bearing risk grows faster 
than the risk, it is effectively generation — oo which bears the additional risk. In an 
insurance context, this implication of the ”Hirshleifer”-effect is not too disturbing. 
However, in the context of capital markets it looks like a somewhat artificial effect. 
It regards the capital stock as something which at — oo has simply appeared. In 
practice however, capital has to be installed at some date. Therefore, we will now 
modify our economy slightly and consider an initial investment stage.
Assume that the economy begins at some date 0 , when an entrepreneur can decide 
to invest in a new venture.1 He can choose a level of infinitely lived capital x  by 
paying a fixed unit cost such that his profit is maximal. We assume that he has no 
own funds and must finance the investment by issuing shares on the stock market 
at date 0 . We assume furthermore that the economy is immediately in the steady 
state equilibrium. For simplicity suppose that the entrepreneur is risk neutral. 
Thus, his maximization problem is
max{E(P0)x — cx} .£
Substituting from Claim 2 for E(P0) and after a derivation with respect to x  we
1 A ltern a t iv e ly ,  we could en d ogen ize  the cap ita l  stock in a m ore tra d i t io n a l  way as in P ag an o  
(19 89 ) .  In P a g a n o 's  m o d e l  th e  "firm" d ec ides  each period  ab o u t  the  o p t im a l  ca p ita l  stock fol­
low ing a rule of net m arket value m ax im iza t io n  and a s tead y  s ta te  ca p ita l  stock can  then  be  
ca lcu la ted .  Here, th is  approach would p roduce the  sam e  results .  We deal w ith  an in itia l  in ves t­
m ent stage  on ly  for tech n ica l conven ience.
168
obtain
i m  - ( r -  i)c 
2a 3 (A)
This gives us a quite intuitive result. A reduction of the asset’s riskiness leads to 
more investment, and an increase of the riskiness depresses investment. Substitut­
ing the optimal capital stock in the utilities of investors we see that utility with 
and without without information is now identical and given by
The increase in investment due to a lower risk just compensates the welfare losses 
of the investors in the case with full revelation of information.
However, this is not a general result and depends strongly on the extent to which 
investment reacts on shifts in the riskiness of the asset. Assume for instance that 
the cost function is not linear, but given by
C(x) = cx2
The optimal capital stock becomes then
E(0)
X  =
2 (a3 (A) +  (R -  1  )c)
Investment still reacts positively to a decrease in the asset’s riskiness, but less 
strongly. In particular, the increase in investment does not compensate any more
for the utility decrease due to the lower risk. For A =  0 utility is given by
Firr \ -  i - , J - 1 W + * ? ) 2 \
V 8 (a] + a t + ( R -  1)C)’ )
and for A > 0
£(U l,)  =  l - ex p ( - i ----------K + & 1 ------ \  .V & w  +  +  ( R  -  1 ) c y  J
We show in the appendix that in the latter case utility is lower.
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Returning with these insights to the welfare analysis of sections 3.3 and 3.4, our 
assessment of the welfare effects of insider trading becomes even more ambiguous. 
If we assume linear investment costs and substitute the optimal capital stock in 
the formula for the utility of uninformed investors, we obtain
E(UV) = 1 - var(fl | wx) +  o\ +  o2p 
ol +<rl \
+ °)
exp ( E ( u ) - ( R - l ) c ) '
o? + c 3p + a? a ’ +  ( 2 /t2 )
This reverses the analysis of the ” Hirshleifer” component of the last two sections. 
As an example consider the case of small R  and low A. An increase in A increases 
price volatility and the riskiness of the stock. Hence, investment decreases and 
using the results of Claim 5 one shows that that the utility from the ” Hirshleifer” - 
component decreases. The extent of this decrease depends on the size of the 
capital stock. If E(0) — (R — l)c is small, the increase in the other component 
of the expected utility will dominate the utility decrease due to the lower capital 
stock, and vice versa.
Finally, we could as before neutralize the effect of changes in risk on the investment 
level by choosing an appropriate cost function. In this case the welfare analysis of 
sections 4.2 and 4.3 would remain basically unchanged. Hence, the reaction of the 
investor’s welfare on shifts in the intensity of insider trading, will both depend on 
the level of the capital stock and on the responsiveness of investment to changes in 
the riskiness of the asset. A clear-cut assessment of the impact of insider trading 
on welfare is impossible.
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4. Conclusion.
The results from the analysis of our model are threefold. The first result regards 
the impact of noise trading on equity prices. The existence of noise introduces a 
feedback effect in the economy which may render beliefs of a high price volatility 
selffulfilling. Especially the high volatility equilibrium of our model is an intrigu­
ing demonstration of the impact of this feedback. The high volatility equilibrium 
provides another example how the existence of noise trading may lead to higher 
price volatility and higher risk than might be justified by the dividend returns on 
the asset. That noise trading may increase risk premia is not really surprising. The 
”fads” of Schiller (1984) (see also Schiller (1990)) have already been formalized in 
models with noise trading by Campbell/Kyle (1988) and DeLong et.al. (1988). The 
special feature of our model is that price volatility and risk premia do not diminish 
if investors’ risk aversion or the level of noise trading decrease. Rather the oppo­
site happens: Lower risk aversion or less noise trading render the feedback effect 
linked to expectations even stronger and lead to an increase in the risk premia and 
excess returns. This effect is strongly opposed to the common presumption that 
a decrease in risk aversion should bring equity prices closer to their fundamental 
value.
The second result concerns the impact of new information on prices, i.e., the 
comparison between the situation with no information on future returns and full 
disclosure of all information on the future returns. We have shown that in a infinite 
horizon model, the disclosure of information has almost no effect on the risk to 
be borne by the economy as long as interest rates are sufficiently close to 0. This 
result differs from the results obtained in the static specifications of models with 
asymmetric information as in Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) or Hellwig (1980) in which 
the premature resolution of uncertainty reduces the direct risk of holding the asset. 
In a infinite horizon model this reduction of uncertainty concerning the dividend 
risk is exactly compensated by the increase in price risk.
However, if the interest rate becomes larger, full disclosure has an effect on the 
allocation of risk in the economy, because returns are discounted with the inter­
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est rate, whereas the variances are not. We have shown that the effect on price 
volatility and risk premia is ambiguous; they may increase or decrease. Whether 
we regard the case when the early release of information has a real impact on the 
perceived riskiness of the asset as more relevant, depends of course on our inter­
pretation of the length of the trading intervals. The longer the distance between 
two successive trading dates in our model, the higher should be the interest rate 
and the stronger should be the impact of new information. In our model, informa­
tion which is released shortly before the realization of the relevant variable, has 
no effect on the economy, information which is released long before the realization 
changes the risk of holding the asset.
The ambiguity of the impact of the release of new information in the case of 
a positive interest rate might also give an additional explanation, why firms do 
not circumvent any problems with asymmetric information and insider trading by 
releasing information as soon as it becomes available. Usual arguments concern the 
costs of such a disclosure policy, credibility problems and the like. In the infinite 
horizon world of our model, firms face the additional problem that they cannot 
judge the impact of the release of information if they do not know which type of 
equilibrium is played. If the high volatility equilibrium is played, full information 
will increase price volatility and risk premia. Moreover, in both equilibria the 
impact of new information on shareholder’s welfare is not clear.
Our third result concerns the impact of asymmetric information and insider trading 
on prices. The effect of asymmetric information on the ex-ante distributions of 
prices works mainly through what we termed ” bid-ask-spread” , i.e., the amount to 
which prices change as a response to noisy supply or demand shocks to the asset 
market. From an ex-ante perspective, these shocks create an extra volatility of 
prices through the price movements due to the bid-ask-spread. The size of the bid- 
ask-spread depends on the intensity of insider trading; a change in the amount of 
insider trading changes both the adverse selection and the risk bearing component 
of the bid-ask-spread. We have shown that the overall effect of these changes is 
ambiguous, it depends both on the played equilibrium and the parameters of the 
model. The final assessment is even further complicated by the interaction between
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the effects of asymmetric information and the possible risk reduction due to the 
inflow of new information.
In this sense, our results on asymmetric information can be considered as an 
extension of the conclusions of Hart/Kreps (1986) concerning the stabilizing effect 
of speculation. Hart and Kreps conclude that ”it is hard to say much about the 
effects of speculation on price stability” and "just as hard to say anything about 
the welfare implications” . In our model it is impossible to treat the impact of 
manipulation per se, because the random demand shocks to the economy are 
independent of prices. But regarding the effects of informed speculation, we might 
summarize our results as Hart and Kreps. It is hard to draw definite conclusions 
on the impact of different levels of informed speculation on price stability and 
welfare.1
Thus, a possible regulator of our economy would be in a rather uncomfortable 
position. Deciding on possible restrictions on insider trading, he would not only 
have to know in which equilibrium the economy finds itself, but also all the relevant 
parameter values of the respective equilibrium to find out whether a reduction of 
insider trading would lead to more or less stable prices and to lower or higher 
welfare. The analysis of this chapter might be also useful for other regulatory 
issues involving informational externalities. As an example consider the recent 
proposals on "sunshine trading”. Sunshine trading was proposed as a remedy for 
potential negative interactions between program trading and market crashes. It 
was argued (see Genotte/Leland (1990), Admati/Pfleiderer (1990); see also Roell 
(1989)) that the preannouncement of future trades by program traders (regarded as 
noise traders) would decrease price volatility, the transaction costs of noise traders 
and the probability of market crashes. However, these assertions rely to a large 
extent on the fact that this preannouncement can be credibly transmitted to the 
whole market; something which for example under the current regulations of the 
New York Stock Exchange cannot to be taken for granted. If the announcements
related observat ion  has been m ade by Stein  (1987) .  Stein  stu d ies  a m o d e l  in which an ad­
d it ion a l group of specu la tors  enters a m arket.  He an a lyses  the  trade-off b e tw een  en h an ced  risk- 
b earing capacity  o f  the  larger m arket,  and sh ifts  in the in form ational a sy m m etr ie s  if th e  ad d it ion a l  
group has a different in form ation  level than  the  old m arket.  His analys is  o f  the  in form ation a l  
extern a lit ies  is sim ilar to th e  analys is  of shifts  in X in our m od e l .
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reach only paxt of the market, an additional effect has to be taken into account. 
The investors who are aware of the amount of noise trading acquire indirectly the 
status of insiders. To them prices convey all the inside information and they can 
submit the same orders as the original insiders. Hence, if preannouncement only 
reaches part of the market, its effects are quite similar to the one of shifts in A 
investigated in this chapter; in particular, the same ambiguous trade-offs as before 
will arise.
A final word concerns the robustness of our results under different specifications. 
Wang (1990) considers a modification of the model of Campbell/Kyle (1988) 
in which he introduces asymmetric information in a similar way as in Gross- 
man/Stiglitz (1980). He studies a certain class of equilibria and reports that in 
these equilibria price volatility and risk premia are monotonically decreasing with 
the intensity of insider trading. In our model this case can only occur in the low 
volatility equilibrium. Even then, the risk reduction effect of new information must 
be strong and has to dominate completely the effects of asymmetric information, 
i.e., interest rates and the variance of noise trading have to be very high. Both 
Campbell/Kyle and Wang use a continuous-time framework which makes the re­
sults difficult to compare. The decisive difference is that both papers study an 
economy with infinitely lived rational investors. A detailed comparison of the case 
with myopic investor behaviour and the case with infinite planning horizon is 
certainly necessary.
However, in some sense both approaches might be considered complementary. If 
one starts from the assumption that real markets are characterized to some extent 
by noise trading in the form of opinion and/or liquidity trading, then any rational 
investor should have two things in mind. First, he should try to speculate and ex­
ploit the noisy price movements. For the study of this effect a model with infinitely 
lived agents is much better suited than a overlapping generations model with two 
generations. Although the young generation also speculates in the above sense, a 
model with finitely lived agents cannot fully capture the effect that investors can 
defer trading over time. Infinitely lived agents can wait with sell orders until a 
demand shock leads to high prices and with buy orders until a supply shock leads 
to low prices.
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But a rational investor should also take a second point into account. He should 
realize that at some point in the future he might become a liquidity trader himself, 
i.e., that some exogenous shock might force him to liquidate his positions. This 
reasoning will make him directly interested in the liquidity of the market, i.e., 
the prices he can achieve at times when he has to leave the market. This second 
aspect can only be captured by the overlapping generations model. In this sense, 
an overlapping generations model might also be the more appropriate way to deal 
with the problem of insider trading from an ex-ante perspective. Intuitively, one 
would expect that informed speculators should especially harm those traders, who 
cannot choose their market timing but rather have a real need to trade.
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4. Appendix.
1. Proof of Claim 3:
We show all three parts of the claim only for the case A =  0 . The proofs for A =  1 
are analogous.
a) We have to show that T°(x) > a2p for every x > a2p . Therefore, choose a 
x =  Op +  £ with e > 0 . Using that a 2 (0 , x) =  0 and tt3^ ,x)a =  crj +  a 2 +  x  for all 
x, we calculate
n * ) - £  + • ? + « + £ ) * - £
= ^  {2 )€ +  €*}
> «(i -  ^ / i - ^ W + ® f ) )
> 0 .
b) Choose a x =  oj, — e with oj, > c > 0 . We have to show that there is a k < 1 
such that
aj, — T° (x) < /ce .
With similar calculations as before, we obtain
a2 O'2
o l  - T ° ( x ) = a % -  a- ^ ( o l  +  <7? -  e +  a i r
=  f ^ { 2 W + « f
I 4 a 2 fT^
< /ce ,
c) Let £ > 1 , and choose a x — o2p +  e with x >  6a p . We have to show that there 
is a /c(6) > 1 such that
|T°(ff= + e ) - o 2P |><c(«) | e | .
176
As before we calculate
T °(a l + e ) - o 3p | = | +  CT< + e + ° r ) 2  ~ ° p
a2 a 2X
R 2 {2 (a2 + o \  +  a£)e +  e2}
4^ i w + a 2 ) ) _ ^ £ 2R1 \ f> ^  ,11 JJ3
> *(«) M  .
> 1« I {(1 +  V I -  +«?) ) -  ^  M >
for a suitable /c(5) > 1. The last inequality follows because x  > So], and hence for 
a suitable 6  < 1
e > 6 (0 ], — a],)
r R 2 I  4 a? o l, . ~7
2 . Proof of Claim 5:
We know from the steady state equation (2 .2) that for o2p =  cPp (A),a£ (A)
° p = ii?  (a * ° ° +  ^ + ° p )2ff*) ■
Calculating the derivatives with respect to A on both sides and evaluating at A =  0 
we obtain
(A1) | f ( 4 ) | A = o  =  j p { 2 a 2o% + 2 o J y ( a f  +  4 ) < r ’ } | ^ ( y  (<7* + < ^ ) ) , A=0 .
Observe first that a 2 (0) =  0. In order to calculate the derivative on the second 
side, decompose again in the adverse selection component and the risk bearing 
component:
+ « * ))!» -. =  ( y  W  + < * )  - « . ) , » - «  +  | f ( « . ) i * - .  •
For notational convenience define
2  i 2y = a] + a2 .
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As in the proof of Claim 5 of chapter 3 we calculate both derivatives on the right 
hand side.
(A 2)
5 a  («•>■*- = aA(4 ) “^ r „ =0+
^-{(<7# + 2y)y2 ^ ( a ^ )  -  (al +  y)y(a ly  + 2 y -^ (a 2P ) ) } | *=0
=  -  J ;K2 | r K )  +  W  +  »W }i»-odA y ix=0 y dA
( A 3 )  ~  a \  \ a P / | a  =  o3A ' ' ' ' |A=U y | i=0
Adding both terms gives
(A4) + ° p » ^ °  =  f x K ) »=° + { $ i { 1 ~  w  + !^ > '* = °
Substituting (A4) in (Al) gives
f r J x W ) , * - .  =  2W  +  * M |[ W  k X  +  7 ( 1  -  W  +  »)«2 )}i*-.
Solving this equation for (cr2p ) gives
f i s !  ■ 2 <r |+y  2 -  2(a2e +  y)a2x
( )  a x (  p ) | a = o  .  y  r ? - 2 a * ( a l + y ) a l ^ 0 ’
Now observe that
2  a2
(R2 -  2a2 (a2 + y)a2)|»=0 =  R? (1 -  — al(a l + a f  +  a2 )) |A=0
-  R2( y l -  ^ T ~ )  for °% - ap (x )
(A6)
R i ( V ^ ^ ] f o r ° p ~ p ^
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We want to show that
and
^ ( d > M ) n = o  > °
^ ( £ p  W )|i=o •
Both inequalities follow from
2a2 fx2
(2 - 2  o3 (ctJ +  y)cr*) |*=0 = 2 -  R 2 +  # * ( 1 ---------------- +<7‘ + ^ ) ) | » = o
2 -  R 2 -  R2 ( y l  - ) for 4  =  M
I 4 Q? (7^
(A7) 2 -  f?2 + iE2 (y  1 ------ ^ - )  for aP =  aP (A)
If R = 1 we have in both cases that
(2 - 2a2(a2 + y)o2x),A=0 > 0  .
To calculate the risk premia, we substitute (A5) in (A3) to obtain 
d f- \ _  2 2 °1 +  V 2 -  R 2
(A8) g AM |* = o  y  j p  _  2a2(a  ^ +  y)o*  |A=0 '
R  =  1 implies 2 — R 2 > 0  and hence risk premia increase in the low volatility 
equilibrium and decrease in the high volatility equilibrium.
In the case A =  1 the calculations are analogous.
3. Proof of Claim 6 :
We know from (A7) in the proof of Claim 5 that
(2 - 2 a2(a2 + y)cr2)ix = 0 > 2  -  R 2
> 0 for R < y/2 ,
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and hence price volatility always increases for R < y/2. For R > y/2 set a\ =  0  in 
(A7). Then
(2 -  2a2 {al +  y)o£)|A = o =  2 -  R 2 + R 2
> 0  .
By continuity price volatility increases for all a 2 sufficiently small. Finally, set 
a2x = in (A7) and
(2 - 2 a2(al + y)o2x)|A = 0 =  2 -  R 2
< 0  .
By continuity price volatility decreases for all o2 sufficiently high.
Risk premia are falling for R > \ / 2 , because of (A8) in the proof of Claim 5.
4. Proof of Claim 7:
For A =  0 we have
E(Uu ) = 1 - J  o ] + o * + o \ (
a] + o* + <7% (0) +  (a2 +  <x2 +  a \ (0))2<r2 
/  1 K 2 + a 2 + a 2 (0 ))2 x2 \
V 2 a l  +  a l  +  a l  (0) +  (a2 +  a2 + a 2p  (0))2a2 )
and for A =  1
e (u„ ) = i - i  < £ ± ° m
V  ° i  +  ° \  W  +  (a ? +  a \
(  1 (a2l + a2p (l))2x2 \
v 2 a l+ o % (l)  + ( o l+ o 2p {l))2o l )
Since for R  — 1 and ap =  ap , a2p
a2P (1) =  a2p (0) +  a 2 ,
both expressions are equal.
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For R >  1 one has to show that
 1   1________
1 + (og + <7? + 2* (0))og < 1 +  (2? + a% (l))og
og +  g? +  gp (0) +  gp (1)
1 + (og + og + Op (0))og 1 +  (og +  og (l))<i
 1   1________
i  +  K 2 +  (o )M  > i  +  (»? +
og + og +  al  (0) of +  ffg (1)
1 + (<*g + o\ +  »p (0))og 1 +  (of +  og (l))og
All inequalities follow by a derivation with respect to <rj.
5. Welfare comparison of section 3.5:
We want to show that
( 1  (og+ o?)2 \  /  1 («? +  £ ) ’
V 8 (og +  og +  (R -  l)e)* J  1 +  i  +  X)c)3
This follows from the observation that
dR f(R )  +  (R -  l)c vv U R  
and by setting f(R )  =
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o2PFigure 1
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